


MEASURING LAND REFORM

**Supplement to
The Statistical Abstract
of Latin America**



by
James W. Wilkie

With a Special Map and Graph Series on Land Reform
by Richard W. Wilkie and John Marti

UCLA Latin American Center
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Supplement 3 (1974) to the Statistical Abstract of Latin America

by

James W. Wilkie

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In contrast to *Measuring Land Reform*, which concerns the generation of "time-series data" (i.e., data listed on a year-by-year or period-by-period basis), this work is concerned with presenting and testing available time-series data needed for reconceptualizing and analyzing the informational infrastructure in which twentieth-century decisions of national policy are made. Although the six essays of Part I (which stand as originally written for six different publications) illustrate statistical themes that give the past an immediate importance for those who seek to understand the present and/or plan for the future, Professor Wilkie's introductory and closing sections explore problems and possibilities for developing the extended use of historical statistics. Part I pursues the following topics: politico-social economy, urbanization, church-state relations, dependency since the 1930s, the public sector, and comparative governmental budgets.

Part II includes yearly time-series data for each of the twenty Latin American countries with regard to population statistics since 1900, education enrollments since 1930, food and agricultural production since 1952, energy supplies since 1929, inflation since 1929, exchange rates since 1915, balance of payments since 1956, exports and imports since 1916, major trading partners since 1915, U.S. assistance to Latin America since 1946, and

economic change since 1950. Because data in Part II are presented simply to exemplify the kinds of statistics we need to develop in order to understand the bottlenecks in state planning and state action, data in this section are not generally analyzed. But since the intent of this work is to place historical statistics into one important perspective, the range and problems of data presented in the volume is sampled in the Introduction and Afterword. Part III, also is designed to further illustrate the complex meaning in one type of data (Gross National Product) presented in Part II.

Part III offers a brief case study in the use of historical statistics to understand outcomes of national policy in an international sphere. Figures on economic growth in Latin America are analyzed in relation to the importance of United States policy, particularly with regard to the historical role of the Alliance for Progress. Professor Wilkie's purpose is to show how available time-series data can help us to test such commonly accepted assumptions as the following: that the economic gap between the United States and Latin America is widening, and that the Alliance for Progress failed, mainly because of U.S. policy.

In his Afterword, the author reflects on the meaning of Part I in the perspective of recent events as well as on data presented in Parts II and III. Special attention is devoted to Mexico, Costa Rica, Venezuela, and Bolivia where the author has conducted extensive field research. Price, softbound, \$15

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
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México Visto en el Siglo XX: Entrevistas de Historia Oral (1969), Coauthored with Edna Monzón de Wilkie.

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Measuring Land Reform

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DEDICATION

THIS VOLUME IS DEDICATED TO LYLE C. BROWN AND ALBERT L. MICHAELS, COLLEAGUES AND FRIENDS IN MANY RESEARCH ENDEAVORS.

FOREWORD

by

Kenneth Ruddle, Editor
Supplement Series, *Statistical Abstract of Latin America*

This book by Professor James W. Wilkie offers a case study in applied historical statistics. In contrast with his volume on *Statistics and National Policy*, where available historical statistics provide the basis for interpretation, this study concerns the development of time-series data in order to analyze national problems. In this case, problems arise from the various ways in which statistics are interpreted particularly as a result of governmental self-deception. Statistics on land reform (Chapter 1) are examined in order to provide insights into the nature of data that interact with policy. Measurement of progress in the redistribution of Bolivian and Venezuelan land titles (Chapters 2 and 3) is concerned with inflated statistics and their impact on national policy (Chapter 4).

Particularly noteworthy is Professor Wilkie's generation of some of the first "hard data" available on Latin American land reform. As Tables 1 and 2 show, by the end of the 1960s Bolivia and Venezuela had carried out some of the most extensive programs of land-title redistribution in Latin America,[†] being exceeded in activity only by the Mexican program begun decades earlier. By concentrating on the South American experience for which time-series data can be analyzed for at least ten years,^{††} he has attempted to outline the problem of undertaking land reform during the last two decades. If other countries expect to learn from the experience of their neighbors as they begin to undertake land reform, they must not only know what experience has been, but they must also have a method of evaluating the tempo of land reform.

The problem in land reform, then, is seen as one of education, but one that is outside the usual educational terms. Leaders as well as the general populace must learn to think of land reform problems in terms of complexity and "alternative realities."

Professor Wilkie also makes a distinction between "land reform" (here defined as title distribution) and "agricultural reform" (including such broadly defined activities as extension of education, credit, and irrigation facilities to rural populations. Both terms are subsumed under the concept of "agrarian reform," but the latter involves technological needs and advances which often are predicated upon the very difficult and/or problematic political act of successfully undertaking redistribution of land titles. Although the author of this book does not necessarily favor (a) land reform, (b) agricultural reform, or (c) "agrarian revolution" (like that undertaken in Cuba), one of his basic assumptions is that objective means of measurement need to be developed so that process of change may be understood, especially for land reform which has become so prevalent in all of Latin America, and where data are available for analyses.

K. R.
Los Angeles
July, 1974

[†]Cuba is omitted from Dr. Wilkie's analyses, because, since 1963, it has not redistributed land titles to its citizens, but has created state farms administered by the Instituto Nacional de la Reforma Agraria: see United Nations, *Progress in Land Reform: Fourth Report* (New York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1966), pp. 78-79.

^{††}The census bases for Bolivia and Venezuela are 1950 and 1961, respectively, the latest years for which full agricultural as well as population census data were available at the time of writing in 1973. Other data bases and time-series carry through about 1970.

PREFACE

The purpose of this study in applied historical statistics is several-fold. First, we are interested in examining available data on the state of Latin America and reform by 1969, data that will form the basis for understanding redistribution of lands beyond the 1960s. Second, in investigating the cases of Bolivia and Venezuela, we may see to what extent published figures are reliable, the development of the time-series data serving as a test of meaning in long-term policy as well as a test for confidence in statistics generated from year to year. Third, in undertaking the above two types of analysis, we may see how alternative views of reality at once reveal difficulties in the process of land reform as well as political and bureaucratic rigidities in the face of these problems. In suggesting the complexities of the land process, some crucial issues arise. Given alternative views of the data, what are some consequent policy dilemmas? How may it be possible to overcome the inertia of established policy in order to continually take advantage of experience?

Although many of those who make and many who implement policy believe that if land reform is accompanied or followed by rural educational programs, rural peoples may be encouraged not to engage in urbanward migration, I suggest here no rural program can be successful without providing for continuing education of the land reformers themselves. This requires an alternative to formal education in which policymakers and policy implementers are encouraged to learn through basic research, especially utilizing data to question their own activities.

I am indebted to many persons for aid in completing this study, especially Edna Monzón de Wilkie for fieldwork assistance in Bolivia and Venezuela. Gratitude is expressed to Lyle C. Brown (Baylor University) for editorial consultation and to Albert L. Michaels (State University of New York, Buffalo) for stimulating interest in Bolivia. The special map and graph series was prepared under the direction of Richard W. Wilkie, Associate Professor of Geography at the University of Massachusetts in Amherst and Cartographer of the *UCLA Statistical Abstract of Latin America*.

Thanks are due for help in La Paz and Caracas to Carlos Serrate Reich, Roberto Gumucio Améstegui, Celso Reyes Patiño, Luis Llano Saavedra, Alex Valdivia, Inga Steinworth de Goetz, Ricardo Alezones, Eddie Rivas Alcalá, Juan Guevara, Alfredo Anzola, George Hall, Antonio Merchán C., Humberto Almao Tovar, José Páez Celis, Humberto and Yeyén Bermúdez, Luisa Elena de Castro, Ricardo Salas H., Luisa Bustillos G., and, especially Mauricio Báez, hijo.

Scholars of assistance in the United States include Philip B. Taylor, Jr., John V. Lombardi, David J. Myers, Ralph B. Edfelt, Kenneth L. Karst, and John Bielefeldt. Ever helpful Johannes Wilbert suggested the Venezuelan dimension to this book. And Waldo W. Wilkie prepared the tables.

Funding for research and writing to develop the work included in this volume was provided by different sources at various points in time: Initial research for this project was undertaken during 1966-1967 in Bolivia with a grant from Ohio State University. Funds for research in Venezuela during 1970 were supplied by UCLA's Latin America Center (under a 211[d] institutional development grant to UCLA from the U.S. Agency for International Development); and a grant to UCLA from the Creole Foundation during 1969-1970 not only supplied travel funds but also permitted the employment at UCLA of John C. Super (now University of West Virginia) as a research assistant. Funds from the Historical Research Foundation facilitated preparation of the map and graph series. Needless to say, none of these funding agencies are responsible for the information and conclusions presented in this work.

J.W.W.
Los Angeles
August, 1974

LIST OF SYMBOLS†

Symbol	Definition	
*	Change in source and/or methodology	
**	Category not in existence or not applicable	
#	Magnitude zero, negligible, or less than unit employed, <i>e.g.</i> , less than .05, less than 500,000	
—	Data not available, or no data	
† @ &	Special explanations in table notes	
(E)		Data estimated (or partly estimated) in source of data, <i>e.g.</i> 150 (E)
(W)		Data calculated or derived from original source by Wilkie, <i>e.g.</i> , 150 (W)
(P)	Preliminary data, <i>e.g.</i> , 150 (P)	
(1940)	Published for (not necessarily in) this year	
8:1 (1940)	Volume, issue, and publication date	

†In all tables detail may not add to totals because of rounding. The amount "billions" equals thousands of millions.

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by

Richard W. Wilkie and John Marti
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AD	Acción Democrática
AID	Agency for International Development; same as USAID
BAP	Banco Agrícola y Pecuario (Venezuela)
CENDES	Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo, Universidad Central de Venezuela
CIDA	Comité Interamericano del Desarrollo Agrícola
COPEI	Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente (Venezuela)
Council	Consejo Nacional de Reforma Agraria (Bolivia)
ECLA	Economic Commission for Latin America (U.N.)
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization (U.N.)
FCV	Federación Campesina de Venezuela
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IAN	Instituto Nacional Agrario (Venezuela)
INCORA	Instituto Colombiano de la Reforma Agraria
ITIC	Instituto Técnico de Inmigración y Colonización (Venezuela)
MNR	Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario
OAS	Organization of American States; same as OEA
OEA	Organización de Estados Americanos; same as OAS
† <i>SNP</i>	<i>Statistics and National Policy, e.g., SNP-X:2</i> refers to Chapter 10, Table 2.
SNRA	Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria (Bolivia)
U.N.	United Nations
U.S.	United States
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development; same as AID

†James W. Wilkie, *Statistics and National Policy* (Los Angeles: *Supplement to the Statistical Abstract of Latin America*, Latin American Center, University of California, 1974), volume 3 in this series here cited as *SNP*.

CHAPTER 1

1: INTRODUCTION: LATIN AMERICA

Before the Bolivian land reform¹ program that began in 1953, only the Mexican Revolution after 1910 had attempted massive distribution of land titles to the peasant in twentieth-century Latin America.² Recently, however, most Latin American countries have undertaken land reform programs with varying degrees of intensity, beginning with the Venezuelan "Democratic Revolution"³ in 1958 and the Cuban Revolution in 1959.

In order to appreciate the magnitude of legislation on land reform stimulated especially by the Cuban Revolution and by the 1961 Charter of Punta del Este, it is interesting to note that between 1960 and 1964 twelve countries enacted land reform measures: Brazil (1964), Chile (1962), Colombia (1961), Costa Rica (1962), Dominican Republic (1962), Ecuador (1964), Guatemala (1962), Honduras (1963), Nicaragua (1963), Panama (1962), Paraguay (1963), and Peru

(1964). As a UN report has noted with regard to these reforms, certain traditional features are common: "Their provisions are, for the most part, permissive rather than mandatory; they provide a framework for land redistribution, but the extent to which it will actually be carried out depends on the will of the Government and the size of the resources it decides from time to time to make available."⁴

Given this view, perhaps it is surprising that in most studies of Latin American land reform, investigation has tended to concentrate upon needs, goals, and possible outcomes of reform rather than upon an assessment of the actual process and tempo of title redistribution.⁵ Consultation of Thomas Carroll's bibliography of land tenure and land reform (1965) reveals a lack of published statistical data necessary to gauge the rate of land reform activity;⁶ unfortunately, this situation remains little changed. Aside from a few

¹As Thomas F. Carroll has noted: "The concept of land reform is itself a controversial and semantically intriguing topic. Its narrowest and traditional meaning confines it to land distribution. A broader view includes in it other related changes in agricultural institutions, such as credit, taxation, rents, cooperatives, etc. The widest interpretation makes land reform practically synonymous with all agricultural improvement measures—better seeds, price policies, irrigation, research, mechanization, etc." Carroll notes that he is of the opinion that land tenure is the central problem in land reform and agrees with the view put forward by Doreen Warriner (see *Land Reform in Principle and Practice* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969]) that the use of the term "land reform" in this wide sense (which includes a change in all agrarian institutions) confuses the real issues because the redistribution of land title is a very difficult change to carry through, far more difficult and controversial than development of technical advances in agricultural institutions. See Carroll, "The Land Reform Issue in Latin America," in Albert O. Hirschman (ed.), *Latin American Issues: Essays and Comments* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), p. 161.

Although T. Lynn Smith (ed.) implicitly takes a different view from that expressed above by noting in his *Agrarian Reform in Latin America* (New York: Knopf, 1965), pp. 7–13, that the titles in Spanish of "agrarian reform" agencies should not be translated into English as "land reform" agencies, we may note that these agencies seldom live up to the grandiose goals implied in their names. Thus, the Bolivian Consejo Nacional de Reforma Agraria and the Venezuelan Instituto Agrario Nacional, for example, here are translated as Land Reform Council and Land Reform Institute, respectively, because in effect they have been interested and involved only in land title redistribution.

²Land reform programs resulting in very limited success were attempted in Colombia (1936), Paraguay (1939), Venezuela (1948), and Guatemala (1952). See Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Agrarian Reform in Latin America* (Oxford: Chatham House Memoranda, Oxford University Press, 1962).

³The Venezuelan concept of "Democratic Revolution" is discussed by Robert J. Alexander in his *The Venezuelan Democratic Revolution; A Profile of the Regime of Rómulo Betancourt* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1964).

⁴United Nations, *Progress in Land Reform: Fourth Report* (New York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1966), p. 6. See also United Nations, *Progress in Land Reform: Third Report* (New York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1962), pp. 36–37.

⁵A UN agency report has justified the need for land redistribution in Latin America as follows: "In recent years, the greatest centre of active planning for land redistribution has been Latin America. It is also the area where the need seems most pressing. In a good many countries a few thousand, or even a few hundred, owners have great estates which occupy over half the land area, while 80 or 90 per cent of the farmers have small holdings of a few hectares covering no more than 5 per cent of the land. Many of them, at that, have only squatter status and live in constant danger of eviction, but even they are generally better off than the landless labourers." See United Nations, *Progress in Land Reform: Fourth Report*, p. 5.

⁶Thomas Carroll, *Land Tenure and Land Reform in Latin America; A Selective Annotated Bibliography* (2d ed.; Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, 1965).

exceptional studies that incorporate title data,⁷ students of the process of Latin American land redistribution have scant material with which to work; and, even in these cases, complete figures are neither given by subnational units for various periods nor interpreted for purposes of political analysis.

In seeking to rectify the problem, this study examines available data compiled by the land reform agencies of two South American countries in order to suggest various ways of measuring activity and its meaning. As shown in the following pages, there is no "reality" to be found in investigating the land reform process; rather there are alternative realities, depending upon measurements designed to ask various questions about the status of activity.

Since major change in land tenure often has been an outgrowth of revolution, many students of Latin America who seek information on land reform are explicitly or implicitly interested in political aspects of land reform. A corollary of this interest involves a crucial question as to whether or not the land distribution rate itself constitutes reform or revolution. In either case one must know how many families have benefitted from government action as well as how much land has been distributed.

Comparative Data for Latin America, 1916 – 1969

Table 1 shows the measurement of cumulative land reform data for Latin America as of 1969. Cuba is omitted because the Castro regime has nationalized lands and created state farms administered by its National Agrarian Reform Institute.⁸ Comparative data for the most massive programs to redistribute land surface to the peasantry are supplied from my own research in Bolivia, Venezuela, and Mexico. Other data are taken from reports of the Social Progress Trust Fund for Latin America. These reports were prepared by the Inter-American Development Bank, the agency charged with gauging development under the Charter of the Alliance for Progress. Although this data has

limitations, as noted in Table 1, it does provide a relatively standard reporting of figures as of recent date; hence it is a unique source for general comparison.

Data in Table 1 are quite revealing. By the end of the 1960s, Mexico, Bolivia and Venezuela had distributed more land to more persons than most of their nonrevolutionary neighbors that had also undertaken land reform. In only two other countries had land reform been linked importantly to revolutionary political activity; Peru and Guatemala. With regard to the former, apparently about 40 to 50 per cent of land reform activity in the 1961–1969 period took place after General Juan Velasco Alvarado initiated rapid changes in October, 1968. In the latter case, Guatemala's activity since the downfall of Jacobo Arbenz in 1954 evidently has been dedicated almost exclusively to (a) the confirmation of existing titles and (b) opening of new lands in government-sponsored programs (see Table 4).

Examination of Table 1 shows that Argentina, El Salvador, Uruguay, and Haiti have not undertaken land reform, although the first three have developed colonization and settlement programs for new lands (see Table 4). Haiti has undertaken no land-tenure consolidation programs (under cooperative or communal terms, for example), even though agricultural productivity is low because of minute land holdings into which the entire country was broken during the nineteenth century.⁹

That Costa Rica has engaged in land reform may seem strange since traditional views see the country as an agrarian democracy growing out of a colonial experience in which no one has monopolized lands and in which each peasant has possessed his own plot of land. That interpretation has been challenged recently by a number of reformers, including Father Benjamín Núñez, a leader of the Costa Rican democratic left.¹⁰ As an outgrowth of research on the land tenure problem, since 1962 the Institute of Land and Colonization has attempted to redress unbalanced land distribution in which .6 per cent of the agricultural holdings cover

⁷For example see the following three works sponsored by the Comité Interamericano del Desarrollo Agrícola (CIDA) and the following national agencies: [1] Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo, Universidad Central de Venezuela, *La Reforma Agraria en Venezuela: Versión Preliminar* (9 vols.; Caracas, 1968–); this study hereinafter is referred to as authored by CENDES. [2] Bolivia, Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria, *Reforma Agraria en Bolivia* (2 vols.; La Paz, 1970–); this study is hereinafter referred to as authored by SNRA. [3] Centro de Investigaciones Agrarias, *Estructura Agraria y Desarrollo Agrícola en México* (3 vols.; Mexico City, 1970). Because these CIDA-sponsored works are interested in agricultural development, however, often they generally are only tangentially interested in title distribution. CIDA members include the OAS, FAO, ECLA, Inter-American Development Bank, and the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences.

⁸See Warriner, *Land Reform in Principle and Practice*, p. 252.

⁹Land cultivation in Haiti has been described as involving extremely small tracts: "According to the 1950 Census, holdings of over 26 hectares represented barely .2 per cent of all farms and occupied 70 per cent of cultivated land. Despite this extreme fragmentation, official estimates are that 102,202 rural families lacked their own land in 1968." See Inter-American Development Bank, Social Progress Trust Fund, *Socio-Economic Progress in Latin America, Annual Report* (1969), p. 363.

¹⁰Compare Alberto Baeza Flores, *La Lucha Sin Fin (Costa Rica: Una Democracia que Habla Español)* [México, D.F.: Costa-Amic, 1969], p. 19; and James W. Wilkie, Albert L. Michaels, and Edna M. Wilkie, Oral History Interviews with Padre Benjamín Núñez, Columbus, Ohio, April 21–22, 1968. For research on the land tenure problem, see, for example, Juan Manuel Salazar, "Tierra y Colonización en Costa Rica," San José: Licenciatura en ciencias económicas y sociales, Universidad de Costa Rica, 1962.

TABLE 1

^aCumulative Land Reform Data for Latin America, 1969
^b(Excludes Colonization and Land Settlement)

Country	Initiation of Program	Month in 1969 of Cumulative Results	Number of Families Benefitted	Number of Hectares Distributed or Confirmed
Bolivia	1955	September	208 181	9 740 681
Brazil	1964	^e March	46 457	957 106
Chile	1965	September	15 800	2 093 300
Colombia	1961	^{e,f} September	91 937	2 832 312
Costa Rica	1963	September	3 889	60 055
Dominican Republic	1963	October	9 717	46 082
Ecuador	1964	^e December	27 857	152 115
Guatemala	1955	December	^g 26 500	^g 166 734
Honduras	1963	December	5 843	90 642
México	1916	^h August	2 525 811	59 413 656
Nicaragua	1964	July	8 117	357 989
Panamá	1963	September	2 594	37 339
Paraguay	1963	—	i#	i#
Perú	1961	^{e,j} December	31 600	850 522
^b Venezuela	1959	December	117 286	4 605 594

^aExcept for Bolivia, Mexico and Venezuela, source is not always clear as to whether for provisional or definitive title; in the first two countries, data are definitive, and in the last they are provisional. Figures for Bolivia, Mexico, and Venezuela are unrevised, revised by the government, and revised by independent investigators, respectively. Data are adjusted for comparability where possible; but in regard to Bolivia and Mexico, for example, see note 47, below.

^bAlthough distinction between land reform and colonization is not always clear, this table excludes identifiable colonization programs because the opening of previously inaccessible lands differs from distributing title of already occupied holdings. The major exception is Venezuela where distinction between land reform and colonization is not made in the data, but this is no problem to date since the latter activity has been minimal. For data on colonization, see Table 4.

^cNot necessarily the same as date of enabling legislation.

^d1 hectare = 2.471 acres. Distinction between land "distributed" and "confirmed" is not always clear, as in Ecuador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, for example, where much activity seems to have involved confirmation of existing titles.

^eIncludes activity by private owners under officially sponsored or registered programs.

^fIncludes confirmation of titles involving 84 500 families and 2 709 796 hectares.

^gGuatemala's land laws of 1956 and 1962 mainly have involved confirmation of existing titles and colonization and land settlement. See Table 4. Cf. Vol. VII of the AID/Washington, *Spring Review of Land Reform*, cited in sources below.

^hIncludes confirmation of titles involving 108 184 families and 6 795 570 hectares.

ⁱParaguay's program has concentrated on land settlement; see Table 4.

^jIncludes confirmation of titles involving 8 600 families and 154 437 hectares; also includes titles processed by the government of General Juan Velasco Alvarado after October, 1968, involving 12 631 families and 473 thousand hectares. See Antonio García, "Perú: Una Reforma Agraria Radical," *Comerico Exterior* (México, D.F.), May, 1970, pp. 390-393.

Sources: Land reform agencies of Bolivia, Mexico, and Venezuela; Inter-American Development Bank, Social Progress Trust Fund, *Socio-Economic Progress in Latin America, Annual Report* (1968), (1969), and (1970); Rony S. Alvarado Pinetta, *Transformación Agraria en Guatemala, [1955-1963]* (N.p.: [Gobierno de Guatemala], n.d.), pp. 8, 15, and AID/Washington, *Spring Review of Land Reform*, Vol. VI: *Land Reform in Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru* (1970) p. 47 of Ecuador study. See also Tables 8 and 21, below. Cf. Organización de los Estados Americanos (OEA), *El Desarrollo de América Latina y la Alianza para el Progreso* (Washington, D.C.: Consejo Interamericano y Social, 1973), p. 366.

about one-third of the exploited land.¹¹ Nevertheless, as long as many Costa Ricans like President José Figueres (elected for the term 1970–1974) are convinced that Costa Rica's land distribution remains relatively balanced,¹² activities of the land reform institute will remain token in nature.

The case of the Dominican Republic is interesting because as a result of the long rule of the dictator Rafael Trujillo (1930–1961), it is estimated he and his family came to control about 60 per cent of the country's land. With the fall of Trujillo in 1961, the land was taken over by the government without compensation to the Trujillo family; and during the 1962 election campaign the manner of distributing this land became an important issue. Juan Bosch's victorious Partido Revolucionario Dominicano was pledged to a general redistribution of national lands to the small peasant, but the subsequent civil war (1965) and internal disorganization slowed this process, and this trouble helps to explain a relatively low cumulative level of activity in land reform.¹³

As seen in Table 1, some countries have devoted considerable energy to confirmation of land titles. Thus, for example, Colombia, Mexico, and Nicaragua have attempted to legitimize certain traditional or squatter holdings on private or public lands. Since the peasant is not apt to invest much capital or labor in lands from which he may be expelled at any moment by persons with venerable title or specially acquired newer title, confirmation of rights is vital. Often, confirmation of title is indistinguishable from land distribution—especially when, for example, agricultural laborers receive title to lands which traditionally they worked as plots assigned to them for their own use on larger estates. Although in Mexico confirmation of title has won wide approval, Colombia's confirmation program has resulted in much unrest. The difference between the acceptance of confirmation projects in the two countries would appear to lie in the fact that

Mexico has distributed great amounts of land to more than 2 million heads of family whereas in late 1971 Colombia's Minister of Agriculture, Hernán Jaramillo Ocampo, termed his country's land reform program a "disaster" in which only 198 300 hectares had been distributed to 8 000 heads of family.¹⁴ In short, Mexico's confirmation of title, which has been intended to save traditional communal holdings (*ejidos*) from encroachment by unscrupulous persons, has been successful because it is part of a larger program.

Beneficiaries of Latin American land reform usually are not permitted to sell or otherwise dispose of the holdings that they have received unless they gain governmental authorization. Under Venezuelan law, title may be transferred only after the land reform agency has determined that the rights of other potential beneficiaries are protected. The Bolivian government, during the first eight years of reform, did not so regulate beneficiaries—apparently because the problem was obscured by the rush of other revolutionary events. In Mexico, once title is confirmed or distributed to lands in communal form, title is held by the community, which then allots holdings on the basis of need. Under the land reform laws of most Latin American countries, when land is abandoned or when the occupants die without closely related heirs, land title reverts to the government, if not to the community. Thus, the total number of beneficiaries is constantly expanding, even though original beneficiaries may have given up title or died. Gross expansion in the number of accumulated beneficiaries and number of hectares distributed reveals one reality.

For comparative purposes, it is necessary also to take into account other kinds of realities in order to know how much has been accomplished in countries of varying sizes. Table 2 and Figure 1-1 present two cumulative measures as of 1969: first, the percentage of economically active males employed in agriculture who had received land; and, second, the percentage of

¹¹Inter-American Development Bank, Social Progress Trust Fund, *Annual Report* (1965), p. 271. Figures are for 1963.

¹²For the Figueres views, see James W. Wilkie, Albert L. Michaels, and Edna M. Wilkie, Oral History Interviews with José Figueres, Columbus, Ohio, March 28–29, 1968. Figueres and Núñez belong to the same political party.

In 1963, 59 per cent of Costa Rica's exploited land was in holdings of less than 345 hectares. See data in Inter-American Development Bank, Social Progress Trust Fund, *Annual Report* (1965), p. 271.

¹³See Robert J. Alexander, "Agrarian Reform in Latin America," *Journal of Economic History* 23 (1963), pp. 559–573. According to the *Times of the Americas*, September 27, 1972: by 1972 President Joaquín Balaguer was attempting with difficulty to put into operation a series of land reform laws by which the state would become the owner of most rice farms and large properties still in private hands, prohibiting large estates and creating mechanisms to facilitate proceedings for the land distribution.

¹⁴*Times of the Americas*, September 29, 1971. By 1973 the Colombian government was reforming the land reform (see *ibid.*, March 21, 1973); in the meantime, Penny Lernoux was reporting "Landowners have evicted 400 000 tenant farmers during the last three years . . . The large landowners justify their current eviction policy on the grounds that the Agrarian Reform Institute (INCORA) is less likely to expropriate estates if there are no land-hungry tenants around. But in fact, INCORA has expropriated very few farms, tenants or no, in its 12-year existence because of political and economic pressures. Although INCORA is legally authorized to expropriate underfarmed estates, most landowners have been able to circumvent the law through political connections or the local courts, where the judge frequently is a relation of the contesting landowner. Moreover, the process of expropriation and reallocation of land is so bound up in red tape that a minimum of three years is necessary to complete all the 463 procedures. That is why INCORA has expropriated only 1 750 acres since 1970. In any case, 95.7 percent of the 8.1 million acres distributed by INCORA since 1961 came from the public domain. INCORA simply provided the titles for land that was already occupied by colonists;" see *ibid.*, October 17, 1973.

TABLE 2
Cumulative Measures of Latin American Land Reform, 1969

Country	Economically Active Males Employed in ^a Agriculture, ^b 1960	Per Cent Benefitted ^c by 1969	Hectares Censused ^d 1960	Per Cent Distributed or Confirmed, ^e 1969
Bolivia	533 593	39.0	32 749 850	29.7
Brazil	10 523 225	.4	249 862 100	.4
Chile	638 673	2.5	^f 30 648 700	6.8
Colombia	2 311 058	4.0	27 337 800	10.4
Costa Rica	190 801	2.0	2 670 700	2.2
Dominican Republic	495 210	2.0	2 257 700	2.0
Ecuador	761 945	3.7	5 999 700	2.5
Guatemala	840 740	3.2	3 448 700	4.8
Honduras	375 517	1.6	^f 2 417 000	3.8
México	5 429 719	46.5	169 084 208	35.1
Nicaragua	268 500	3.0	3 822 800	9.4
Panamá	150 817	1.7	1 806 500	2.1
Paraguay	291 208	#	^g 17 473 500	#
Perú	1 340 483	2.4	17 722 000	4.8
Venezuela	733 320	16.0	26 002 228	17.7

^aIncludes agriculture, ranching, fishing, hunting, forestry; excludes data in Table 4.

^bExcept: 1950 for Bolivia; 1961 for Honduras, Peru, Venezuela; 1962 for Ecuador, Paraguay; 1963 for Costa Rica, Nicaragua; 1964 for Colombia, Guatemala. Minimum age varies from 6 to 15; for example, Bolivian and Venezuelan data are for age 10 and over while revised Mexican data are for age 12 and over.

^cCalculated using data for number of families benefitted given in Table 1; heads of families are assumed to be male.

^dExcept 1950 for Bolivia; 1954 for Ecuador; 1961 for Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela; 1963 for Costa Rica, Nicaragua; 1964 for Guatemala; 1965 for Chile; 1966 for Honduras. Criteria of census may vary from country to country.

^eThe percentage of hectares distributed or confirmed with title is calculated using data in Table 1.

^fPreliminary.

^gSample census.

Source: Employment data are from *América en Cifras* (1967), table 408-02; and México, Dirección General de Estadística, *Censo General de Población, 1960: Población Económicamente Activa, Rectificación a los Cuadros 25, 26, 27*, p. 1. Land census data are from *América en Cifras* (1970), Table 311-01; and from land agencies of Bolivia and Venezuela.

hectares censused which had been distributed by 1969. In the first case, it is clear that Mexico, Bolivia, and Venezuela had gone further than any other Latin American countries in benefitting the population that is eligible to receive land. On the one hand, data may be inflated because of qualifications in Table 1; but, on the other hand, figures may be low in Table 2 because the number of males economically active in agricultural pursuits includes persons well under the minimum age of eligibility to receive land.


With regard to the proportion of land distributed in the latest available agricultural census, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Mexico again were the three most important countries. Although Chile and Colombia had distributed some 2 to 3 million hectares each, for example, such lands represent only from 7 to 10 per cent of lands censused to determine the nature of ex-

ploitation. Furthermore, even though the number of beneficiaries was about six times greater in Colombia than in Chile, the percentage of males benefitted was not much different because of Colombia's larger agriculturally employed population.

A different kind of reality involves the rate of title distribution in each country. By this measurement (given in Table 3), Mexico, Bolivia, and Venezuela also retained their outstanding positions, with Mexico's yearly average rate of families benefitted being over three times that of second-place Bolivia. Although Colombia gave benefits to its population at almost the same rate as Venezuela, Chile was closest to Venezuela in yearly average number of hectares distributed.

Thus, by all measures presented thus far, only three countries stand out in amount of land reform activity by 1969; but other countries with increasing

LAND REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA BY 1969



SOURCE: TABLE 2

R. W. WILKIE / J. E. MARTI

Figure 1-1

TABLE 3

†Average Yearly Land Reform Activity in Latin America

Country	Years of Activity	Families Benefitted	Number of Hectares Distributed or Confirmed
Bolivia	15	13 879	649 379
Brazil	6	7 743	159 518
Chile	5	3 160	418 660
Colombia	9	10 215	314 701
Costa Rica	7	556	8 579
Dominican Republic	7	1 388	6 583
Ecuador	6	4 463	25 353
Guatemala	14	1 893	11 910
Honduras	7	835	12 949
México	54	46 774	1 100 253
Nicaragua	6	1 353	59 665
Panamá	7	371	5 334
Paraguay	7	#	#
Perú	9	3 511	94 502
Venezuela	11	10 662	418 690

†Excludes Table 4.

Source: Calculated from Table 1.

importance were Chile and Colombia, with Peru gaining in rate of activity only after General Juan Velasco Alvarado's ascent to power in October, 1968.¹⁵ Other measurements of the land reform process are developed for time-series data presented in the following chapters, but the above examples serve to place Bolivian and Venezuelan case studies of land reform in two South American countries within a comparative perspective.

That different terms of measurement define different aspects of land reform process may seem self-evident; nevertheless, some investigators still seek to find a single "reality." Thus in the cases of Bolivia and Venezuela, independent investigations not only have been undertaken to overcome difficulties in interpreting official data, but time series may be revised officially with the passage of years. Consequently, the problem of alternative realities is compounded by the fact that, for purposes of analysis, revised data supplants unrevised data, even though the unrevised series were important in the determination of official policy.

In theoretical terms, if we are to comprehend the historical process, it is necessary to understand perception of reality (as well as reality itself), because that perception (right or wrong) influences decisions that interact with reality to change patterns and outcomes in human affairs. If leaders think that they have distributed Z amount of land, for example, they may not feel that further activity is necessary; therefore, the consequences of such a decision can be of great influence on subsequent government-peasant relations—especially if only X amount of land has been distributed, thus causing political problems. In short, what people think happens is often as important as what actually happens, and the latter may be influenced by the former. Time-series data are important clues to understanding political decisions, even if later revised.

As is discussed below, in 1969 the Venezuelan land reform agency took a census of land tenure conditions on properties administered by the government. Officials of the agency developed the census on the

¹⁵Chilean land reform, which was troubled by "land invasions" under the Allende government (1970–1973), now has a questionable future. Although the military government has promised to continue reform, it also has promised to return to their former owners all lands confiscated illegally; see *Times of the Americas*, January 9, 1974 and October 31, 1973, respectively. The latter issue notes that between 1965 and August 1973 over twelve million hectares were expropriated under the land reform program.

Peru's military government plans to expropriate nearly five million hectares of land between 1969 and 1972 and planned to expropriate an additional four million hectares during 1973 and 1974, with goals calling for transfer of about eleven million hectares by 1975; see *Times of the Americas*, March 14, 1973.

For discussion of land reform in Chile and Peru during the 1960s, see James F. Petras and Robert LaPorte, Jr., *Cultivating Revolution, The United States and Agrarian Reform in Latin America* (New York: Vintage, 1971).

assumption that they need a true picture with which they may make improved decisions concerning the conduct of land reform. It is my view, however, that other realities are equally important: not only must the government know (a) how many persons hold land at any moment, but also (b) how many persons have been granted provisional title with accompanying hopes of benefitting from the agrarian reform, (c) how many have been granted final title, and (d) how many have abandoned their title. As is shown in some detail these factors are alternative realities of land reform and they are significant in their own right, especially in relation to subnational political units and presidential politics.

Colonization and Land Settlement

One important aspect of agrarian reform which has been omitted above, and which is discussed only tangentially in this study, involves colonization and

land settlement. Such programs (see Table 4) have been excluded from measurement in order to make the distinction between title distribution for (a) traditionally owned lands and (b) newly opened lands. In the former case, division of an estate's land among its workers or the award of titles to make legitimate the de facto holdings on private and public land involves programs intended to create rural stability as well as to encourage normal credit and investment operations. In the latter case, development of new lands to alleviate rural instability involves transfer of peasants to previously unopened and inaccessible areas, often in different climatic zones.

Although both redistribution of existing titles and development of titles for virgin lands involve costly processes, the latter clearly is more expensive since facilities have to be provided in the new region and a new pattern of life must be established. Thus Craig L. Dozier has written:

TABLE 4

^aLand Colonization and Settlement in Latin America

Country	Cumulative Period (month/year)	Month in 1968-1969 of Cumulative Results	Number of Families Benefitted	Number of Hectares Settled
Argentina	1940-1968	—	9 139	898 652
Bolivia	1964-1969	June	64 500	215 864
Colombia	1961-1969	September	7 351	1 133 000
Costa Rica	1963-1969	September	255	7 000
Ecuador	1964-1969	August	9 000	327 551
El Salvador	1952-1969	October	^b 4 628	13 870
Guatemala	^c 1955-1968	December	27 614	171 908
Honduras	1968-1969	September	900	10 895
México	1922-1969	August	66 332	5 284 581
Nicaragua	1964-1969	August	3 320	98 859
Panamá	1963-1969	—	1 491	25 979
Paraguay	1963-1969	September	23 832	1 205 121
Perú	1961-1969	December	4 700	84 166
Uruguay	1948-1969	November	900	80 000
Venezuela	1959-1969	September	^d #	^d #

^aInvolves the opening of new lands (in contrast with distribution of title to already occupied holdings given in Tables 1, 2, and 3). Includes varying degrees of official action in opening new lands; data, for example, may include "spontaneous settlements" facilitated by government road-building programs (as in Bolivia) or lands opened by the government for colonization but not actually settled (as in Colombia). Such differences make data comparison problematical.

^bNo data for 1967 given in source.

^cIncluding legalization of titles to land distributed after the land reform law of 1952 and before the Agrarian Transformation Law of 1962. According to Alvarado Pinetta, *Transformación Agraria en Guatemala*, pp. 15-32, the land reform agency granted titles through 1962 to 24 147 families in the amount of 157 527 hectares.

^dMinimal; see Table 1, note b.

Source: See Table 1. For bibliography, see Land Tenure Center, *Colonization and Settlement: A Bibliography* (Madison: mimeo., 1969).

Although virtually empty spaces abound in Latin America, one cannot regard them as an unqualified asset, a ready and waiting solution. Although the effectively used lands constitute a surprisingly small percentage of the total area, they are the only good lands that could be made productive without unusual difficulty and cost in one form or another. The continent has been well explored—if not well exploited—and there are no agricultural El Dorado's waiting to be discovered. The leftovers are mainly subhumid areas which would require irrigation and tropical forest lands which must be cleared. Though the latter might be accomplished gradually by each colonist on his own lot after he has settled (the least costly procedure), the slowness in getting substantial parts of his land under cultivation could be critical. The potential natural productivity of the tropical forest lands is a subject of controversy.¹⁶

Not only do effective colonization and land settlement involve costly infrastructural expense, but also the colonist must be introduced to problems of regional temperatures, soils, slopes, and drainage. If the colonist is to avoid a tendency simply to transfer crops and agricultural techniques from his former region to the new one, he must receive education and be helped by continuing agricultural extension programs. Furthermore, credit, seeds, fertilizer, and farm machinery must be made available, especially in the initial period of transfer.

Although redistribution of land in already settled agricultural areas limits selection of beneficiaries eligible by reason of residence, effective directed colonization requires selection of persons according to needs and motivations, agricultural background and abilities, and personal characteristics bearing upon the need to achieve satisfaction in a new way of life with its deferred rewards.¹⁷ Moreover, even for those colonists who overcome strange habitat conditions (new foods, health conditions, living arrangements, and patterns of marketing), success may be dependent upon the following kinds of variables: "proximity to the highland homelands and the possibility of reasonably easy and frequent trips back and forth; the economic well-being and adequacy of services and amenities in the project; homogeneity of colonists with kinship, friendship, and place-of-origin ties."¹⁸

Since some governments include "spontaneous colonization" in figures given in Table 4, it is not always possible to make an elementary distinction be-

tween directed and nondirected programs. In reality, the latter is an aspect of internal migration which should not be confused with officially planned and prepared programs.

For several reasons, then, data on colonization are generally excluded from discussion here, although it is recognized that where separate colonization programs exist, as in Bolivia, in the long run the land reform agency may find itself in competition with the colonization agency. The former is charged with on-going evaluation of the use of land to determine whether rights to titles should be continued or revoked. Once land in zones of colonization has been integrated into the mainstream of rural economic life and colonization is concentrated in new areas, inter-agency conflict may arise over jurisdictional control of problems arising from sale, consolidation, and abandonment of "colonized land."

Bolivian Background

Bolivia's case of land reform has been conditioned by geographical, social, and political factors which are worth brief mention here ahead of the detailed discussion of title redistribution that follows. Bolivia may be divided into many regions, each with distinct characteristics of terrain, population, and production. In terms of terrain, three regions dominate the geographic life of the country. The western zone is a high Andean altiplano situated 11 000 to 14 000 feet above sea level. This area includes La Paz, the national capital, and Titicaca, the highest navigable lake in the world—both at about 12 500 feet above sea level. Although the size of the region encompasses only parts of three departments (La Paz, Oruro, Potosí) and comprises only about 16 per cent of Bolivia's territory, it contains about 55 per cent of the country's population (data are for 1950, date of the last population census).¹⁹ Production of potatoes, corn, *quinoa* (a grain), *oca* (a root), barley, wheat, beans, and vegetables provides crops for subsistence and commerce; however, the real contribution of the region to the national economy has involved production of minerals, especially tin.

From the edges of the altiplano, the central portion of the country drops abruptly to elevations ranging from 5 000 to 8 000 feet. On the eastern slopes of the Andes, coffee and coca are grown to provide major cash crops. The leaves of the latter plant (from which cocaine is derived) are dried and chewed by highland Indians to alleviate hunger, pain, cold, and exhaustion. Valley crops include wheat, barley, and

¹⁶Craig L. Dozier, *Land Development and Colonization in Latin America: Case Studies of Peru, Bolivia, and Mexico* (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 4.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 198.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 199.

¹⁹Cornelius H. Zondag, *The Bolivian Economy, 1952–1965: The Revolution and Its Aftermath* (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 12.



Traditional farm-to-market transportation of small grains on the Bolivian Altiplano
(Photo by J.W. Wilkie)



Modern farm-to-market transportation of small grains on the Bolivian Altiplano
(Photo by J.W. Wilkie)





Figure 1-2




<u>BOLIVIA (1950)</u>	<u>ESTIMATED POPULATION</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
1. La Paz	948,446	31.4
2. Potosí	534,399	17.7
3. Cochabamba	490,475	16.2
4. Santa Cruz	286,145	9.5
5. Chuquisaca	282,980	9.4
6. Oruro	210,260	7.0
7. Tarija	126,752	4.2
8. Beni	119,770	4.0
9. Pando	19,804	.6
	<u>3,019,031</u>	<u>100.0</u>
		1950

SOURCE: APPENDIX S

Figure 1-3

BOLIVIA



R.W. WILKIE / J.E. MARTI

Figure 1-4

alfalfa. Milk, cattle, and hog production are important in the valleys because the climate and vegetation of the highlands favor the raising of sheep, llama, and alpaca. The valley areas (located in the departments of Cochabamba, Chuquisaca, and Tarija, along with portion of La Paz and Potosí, hold about 14 per cent of the national territory and 30 per cent of its population. It is notable that in 1950 about 70 per cent of the country's populace spoke an Indian language, with Quechua predominant in the valleys, Aymara in the highlands, and Guaraní and others in the eastern lowlands.²⁰

The eastern zone is a subtropical area with lowlands ranging in elevation from 500 to 2 500 feet above sea level. These lowlands vary from the dry Chaco region with thick low brush to the humid swampy area of the north. Communications are poor but the potential for cattle raising and agriculture appears to be enormous if the region can be opened up to settlers. Comprising 70 per cent of Bolivia's surface, it holds only about 15 per cent of the population. In the northern region, Pando department and part of La Paz produce tropical export crops such as rubber and Brazil nuts. The Beni area also is famous for forest products and cattle. In the south, Santa Cruz produces sugar, rice, oil seeds, fruit, coffee, and cattle. Development of Santa Cruz, the area of greatest land colonization and center of petroleum fields, promises to provide a counterweight to the traditional importance of the altiplano region of western Bolivia.²¹

The population of Bolivia in 1963 (when a sample census was taken) was just over 3 million persons, with about 69 percent of those economically active working in agricultural pursuits. This represented little change from the census of 1950 which showed a total population of some 300 000 less and indicated that 3 per cent more of the economically active share was involved in agriculture.²²

According to the most recent agricultural census of Bolivia (1950), before the revolution of 1952 land ownership was highly unbalanced. About 92 percent of exploited land was controlled by about 6 per cent of the farms and ranches censused. This data is shown in Table 5, which also reveals that about 59 per cent of the holdings controlled only .2 per cent of land censused.

Bolivian politicians traditionally did little to change the country's concentration of land and mining wealth in the hands of a few. During the 1940s, however, an opposition movement was forged which seized power in the early 1950s and then set about to remedy consequent social and political imbalances in national life.²³

When Víctor Paz Estenssoro, founder and leader of the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR), assumed the presidency of Bolivia after a victorious revolution in April of 1952, he undertook a broad program of state action to resolve his country's problems. His period as chief executive witnessed expropriation of the tin mines, institution of universal suffrage, and development of new labor laws, as well as commencement of a land reform program.

Political tensions between right and left wings of the revolution came to the fore during the presidency of Hernán Siles Zuazo, Paz's successor for the period 1956–1960. These problems, engendered especially by an inflationary economy, saw Siles attempt to shift the base of MNR political support from the tin miners to the newly reconstituted army. Siles and Paz were convinced that a "new" army was preferable to an irregular militia composed largely of miners who were not responsible to the president of Bolivia.

Much to the consternation of extremist pretenders to the presidency, from both the left and the right, Paz returned to power in 1960 as leader of moderate forces within the MNR. With continued support from the U.S. government, which had decided in the early 1950s that Paz was a "non-communist Marxist," Paz developed his plan to encourage foreign and domestic investment in Bolivia. At the same time, however, he decided to emphasize land reform in order to build a strong base of internal political support.

In 1964, a year when complex forces and rising dissidence threatened to turn Bolivian politics toward extreme policies on the right or left, Paz was elected yet again to the presidency. Given a deteriorating political situation, the military seized power in November of that year with the rationale that a new government was needed to "purify the Revolution of 1952." Generals René Barrientos Ortuño and Alfredo Ovando Candia shared or alternated in the presidency until Barrientos was elected in his own right in 1966. With the MNR apparently discredited by problems that Paz had not controlled (corruption and mistreatment of political prisoners had gotten out of hand in the confusion of remaking Bolivian society), the generals undertook to provide a period of "harmony." Their repression of the MNR and the extreme left (which had broken with the MNR), however, meant that a period of political instability would continue to prevail.

In this atmosphere, Ernesto "Che" Guevara believed that Bolivia represented a vulnerable place to open a new guerrilla front in Latin America. Although Bolivia (with thousands of miles of unmarked frontier bordering on Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina, Chile, and Peru) may have seemed an ideal base from which to

²⁰*Ibid.*, pp.12, 18.

²¹*Ibid.*, pp. 12, 20.

²²See Appendix K, below.

²³For analysis of implicit meaning in treating "land concentration," see my discussion at (and in) note 207.

TABLE 5
Bolivian Land Patterns, 1950
Part I: Ownership

Size in Hectares	Number of Holdings †(86 337 = 100 Per Cent)	Surface (32 749 850 = 100 Per Cent)
Up to 1	28.7	#
from 1 to less than 5	30.6	.2
from 5 to less than 10	10.1	.2
from 10 to less than 20	6.8	.3
from 20 to less than 50	5.6	.4
from 50 to less than 100	3.2	.6
from 100 to less than 200	2.6	.9
from 200 to less than 500	2.9	2.3
from 500 to less than 1 000	1.8	3.2
from 1 000 to less than 2 500	2.5	10.1
from 2 500 and up	3.8	81.8

†Includes 1.4 per cent size unknown.

Source: *América en Cifras* (1970), Table 311-04.

Part II: Land Use

Type Hectares	Surface (109 361 100 = 100.0 Per Cent)
Cultivable	^a 2.7
Pasture	10.3
Forest	42.8
Other	^b 44.2

^aIncludes idle cultivable land.

^bIncludes wastelands as well as lands potentially usable.

Source: Table 12; and United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization *Production Yearbook* (1970), pp. 4-5.

launch the conquest of the South American continent, "Che" soon found that the country's jungles were not the tropical paradise from which he had operated under Castro successfully to topple Batista in Cuba. Further, he received virtually no support from Bolivia's rural inhabitants. Fidel Castro's introduction to Che's diary, which was published after the guerrilla leader was killed by the Bolivian army in October, 1967, shows how unrealistically the guerrilla experience in Bolivia can be viewed, even in the face of disaster. Since Bolivia's peasants had seized their land in the aftermath of the victorious revolution of 1952, and since the Bolivian government was moving toward legalization of a de facto revolution in land tenure

(especially after 1960), guerrillas should not have expected to receive rural support.²⁴

Bolivia's military gained some strength from its defeat of Che Guevara, and Paz's economic development continued apace under Barrientos; the country, however, was restive under a system buttressed mainly by army officers. Then Barrientos was killed in a helicopter crash on April 27, 1969, during one of the many tours of the country which he frequently made to generate political support, especially among the peasantry.

Vice-President Luis Adolfo Siles Salinas served as acting president until September 26, 1969, when he was overthrown by General Ovando, who feared that

²⁴Robert J. Alexander, "The Myth and Reality of Che Guevara," *New Politics* 8 (Winter, 1969), pp. 51-57.



Traditional cultivation – recently burned shifting field (*conuco*) in the State of Miranda, Venezuela
(Photo by K. Ruddle)



Unimproved pasture in the Llanos, State of Anzoátegui, Venezuela
(Photo by K. Ruddle)

he could not win a scheduled election for the chief executive's office. Ovando immediately expropriated the U.S.-owned Bolivian Gulf Oil Company holdings and promised to speed up distribution of land titles. With such appeals for mass political support, he attempted to move his military regime to the left—probably with the thought in mind that in 1952 the MNR had abolished the army because it had served as a bulwark of conservatism. Alienation (and persecution) of the MNR, however, meant that after 1964 the country lacked effective political organization, with the military dividing into rightist and leftist factions. Thus, on October 6, 1970, Ovando was replaced first by a rightist (Rogelio Miranda lasted one day) and then by a leftist (Juan José Torres) before a “moderate” army officer seized power August 21, 1971. Under Hugo Banzer Suárez, the MNR regained recognition and cabinet posts. Needless to say, the term “moderate” as expressed in Bolivia could be taken to mean “leftist” in countries that have not undergone so thoroughgoing a revolution as Bolivia.

Given the diverse and convergent forces at work in Bolivia since 1952, the summary of events above is intended to provide a backdrop for the interpretation and analysis of land reform undertaken here. Examination of land distribution is only one facet of complex and interrelated political issues, but it is an important aspect that merits the analysis developed here.

Venezuelan Background

For analysis of land reform, Venezuela (with five regions) makes an interesting contrast with Bolivia (with three regions).²⁵ Whereas 55 per cent of the Bolivians live in the Andean altiplano, only about 13 per cent of the Venezuelans were living in 1961 in the high Andean states (Mérida, Táchira, Trujillo),²⁶ which compose about 3 per cent of Venezuela's territory. The Andes zone grows yuca, beans, peas, wheat, garlic, and the bulk of Venezuela's coffee (the state of Monagas in the *llanos* zone is also an important producer). Part of the zone that overlaps with Zulia is important for its banana production.²⁷

²⁵With regard to political organization, Venezuela's 1961 Constitution proclaims the country to be a federal republic (Article 2). In reality its states have little power. Since the time of Juan Vicente Gómez, national presidents have exercised paramount influence in state affairs, even including selection of governors. Although states elect unicameral legislatures, these bodies have been almost completely at the command of the governor. See Venezuela, *Constitution of the Republic of Venezuela, 1961* (Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union, 1963); and Leo B. Lott, “Venezuela,” in Martin C. Needler (ed.), *Political Systems of Latin America* (2d ed.: Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1964), pp. 287–288.

Bolivia is a unitary republic, with governors appointed to the departments by the national president. There are no departmental legislatures. See Robert J. Alexander, “Bolivia: The National Revolution,” in Needler, *Political Systems of Latin America*, p. 385.

²⁶Population data for Venezuela (as with Bolivia) are for the census year nearest the undertaking of land reform. Venezuelan population data for 1971 became available subsequent to preparation of this study and are included in Appendix DD. Data for 1971 on agriculturally employed population still were not available even to include in an appendix.

²⁷Geographic zones are delimited according to political units, even though the two do not always coincide. See Levi Marrero, *Venezuela y sus Recursos* (Caracas: Cultural Venezolana, 1964), from which my geographic discussion is drawn, especially pp. 241, 372, 610, and Chapter 17.

²⁸*Ibid.*, Chapter 17.

²⁹*Ibid.*

In the east, the state of Zulia (a zone by itself) has 12 per cent of the nation's population and 7 per cent of its surface. The Zulia region, which encompasses the Lake Maracaibo area, not only shows wide diversity of agricultural production but also is Venezuela's richest oil zone (producing two-thirds of the country's petroleum output). It is one of Venezuela's most wealthy dairy and sheep-raising areas, and it is an important producer of bananas, coconuts, sugar cane, corn, and beans.

The coastal zone, composed of the lower Andes (including the entities of Carabobo, Aragua, Distrito Federal, Miranda, Sucre, Nueva Esparta) and the hilly uplands (Falcón, Lara, Yaracuy), contains 53 per cent of the population in less than 10 per cent of the country's territory. This region, in which the national capital (Caracas) is located, is the center of industrial activity as well as a region of intensive land exploitation. Crops include rice, onions, corn, potatoes, tomatoes, peas, beans, citrus fruit, cotton, tobacco, sugar cane, cacao, and coconuts. The states of Lara and Falcón (part of an economically transitional area between Zulia and the central coast area) are also important in the raising of sheep and goats.²⁸

Immediately south of the coastal zone lies the *llanos* zone, which crosses the middle of the country with 19 per cent of the population and 35 per cent of the area.²⁹ This zone (including the states of Apure, Barinas, Portuguesa, Cojedes, Guárico, Anzoátegui, Monagas, and Territorio Delta Amacuro) is fabled in literature for its vast emptiness. As Alexander von Humboldt noted in 1799:

The *Llanos* (or Pampas) are true steppes. In the rainy season, they are green with vegetation, but once the dry season sets in, with the sun blazing down day after day from a cloudless sky, they take on the aspect of a desert. The grass cover shrivels up, great cracks appear in the dry surface, and the crocodiles and snakes bury themselves in the mud, to sleep through the heat until the onset of the rains in the New Year rouses them again. Then there is a sudden trans-





Figure 1-5



VENEZUELA (1961)	POPULATION	PERCENT
1. Distrito Federal	1,257,515	16.7
2. Zulia	919,863	12.2
3. Miranda	492,349	6.5
4. Lara	489,140	6.5
5. Sucre	401,992	5.3
6. Táchira	399,163	5.3
7. Anzoátegui	382,002	5.1
8. Carabobo	381,636	5.1
9. Falcón	340,450	4.5
10. Trujillo	326,634	4.3
11. Aragua	313,274	4.2
12. Mérida	270,668	3.6
13. Monagas	246,217	3.3
14. Guárico	244,966	3.3
15. Bolívar	213,543	2.8
16. Portuguesa	203,707	2.7
17. Yaracuy	175,291	2.3
18. Barinas	139,271	1.9
19. Apure	117,577	1.6
20. Nueva Esparta	89,492	1.2
21. Cojedes	72,652	1.0
22. Delta Amacuro	33,979	.4
23. Amazonas	11,757	.2
TOTAL	7,523,138	100.0

SOURCE: APPENDIX DD, PART II

Figure 1-6




Figure 1-7

formation. No sooner has the first rain fallen than the steppe is carpeted with flowers and grasses, and there is pasture for horses and cattle once more.

And everything conspires to make these steppes seem even broader than they are—the monotony of the surface; the absence of any habitation; the strain of travel under a burning sun and in a dust-laden atmosphere; the way in which the featureless horizon seems to withdraw as one goes on, and the palm trees all look alike, so that there is no sense of progress, for there are always other palm trees ahead, exactly like the ones behind. And ever before the traveller is the torturing mirage, with its false promise of relief, of water.³⁰

For centuries the economy of the *llanos* (maximum elevation 700 feet) mainly involved cattle and horse raising. Beginning in the 1930s, however, the area began to undergo extensive transformation with the discovery of oil; and the states of Monagas and Anzoátegui soon produced a third of the nation's petroleum.³¹

Until the end of World War I, Venezuela had been a pastoral country which exported cattle, cacao, and coffee while producing most foods required for domestic consumption. In an oil boom during the 1920s and 1930s, however, agricultural development was eclipsed in importance, and production did not keep up with the rest of the economy.³² As peasants began to leave the land in search of higher paying work, and as government expenditures were concentrated in the cities under programs designed to modernize the country, Venezuela found it difficult to reduce import of foodstuffs. During the 1940s, for example, the country was dependent upon imports to satisfy needs for rice, wheat, corn, potatoes, dairy, and pork products.³³ Such dependence has decreased only in recent years.

Venezuela's important newly developing region includes the area south of the Orinoco River. The Guayana zone (Bolívar and Territorio Amazonas) encompasses 45 per cent of the country's area, but has only about 3 per cent of the population. Agriculturally the region is undeveloped, having only 3 per cent of Venezuela's exploited land in 1961. With gold, diamonds, and iron deposits, its immediate wealth lies in nonagricultural enterprises of Bolívar state. The Guayana Corporation was created by the government in 1960 to promote integrated development of hydroelectric power resources and to supply power for its Orinoco steel plant inaugurated in 1962. With such plans, the government hopes to make southeastern Venezuela the "Ruhr of South America."³⁴

The Venezuelan population is as dissimilar to Bolivia as its geography. In Bolivia, about 70 per cent of the population speaks an Indian language, but in Venezuela less than 2 per cent are Indian speakers, mostly located in the Guayana zone.³⁵ Of the total Venezuelan population, which was 7.5 million persons in 1961 (up 2 million in the period after 1950), only 32.3 per cent of the economically active population were employed in agriculture (down 9 per cent).³⁶

According to Pan American Union data, in 1961 Venezuela's pattern of land ownership was one of the most unbalanced in Latin America, with 1.3 per cent of the farms and ranches controlling 71.8 per cent of land censused. Conversely, as Table 6 also shows, 1.4 per cent of the land was used by 48.6 per cent of the holdings censused.

Not only had the government traditionally done little to remedy this imbalance,³⁷ but the dictator Juan Vicente Gómez who ruled Venezuela from 1908 until he died in 1935 had acquired vast holdings, many of which were seized by the state after his death. Failure of subsequent governments to distribute these and other lands, especially during the period from 1945 to 1948 when the reform party Acción Democrática (AD) gained power, meant that problems of unequal land ownership were continued past the mid-twentieth century mark.

³⁰Quoted in Irmgard Pohl and Josef Zepp, *Latin America: A Geographical Commentary*, ed. K. E. Webb (New York: Dutton, 1967), pp. 188–189.

³¹Edwin Lieuwen, *Venezuela* (2d ed.; London: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 7.

³²As noted in *ibid.*, p. 117, "petroleum did not ruin agriculture, as so many nationalistic writers are fond of asserting. Rather, its spectacular development merely made more apparent, by contrast, the backwardness and stagnation of agriculture."

³³Venezuela, Ministerio de Agricultura y Cría, *Anuario Estadístico Agropecuario* (1969); and Marrero, *Venezuela y sus Recursos*, p. 592.

³⁴Marrero, *Venezuela y sus Recursos*, Chapter 17 (p. 650); Lieuwen, *Venezuela*, pp. 182–183.

³⁵UCLA *Statistical Abstract of Latin America* (1968), p. 87.

³⁶Venezuela, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos Nacionales, *Censo de Población, 1961*, Vol. A, pp. 134, 198; and UCLA *Statistical Abstract of Latin America* (1961), p. 19.

³⁷For discussion of implicit meaning in treating such imbalance, see my comment at and in note 207.

In 1938 the Instituto Técnico de Inmigración y Colonización (ITIC) was founded to colonize Venezuela with European migrants; between 1938 and 1945, ITIC established 310 farms and 7 colonies; see Raymond J. Penn and Jorge Schuster, "La Reforma Agraria en Venezuela," *Revista Interamericana de Ciencias Sociales* 2:1 (1963), pp. 29–30.

TABLE 6
Venezuelan Land Patterns, 1961
Part I: Ownership

Size in Hectares	Number of Holdings † (320 094 = 100 Per Cent)	Surface (26 005 000 = 100 Per Cent)
Up to .9	5.5	#
1 to 4.9	43.1	1.4
5 to 9.9	18.1	1.5
10 to 19.9	12.9	1.9
20 to 49.9	9.0	3.1
50 to 99.9	3.6	2.8
100 to 199.9	2.3	3.6
200 to 499.9	1.9	6.8
500 to 999.9	.9	7.1
1 000 to 2 499.9	.7	13.3
2 500 and up	.6	58.5

† Includes 1.4 per cent without land.

Source: *América en Cifras* (1970), Table 311-04.

Part II: Land Use

Type Hectares	Surface (89 721 000 = 100.0 Per Cent)
Cultivable	^a 5.8
Pasture	15.4
Forest	53.5
Other	^b 25.3

^aIncluding idle cultivable lands.

^bIncludes wastelands as well as lands potentially usable.

Source: Table 27; and United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization, *Production Yearbook* (1970), pp. 4-5.

AD's leaders, notably Rómulo Betancourt and Raul Leoni, based an important plank of their 1940s campaign upon promises to aid the agrarian sector. Between 1936 and 1948, Betancourt helped to foster and forge an alliance between newborn rural and urban labor movements, an alliance consummated during the period 1945–1948. Before 1945, AD's leaders were important in organizing the politically oriented Federación Campesina de Venezuela (FCV) which had

almost 6 000 legally inscribed members by 1944. This nucleus grew to 43 000 supporters throughout the rural areas by 1948, when Lieutenant Colonel Marcos Pérez Jiménez and other military men undertook what has been called a counterrevolution to prevent the creation of a workers' "state within a state."³⁸

Although AD had called for land reform when it seized power in late 1945, Provisional President Betancourt's attitude was moderate in tone:

³⁸By 1948 the peasants were allied with 94 000 urban-oriented workers; see John D. Powell, *Preliminary Report on the Federación Campesina de Venezuela: Origins, Organization, Leadership and Role in the Agrarian Reform Program* (Madison: Land Tenure Center, 1964), pp. 2–5.

In order for the land to be productive, it is necessary that it be in the hands of those who make it produce. When I maintain this thesis—presenting it in the name of the revolutionary government, which has a definite concept of land policy—I do not take a position on the radical extreme left. The thesis that the peasant should be owner of the land that he fertilizes with his sweat has its roots in the best national traditions. It was Bolívar who first advocated in Venezuela the need for land reform.

It should not be feared that a government such as ours, which has been demonstrating that it has a sense of responsibility, is going to adopt a demagogic policy with regard to land distribution. The land will be redistributed, but at such time as the government has the plans and technical facilities that will permit rational and productive exploitation of those lands.³⁹

AD did not obtain land reform legislation until early 1948, although during 1946 and 1947 it did divide at least 73 770 hectares of government land among 6 000 peasant families.⁴⁰

The military regime dominated by Pérez Jiménez claimed interest in rural problems with publication of a land decree in 1949, but during the next nine years it distributed only 103 940 hectares to 5 767 heads of family.⁴¹ Pérez Jiménez dissolved the organizations of rural and urban workers which provided AD's basis for political action, and set himself the task of emphasizing urban development.

With expanded funds from oil royalties (AD had worked out a 50-50 share of profits with the foreign-owned oil companies) and with the opening of new oil concessions (which AD had refused to extend), the Pérez Jiménez government undertook impressive public works in the Caracas area. Thus, the new government won a mass base of support in the Distrito Federal, which then (as in 1961) had over 15 per cent of the nation's population.⁴² Nevertheless, Pérez Jiménez's economic programs were not enough to save his regime, which became noted for corruption, inefficiency, and authoritarian leadership. Perhaps because

of the fact that there were 66 per cent fewer students attending schools of higher education in 1951 than in 1948,⁴³ for example, Pérez Jiménez had the funds enabling him later to declare with pride that "During the regime over which I presided, the whereabouts of each and every Venezuelan citizen was known with certainty . . ."⁴⁴

The "Democratic Revolution," which was undertaken by AD once Pérez Jiménez was overthrown in 1958, renewed its programs of the 1940s and attempted to establish a system of free elections. Even with reestablishment of rural and urban labor union influence and with emphasis on new land reform legislation, however, AD's electoral base faced serious erosion.

Rómulo Betancourt was elected to the presidency in 1958 with 49.2 per cent of the ballots. At the same time, the Christian Socialist Party (COPEI),⁴⁵ which also favored land reform, gained 15.2 per cent of the valid vote. Under Rafael Caldera, COPEI cooperated with AD in order to carry out reform programs, even as AD itself began to split over whether or not social and economic programs should be undertaken with more dispatch.

During Betancourt's term as president from 1959 to 1964, he faced violent opposition from leftists who were determined to overthrow the democratically elected government in order to implement immediate changes. AD split three times (1960, 1962, 1967), each time losing significant strength. In the presidential election of 1963, AD's Raúl Leoni won with only 32.8 per cent of the vote, with COPEI increasing its share to 20.2 per cent. In the election of 1968, COPEI's Rafael Caldera finally won in his third straight campaign for the presidency by gaining 29.1 per cent of the vote, .9 per cent more than AD's candidate.⁴⁶

That AD gave up the presidency in an extremely close election for the term 1969–1974 vindicated its actions during the early 1960s when it had suspended constitutional guarantees to "preserve democracy." Many critics did not believe that a so-called "Democratic Revolution" should suspend the rights of citizenship, even if the government were under attack by Castro-sponsored guerrillas. Nevertheless, AD proved

³⁹Rómulo Betancourt, *Venezuela: Política y Petróleo* (México, D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1956), p. 352.

⁴⁰Ramón Fernández y Fernández, *Reforma Agraria en Venezuela* (Caracas: Vargas, 1948), pp. 71–72.

⁴¹Venezuela, Instituto Agrario Nacional, *Informaciones Estadísticas Sobre las Principales Actividades Realizadas por el Instituto Agrario Nacional, 1-7-49/31-12-60*. The Instituto Agrario Nacional (IAN) was established in 1949 to replace the ITIC.

⁴²Venezuela, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos, *IX Censo Nacional de Población; Población Urbana, Intermedia y Rural*, Censos de 1961, 1950, 1941, y 1936.

⁴³*SNP* — IX:1. In order to justify his study entitled the *Venezuelan Democratic Revolution*, Alexander, Chapter 3, details the problems of the Pérez Jiménez regime.

⁴⁴*El General Marcos Pérez Jiménez y el Nuevo Ideal Nacional* (N.p.: Ediciones Cruzada Cívica Nacionalista del Estado Miranda, n.d.), n.p.

⁴⁵COPEI is derived from the initials of the Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente. See John D. Martz, *Acción Democrática: Evolution of a Modern Political Party in Venezuela* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), Chapter 11. On COPEI's 1968 victory, see David J. Myers, *Democratic Campaigning in Venezuela: Caldera's Victory* (Caracas: Fundación La Salle, 1973).

⁴⁶Venezuelan presidential election statistics are from *UCLA Statistical Abstract of Latin America* (1968), p. 179.

that it acted not out of its own selfish interest, but to preserve a system of democratic government.

Betancourt's regime of the early 1960s was also under attack from internal and external rightists. Not only did it face rebellion from some Venezuelan military officers jealous of their traditional rights, but Betancourt was nearly assassinated in 1960 by henchmen of the Dominican Republic's Rafael Leonidas Trujillo.

Because AD was so concerned with political matters between 1959 and 1969, the nature of the Venezuelan "Democratic Revolution" has been somewhat obscured. Clearly AD had a major job on its hands to establish political order in which democratic elections could take place. Since AD began this task in the period 1945–1948 (when the mere coming to power of a representative party constituted the "most fundamental" revolution in Venezuela's history),⁴⁷ and since the establishment of a democratic tradition is not necessarily concluded,⁴⁸ the meaning of "revolution" involves detailed definition of specific aspects of government activity.

Orientation of the Study

Although there are many aspects of "revolutionary" activity in the Venezuelan and Bolivian cases, this study does not generally involve examination of broad social and economic programs or of political events. Instead it seeks to examine the complexities, problems, and possibilities of measuring the process of land-title redistribution in two countries. Since land reform is an accepted part of governmental programs in Bolivia and Venezuela, this study is not concerned with the need for land reform (or with specific alternative

kinds of land reform). Rather it attempts to gauge the extent of title redistribution in order to provide information about the relationship of reform and revolution in subnational units, especially as related to political decisions. In the long run, successful reform may well depend upon agrarian reform (including credit, education, new methods of production, and the opening of new lands for settlement); but in the meantime, such countries as Bolivia and Venezuela have undertaken legal redistribution of titles as the primary means of achieving a new balance in the ownership of land. It is to this data that we must turn in order to assess a basic aspect of the tempo of change in the rural sector.

Because data are not always comparable, the following analyses emphasize two views of land reform and discuss different kinds of data gathered. For example, time-series data on type of land distributed are available for Bolivia, but such figures have not been compiled in Venezuela. Further, since Bolivia's data are for definitive title and figures for Venezuela generally deal with provisional title, activity cannot be discussed with precision. Nevertheless, in showing the types of data gathered in each country, it is possible to discuss problems in the understanding of the land reform process.

Although official statistics may at any time be problematic in nature, independent analysis can reveal strengths and weaknesses as well as inconsistencies in data. The present study not only is intended to suggest ways in which official figures may be examined to yield a number of insights into the process of land reform but also to show implicitly the type of problems in planning which arise because existing statistics have not been analyzed.

⁴⁷Lieuwen, *Venezuela*, p.64.

⁴⁸For example, until 1972 successive presidential victories were won with ever smaller percentages of the vote, thus strengthening Pérez Jiménez's threat to return to Venezuelan political power with popular support. Initial indications of the 1972 presidential election results, however, suggest that AD's return to power with Carlos Andrés Pérez gaining about 50 per cent of the vote may have changed the trend; see *Times of the Americas*, December 26, 1973.

2: BOLIVIA (1952–1969)

Since the outbreak of the Bolivian Revolution on April 9, 1952, many authors have written about land reform in Bolivia,⁴⁹ but few have examined the amount of land actually redistributed under the land reform decree of August 2, 1953.⁵⁰ Perhaps there has been little interest in legal redistribution of land title because over 300 000 peasant families forcefully seized lands after the Revolution and have worked them while waiting for legal process to sanction or question a de facto situation.⁵¹ In regard to land seizures, Professor Dwight B. Heath has written:

In the high fertile valleys (around Cochabamba, Sucre, Tarija), smouldering resentment against oppressive landlords broke into open warfare when the Indians got arms . . . (from the victorious Revolution), before the land reform was drafted. It is a well documented fact that many farmers who refused to yield their properties to insurgent bands of Quechua peasants . . . were driven off by force, or shot. There were many landowners who simply abandoned their farms, leaving herds of select livestock, all types of dairying and farming machinery, and their household and personal effects rather than risk staying where anarchy ravaged the land.⁵²

Referring to these developments, Amado Canelas has stated: "Almost immediately after pronouncement of

the decree of August 2, 1953, there was . . . practically no peasant without land, because of the expulsion of the ex-landowners."⁵³

Although the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), which shared power with General Gualberto Villarroel's government of 1943–1946, projected land reform before complete triumph in 1952, the MNR had not developed a concrete plan of action. Paz Estenssoro has explained in the following oral history interview the relationship of the Land Reform Decree of August 2, 1953, to the position that his party faced in 1944 in regard to a rural labor law for the department of Tarija:

James W. Wilkie: The Land Reform Decree turned out to be very different from the precepts which you had set down in your speech to Congress on November 24, 1944.⁵⁴ In reading this speech, one can see that you already had a definite concept of what the rights of the rural people should be, but all you asked was for the right of the peasant to exploit for five years the parcels of land which they worked . . .

Víctor Paz Estenssoro: [The law which was discussed was] limited to the Department of Tarija, and it did not go beyond establishing conditions for the renting of lands in order to prevent expulsion of peasants But in the text of the speech, as you can see, my position was that

⁴⁹For guides to investigation of Bolivia's land reform, see Land Tenure Center (University of Wisconsin, Madison), *Bolivia: Agricultura, Economía y Política: A Bibliography* (Madison: mimeo., 1968. Also, I have deposited in the UCLA Research Library a copy of my "Bibliography on Bolivian Land Reform (1970)" which lists some important works not cited here. For recent major works see William E. Carter, "Land Reform in the Agrarian Sector," Madeline Léons and William Léons, "Land Reform and Economic Change in the Yungas," and Melvin Burke, "Land Reform in the Lake Titicaca Region," all in James M. Malloy and Richard M. Thorn (eds.) *Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia Since 1952* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), Chapters 7, 8, 9 respectively.

⁵⁰The MNR briefly presented its case in: Bolivia, Dirección Nacional de Informaciones, *Bolivia: 10 Años de Revolución* (La Paz: Biblioteca Historia y Cultura Política, 1962), pp. 57–58. For examples of independent statistical analyses of official data at specific moments in time (in contrast with the detailed time-series data developed here), see Fausto Beltrán A. and José Fernández B., *¿Dónde Va la Reforma Agraria Boliviana?* (La Paz: Talleres Gráficos Bolivianos, 1960); Antonio García, "La Reforma Agraria y el Desarrollo Social," and Casto Ferragut, "La Reforma Agraria," in Oscar Delgado (ed.), *Reformas Agrarias en la América Latina* (México, D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1965), pp. 403–445 and 446–467, respectively; Demetrio Canelas, *Mito y Realidad de la Reforma Agraria* (La Paz: "Los Amigos del Libro," 1966); Joseph R. Thome, "Problems Which Obstruct the Process of Title Distribution Under the Bolivian Agrarian Reform," Preliminary Report, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Contract, Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, September 1966; and Raúl Alfonso García, *Diez Años de Reforma Agraria en Bolivia* (La Paz: Dirección Nacional de Informaciones 1963). See also Ronald J. Clark's work cited in Table 40, below.

⁵¹Richard W. Patch, "Bolivia: U.S. Assistance in a Revolutionary Setting," in *Social Change in Latin America Today* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1960), pp. 108–176; Dwight B. Heath, "Land Reform and Social Revolution in Bolivia," a paper presented to the 62d annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association, San Francisco, California, November 21–24, 1963; and Jorge Dandler H., *El Sindicalismo Campesino en Bolivia; Los Cambios Estructurales en Ucureña* (México, D.F.: Instituto Indigenista Interamericano, 1969).

⁵²Dwight B. Heath, "Land Reform in Bolivia," *Inter-American Economic Affairs* 12:4 (1959), pp. 3–27, 4. On the number of families involved, see note 194.

⁵³Canelas, *Mito y Realidad*, p. 215. Cf. Katherine Barnes de Marschall, *Revolution and Land Reform in Chuquisaca and Potosí* (La Paz: SNRA, 1970), which notes that peasants in those departments were reluctant revolutionaries.

⁵⁴Paz's speech on land reform is reprinted in Víctor Paz Estenssoro, *Discursos Parlamentarios* (La Paz: Editorial Canata, 1955), pp. 297–324.

there was no question of returning the land to those who had owned it in the days of the Incas, before the Spaniards arrived, but of giving the land to those who work it, because work is the fundamental factor in the creation of surplus value generated within agricultural production.⁵⁵ Consequently, since we put the land reform into practice in 1953, it has had a perfect relation with that concept, because land is given to those who work it, regardless of whom they may be. In 1945, conditions were not ripe to undertake land reform: We could not carry it out because of the influence of reactionary military elements who were incrustated in the Villarreal government.⁵⁶

In contrast with Paz Estenssoro's promulgation of universal voting rights and nationalization of the large tin mines within fourteen weeks and six months, respectively, after the victory of April 9, 1952, over nine months passed before a Land Reform Commission began work.⁵⁷ The reform law thus did not go into effect for almost fifteen months after the MNR took power; certainly this meant that land reform had a lower priority than the programs that antedated it. Paz Estenssoro has explained this time lag in reform as follows:

Immediately after we assumed power—realizing that the gravest problem in Bolivia was the condition in which the peasant found himself—we created a special ministry: the Ministry of Peasant Affairs was empowered to carry out land reform. But even if we carried out land reform, we could not acquire, overnight, the miraculous power to bring the peasants up to the cultural level of the other social sectors. Therefore, there was always going to be delay as a result of centuries-old domination and exploitation to which the peasant had been subjected and which had to be conquered . . . Besides carrying out land reform . . . [the Ministry of Peasant Affairs] was charged with peasant education,

which could not be compared to education in the cities precisely because of the state of cultural backwardness in which the peasants found themselves, beginning with the language problem.⁵⁸

The body actually empowered to handle land reform has been the National Land Reform Council.⁵⁹ This body is a direct dependency of the Presidency of Bolivia, but its decisions are also subject to review by another executive agency, the Ministry of Peasant Affairs discussed above by Paz Estenssoro. The President of Bolivia must sign all final resolutions and executions of land titles.⁶⁰

As we have seen, many peasants neither waited to be educated nor did they wait for cumbersome land reform legal machinery to be set in motion; instead, they began to seize land. Obviously, turmoil in the countryside forced the MNR into faster action in land reform than it otherwise might have taken, as the following oral history discussion indicates:

Víctor Paz Estenssoro: In several districts in certain zones of the country, peasants had taken over a few *fincas* and ousted the owners. They assumed that they had the right to invade the properties. In order to deal with this aspect of the problem, for example, the land reform decree had a clause which stated that from the very first day of the reform, the peasants became owners of the *sayañas*, the plots of land which they had been cultivating, without affecting the fact that in the future they would be assigned a corresponding extension of land, depending on the region of the country, as prescribed in the text of the decree. With this, the agitation in the countryside subsided completely and we had enough time to carry out land distribution according to the proceedings set down in the decree.

James W. Wilkie: And what was your attitude in respect to the invasion of lands?

⁵⁵For Paz's views on national land reform, dated August 25, 1944, see the "Proyecto de Reformas Constitucionales del Régimen Agrario y Campesino," which he and Walter Guevara Arze presented to the 1944 MNR National Convention; this plan is printed in Alfredo Sanginés G., *La Reforma Agraria en Bolivia*, (2d ed.; La Paz: Universo, 1945), pp. 327–329.

⁵⁶James W. Wilkie and Edna M. Wilkie, *Entrevistas de Historia Oral con Víctor Paz Estenssoro*, Lima, Perú, June 29, 1966.

⁵⁷The work of the land Reform Commission is discussed by Robert J. Alexander, *The Bolivian National Revolution* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1958), pp. 60–65.

⁵⁸Wilkie and Wilkie, *Entrevistas de Historia Oral con Paz Estenssoro*, June 28, 1966.

⁵⁹Technically, Bolivia's land reform law is administered by the Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria (SNRA), which consists of (a) the President of the Republic, (b) the Consejo Nacional de Reforma Agraria, and (c) land judges. The judges are in reality employees of the Consejo (Council), according to Thome, "Problems Which Obstruct the Process of Title Distribution," pp. 14–15. Also, though the Council was conceived of as a board of directors and supreme court for land reform cases, in practice the Council (including a chief administrator or president, eight council members, Legal Department, Technical Department, Statistical Department, and the new Mobile Brigades) has become the sole executing agency. The present study generally follows Thome's usage and the following discussion concerns the Land Reform "Council," except when dealing with publications and data revisions by the SNRA. For all practical purposes, the two terms are interchangeable here.

⁶⁰The best description and analysis of administrative aspects of land reform in Bolivia is presented in *ibid.* Thome traces the stages by which titles are redistributed and his work should be read as complementary to this chapter.

Víctor Paz Estenssoro: In general, an effort was made to return lands to the owners in order that the peasants would remain in possession only of their former plots. But the majority of the owners of those *fincas* which had been taken over by the peasants did not return to them until the process of redistribution had been completed, because the cases affected [by invasion] . . . were those in which the peasants had been subjected to tremendous abuses from the landlords. Therefore, the owners themselves were fearful of reprisals from [those] . . . liberated by the land reform.⁶¹

We may understand better the course of Bolivia's land reform by examining the political periods in which land policy has been formulated.

Political Aspects of Land Reform

Periodization of land reform developments by presidential term is made on the assumption that each president is responsible for the character of his administration. Although we have shown elsewhere that the chief executive in Bolivia is not as powerful as his counterpart in Mexico,⁶² it is clear that his appointive power and budgetary control over the National Land Reform Council permit him to influence the course of land redistribution. Dwight B. Heath has noted:

The land reform law itself is administered by politically appointed local and regional . . . [planning and administrative bodies]. In a country where government has traditionally been strongly partisan it is not surprising that this affects the application of the law.⁶³

Detail of actual central government expenditure by the Council is shown in Table 7 for the period 1954–1969. Only under President Paz Estenssoro (1954–1956) did the Council receive more than 1 percent, and this was less than projected. President Hernán Siles Zuazo cut percentages during the period 1956–1960; and Paz Estenssoro did not reverse this trend between 1960 and 1964 during his second period and short third term in the presidency.

In commenting upon problems obstructing the process of title redistribution in Bolivia, Professor

Joseph R. Thome has discussed cumulative budgetary restraints which, during 1965 and 1966, were seen in the following pathetic conditions:

In Santa Cruz, for example, the Departmental Office [of the Council] operates out of the headquarters of the Campesino Federation—an old shabby building—where they have been given the rent-free use of two crowded rooms. There, ten people have to take turns using one dilapidated typewriter and, as there are not sufficient desks or tables (also borrowed) for everyone, some have to stand while others work

The list of deficiencies is staggering: the Departmental offices have no money for mailing case files to La Paz and must charge this to the *campesinos*; [the Council] . . . has only two serviceable vehicles for the entire nation; and, as of August 31, 1966, [the Council] . . . has already used up 80 percent of its operating budget for 1966, which, among other things, means that it will not be able to provide any more paper, stationary or pencils to any of its 386 employees.⁶⁴

Although outside funds were forthcoming, sudden infusion of money could not readily overcome problems generated by a long-term lack of funds necessary to develop the Council's organization or to create a staff with competence and esprit de corps. Thus, when the government announced in *El Diario* of April 25, 1968, the signing of a combined loan and grant from USAID of over 395,000 dollars to enable the Council to set up Mobile Brigades to distribute titles to 100,000 heads of family in from forty-five days to fifteen months, it showed that planning was incredibly unrealistic. As we shall see later when examining rate of title distribution, such a goal was completely unattainable during the whole of 1969, let alone the last eight months of 1968.

Furthermore, because of complicated bureaucratic procedure which automatically slows down the process of land reform, a president must make a special effort to distribute land. In 1966 Thome noted that the land reform process has been even more complicated than the regular civil procedure because

Where a party to a civil suit only has three stages or opportunities in which he can have his

⁶¹Wilkie and Wilkie, *Entrevistas de Historia Oral con Paz Estenssoro*, June 29, 1966.

⁶²Wilkie, *The Bolivian Revolution and U.S. Aid Since 1952*.

⁶³Heath, "Land Reform in Bolivia," pp. 8–9. According to Thome, "Problems Which Obstruct the Process of Title Distribution," pp. 14–15, the President of Bolivia appoints the president and vice-president of the Council; the other seven members of the Council represent various ministries, labor unions, and rural organizations and are appointed by the President of Bolivia from panels of three presented by each group to be represented.

⁶⁴Thome, "Problems Which Obstruct the Process of Title Distribution," p. 20.

Table 7
Per Cent of Bolivian Central Government Actual
Expenditure on Land Reform, 1954-1969

Year	Per Cent
1954	.8
1955	1.5
1956	.9
1957	.4
1958	.4
1959	.4
1960	.5
1961	.4
1962	.5
1963	.5
1964	.4
1965	.4
1966	.3
1967	.3
1968	.3
1969	.2

Sources: For 1954-1964, see James W. Wilkie, *The Bolivian Revolution and U.S. Aid Since 1952: Financial Background and Context of Political Decisions* (Los Angeles: Latin American Center, 1969), p. 72. For 1965-1969, see Table VII:3.

contentions reviewed, there are at least five such opportunities in a [land reform case] Moreover, while a quasi-judicial process . . . is justified for expropriation cases, where property rights are challenged, it is really inapplicable to non-adversary cases [which recognize existing holdings or give title to unoccupied public lands].⁶⁵

Since the Constitutions of 1945, 1961, and 1967 have protected private property rights only insofar as a social function is fulfilled, the Land Decree of 1953 automatically has rendered all titles insecure until the government determines whether or not land is subject to expropriation. All unexploited or inefficiently exploited lands are to be redistributed. Properties not

subject to expropriation must be so certified by the Council. Such properties include family house, small properties, cooperative properties, Indian communes, medium properties, agricultural enterprises with salaried employees, and modern forms of land exploitation. In the meantime, while certification takes place and until maximum size of holdings is assured (see Appendix M), a condition of land-tenure insecurity has been created. Many peasants fear that the old proprietors will try to regain lost lands; and apparently some former proprietors have returned to their haciendas to demand a share of production. For these reasons, some peasants have made their own arrangements with former owners in order to protect their new holdings. Further, peasants who have not applied for titles become disheartened when they see that applicants still have not received title after waiting five to ten years.⁶⁶ Without legal title, the land market is reduced, investment in agricultural innovation is inhibited, improvements on the land are limited, and the supply of agricultural credit is restricted.⁶⁷

Given these problems, it is important to assess the rate of the land reform process in presidential epochs in order to understand the rural sector's relation to revolutionary policy and the results of the revolution. Presidential policy has not been made in a vacuum but has reacted to the stresses and strains within a complex social and economic situation. Before delineating the rate of redistribution of titles, however, it is necessary to examine the nature of statistics under discussion.

Nature of Land Reform Data and Method of Reporting Statistics

Statistics compiled by the National Land Reform Council have been criticized on several grounds. On the one hand, they are thought to involve confusion of original cases with revisions (which would mean duplication of statistics); on the other hand, charges have been made that the government statistics do not express the number of cases in process (which would mean that the work of the Council is greater than shown in the data available at any given moment).⁶⁸ In the former case, critics note that the original data include former landowners and persons who have simply had their existing rights confirmed as well as persons who have received land for the first time. In

⁶⁵*Ibid.*, p.36.

⁶⁶[Guillermo Gallo Mendoza and Roberto Gumucio Améstegui (coordinators)], *Reforma Agraria en Bolivia: Titulación* (La Paz: SNRA, 1967), p. 12.

⁶⁷Ferragut, "La Reforma Agraria," p. 460, noted in 1963 that official agricultural credit could be had without title if the regional land judge grants a certificate that states that the applicant will benefit from a land reform case in progress. Apparently, however, this method did not work out in practice; see [Gallo Mendoza and Gumucio Améstegui], *Reforma Agraria en Bolivia: Titulación*, p. 12.

⁶⁸For the respective views see Canelas, *Mito y Realidad*, pp. 216-217; and Ferragut, "La Reforma Agraria," pp. 459-460.

the latter case, a criticism is advanced that the classification of land in terms of being cultivable, incultivable, or for pasture is relative because uniform criteria have not been developed for purposes of differentiation.

To overcome some of these criticisms, as we shall see below, the Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria (SNRA) in 1966 entered into a project with the Comité Interamericano del Desarrollo Agrícola (CIDA) to reexamine each case terminated by the Council and to place relevant statistics on IBM cards. Thus, the SNRA has published cumulative revised data for 1967 (see Appendix W) and continued its processing of data which could eventually lead to a revised "computerized series" comparable with the original data.⁶⁹

Although revised time-series land reform data are not yet available for Bolivia, and the original series was discontinued in 1970 pending updating of the new computer series, original, unrevised statistics are available for constructing a yearly time-series view for the whole country up to 1969 (see Appendix A). While these original data cannot be reconstructed on a yearly basis for each of the country's nine departments, fortunately, however, it has been possible to develop such figures for crucial dates that are important for our political analysis. Therefore, the tables that follow are closely related to presidential terms⁷⁰ in order to present national and departmental data in standard units of time through 1969.

The dates chosen for cumulative analysis of title distribution since inception of the land reform program are for periods ending July 31, 1956; July 31, 1960; October 31, 1964; July 31, 1966; and September 30, 1969.

All correspond closely to change in presidential terms.⁷¹ the last period encompassing five months of the Barrientos period which was filled by a substitute after the general's death and before the end of elective government in 1969.

Tempo of Land Title Distribution

From the cumulative original figures on the total progress of land reform in Table 8 and Figure 2-1, it is clear that very little has been accomplished by 1956 when Paz Estenssoro left office. Only 85 542 hectares had been distributed to 5 600 heads of families (including former landowners). Note that because it is possible for a peasant to receive title either to collectively held lands or to his own plot, or to both, the number of titles exceeds the heads of family benefitted (in 1956 the difference was 1 073; in 1966 it had mounted to 93 067). The bulk of presidential action on land falls in the period 1960–1964, Paz Estenssoro's second term.

In order to show the land reform data in a different manner, Table 9 presents the amounts of distribution in noncumulative terms and shows percentages by category of activity. In Paz Estenssoro's first term ending in 1956, individual titles were emphasized, with only 21.0 per cent of all titles granted collectively. During President Siles's term the trend shifted to become more equal in distribution between collective and individual titles. Near balance was reached during Paz's years from 1960 to 1964, with some change in favor of individual holdings thereafter.

⁶⁹This SNRA project was undertaken with the cooperation of the Land Tenure Center located at the University of Wisconsin. In an interview with the coordinator of the project, Roberto Gumucio Améstegui noted in La Paz on October 26, 1970, that the computerization of data for a complete yearly time series may be too time consuming and expensive for the SNRA to develop, not only because of a shortage of personnel and funds but also because the SNRA possessed the only computer in the country and other agencies such as the Treasury Department were seeking its use. See also discussion at note 206.

With regard to inclusion of former landowners in land reform data, this is absolutely necessary because they are affected by land reform at least as much as are the new recipients; and confirmation of title also is important if peasants are expected to invest in the land.

⁷⁰President Víctor Paz Estenssoro served from April 15, 1952, until he turned over his office to Hernán Siles Zuazo on August 6, 1956. Paz reassumed the presidency on August 6, 1960, and began a third term August 6, 1964. On November 4, 1964, the MNR government was overthrown by General René Barrientos Ortuño and Alfredo Ovando Candia. Barrientos was acting president from November 5, 1964, to May 26, 1965, when he was joined in the presidency by Ovando; Barrientos resigned to become a presidential candidate on January 3, 1966, leaving Ovando as sole acting president. Barrientos served as president from August 6, 1966, until he lost his life on April 27, 1969. Luis Adolfo Siles Salinas (not to be confused with former President Hernán Siles, above) took over as acting president until he himself was overthrown by General Ovando on September 26, 1969, the last date for which data are included here. Presidential assumptions of office are given in Wilkie, *The Bolivian Revolution and U.S. Aid Since 1952*, Appendix H.

⁷¹Although cumulative summaries by department are available neither for Víctor Paz Estenssoro's first term in the presidency nor for Hernán Siles Zuazo's period as chief executive, data have been calculated by examining land title records according to case number in the Council's registry books; these data for the first six months of 1956 have been added to the cumulative summary available for December 31, 1955. Since only figures with identifiable dates have been used for the period January 1–July 31, 1956, the result is a minimum total for Paz; thus, it is likely that the Paz totals are slightly underestimated and that those for Siles, who followed him, are overestimated in the reconstructed series.

With regard to totals for July 31, 1960, monthly figures for August–December, 1960, have been subtracted from cumulative figures for December 31, 1960. Since no data are available in the August, 1960, monthly figures for certain categories (collective, cultivable, sports cooperatives, schools, colonization, and urbanization), these categories are slightly underestimated for Siles and overestimated for Paz who followed in the presidency. Minor adjustments in 1960 totals have been made to take into account monthly totals in these categories for September–December which do not agree with cumulative figures for December 31, 1960.




Figure 2-1

TABLE 8

^aOriginal Cumulative Bolivian Land Reform Data,
^bBy End of Presidential Term, 1956-1969

Category of Original Data	^c 1956	^d 1960	^e 1964	^f 1966	^g 1969
^h Titles (total)	6 673	69 226	246 691	272 225	317 787
Individual	5 271	40 192	130 498	144 409	170 839
Collective	1 402	29 034	116 193	127 816	146 948
ⁱ Heads of Family	5 600	45 655	163 578	179 158	208 181
^j Hectares Affected (total)	85 542	1 446 785	6 121 715	7 103 808	10 106 530
Reversion to State (subtotal)	#	20 869	219 820	250 070	365 848
Distributed (subtotal)	85 542	1 425 916	5 901 895	6 853 738	9 740 681
Individual					
Cultivable	34 526	637 697	2 465 808	2 665 949	3 039 911
Collective					
Cultivable	25 735	347 036	1 064 178	1 118 360	1 180 345
Pasture	25 236	404 815	1 797 306	2 422 378	4 719 115
Uncultivable	32	30 712	486 275	552 266	699 217
Schools	13	938	5 056	5 659	6 721
Sports	#	47	338	400	611
Cooperatives	#	3 353	48 496	52 601	55 782
Colonization	#	#	28 475	28 542	29 131
Urban Zones	#	1 294	5 963	7 585	9 849

^aData are from monthly summary sheets entitled "Número de Títulos Ejecutoriales y Superficies Entregados a Beneficiarios de Reforma Agraria a Partir de Mayo de 1955." See discussion of methodology and limitations which is included in text above and below. Excludes data in Appendix U.

^bAlthough the Revolution triumphed on April 9, 1952, the Land Reform Law dates from August 2, 1953; and the first legal distribution was not completed until May, 1955. Data exclude colonization.

^cJuly 31, 1956.

^dJuly 31, 1960.

^eOctober 31, 1964.

^fJuly 31, 1966.

^gSeptember 30, 1969.

^hIncludes former landowners affected by law; it is possible for a peasant to receive either a collective or individual title, or both.

ⁱHeads of family receiving title.

^jDetail may not add to total due to rounding; 1 hectare = 2.471 acres.

Source: Bolivia, Consejo Nacional de Reforma Agraria, Departamento de Estadística.

Whereas Pas Estenssoro gave a large share of total hectares for cultivable collective holdings (about 30 per cent) in his first term, he cut this figure in half during his second period, although the percentage devoted to collective pasture land held steady. One reason for a drop in collective cultivable lands may be understood in the following oral history interview with Paz:

Víctor Paz Estenssoro: As far as the manner in which land was distributed, it was given individually and also collectively. Especially in the medium-sized properties and latifundia, each of the peasants was assigned an individual plot.

TABLE 9

† Bolivian Land Reform Data by Presidential Period

Original Data	Paz		Siles		Paz		Barreintos-Ovando		Barreintos-Siles Salinas	
	Amount	Per Cent	Amount	Per Cent	Amount	Per Cent	Amount	Per Cent	Amount	Per Cent
Titles (total)	6 676	100.0	62 553	100.0	177 465	100.0	25 534	100.0	45 562	100.0
Individual	5 271	79.0	34 921	55.8	90 306	40.9	13 911	54.5	26 430	58.0
Collective	1 402	21.0	27 632	44.2	87 159	49.9	11 623	45.5	19 132	42.0
Heads of Family	5 600	**	40 055	**	117 923	**	15 580	**	29 023	**
Hectares Affected (total)	85 542	100.00	1 361 243	100.0	4 674 930	100.0	982 093	100.0	3 002 722	100.0
Reversion to State (subtotal)	#	#	20 869	1.5	198 951	4.3	30 250	3.1	115 778	3.8
Distributed (subtotals)										
Individual										
Cultivable	34 526	40.4	603 171	44.3	1 828 111	39.1	200 141	20.4	373 962	12.5
Collective										
Cultivable	25 735	30.1	321 301	23.6	717 142	15.3	54 182	5.5	61 985	2.1
Pasture	25 236	29.5	379 579	27.9	1 392 491	29.8	625 072	63.6	2 296 737	76.5
Uncultivable	32	#	30 680	2.3	455 513	9.7	65 991	6.7	146 951	4.9
Schools	13	#	925	.1	4 118	.1	603	.1	1 062	#
Sports	#	#	47	#	291	#	62	#	211	#
Cooperatives	#	#	3 353	.2	45 153	1.0	4 105	.4	3 181	.1
Colonization	#	#	#	#	28 475	.6	67	#	589	#
Urban Zones	#	#	1 294	.1	4 669	.1	1 622	.2	2 264	.1

† Calculated from Table 8.

Methods and Sources: See notes and source for Table 8.

James W. Wilkie: Could he sell it?

Víctor Paz Estenssoro: Yes, he could sell it; it was his own. Also, large-sized extensions of land were delimited for collective cultivation. . . . But in certain zones of the country it happened that the desire for private ownership of land was so strong in the peasants that these areas which were collectively assigned to them were later divided among themselves, without any intervention from the authorities, because each wanted to have his own plot.

James W. Wilkie: And was this legal? Why did you decide to distribute land collectively?

Víctor Paz Estenssoro: No, it was not legal. We distributed land collectively, on the one

hand, because of the tradition still present in many areas of the country of the ancient commune which dates from the time of the Incas, and on the other, because of the thesis that communal work, in regard to land, gives a much larger yield. In many areas the peasants have worked collectively with very good results. But in others, especially in Cochabamba, they divided the land themselves. . . .⁷²

It is important to note Paz's view that lands granted under Bolivia's land reform can be sold, because since the mid-1960s the Land Reform Council has interpreted articles 2 and 33 of the 1953 Land Reform Decree—Law 03464 to mean that lands received are inalienable and can only pass to legal heirs upon the death of the grantee; otherwise the property

⁷²Wilkie and Wilkie, Entrevistas de Historia Oral con Paz Estenssoro, June 29, 1966. Cf. Ronald J. Clark, *Temas Sobre La Propiedad Rural y la Reforma Agraria en Bolivia* (La Paz: Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria, 1970) who discusses the *individualización* of communal properties on a de facto basis. For an idealistic (if less realistic) view of the problem, see García, "La Reforma Agraria y el Desarrollo Social," pp. 431–432, who believes that land reform should have stressed Bolivia's communal heritage.

generally reverts to the state.⁷³ It is clear that since such a provision of land reform is difficult to implement, often it has been ignored by the government, in the same manner that the provision requiring the government to issue bonds in compensation for expropriated lands has not been fulfilled.

In regard to lands distributed, titles of cultivable lands placed in hands of individuals were about 40 per cent of the total during the first three presidential periods under consideration. This figure fell to about 20 per cent under Barrientos and Ovando, and to 12.5 per cent under Barrientos-Siles Salinas. Post-MNR governments after 1964 apparently turned away from grants of cultivable collective holdings to favor titles for pasture land. Under Paz and Siles, cultivable collective lands ran between about 24 and 30 per cent; this amount fell to 5.5 and 2.1 per cent of total lands distributed under Barrientos-Ovando and Barrientos-Siles Salinas, respectively. Uncultivable lands made up a share of from 4.9 to 9.7 per cent only after 1960. Lands for schools, sports, cooperatives, and urban zones have been of minor import in presidential policy. Colonization under the auspices of the Council has been negligible as the major responsibility for this activity was in the Department of Colonization, affiliated with the Ministry of Agriculture, until creation of a separate agency in 1965.

Since presidential terms have varied in length, it is necessary to present monthly averages of activity for each category of distribution in order to understand the relative impact that successive executives have had on Bolivia's rural situation (see Table 10). Not only did Paz Estenssoro reach the highest level of distribution in absolute terms (Table 8), but his record for relative activity in monthly terms is higher in all categories except in grants of pasture land, which reached successive peaks under the post-MNR governments. Total title distribution during Paz's fifty-one months in office from 1960 to 1964 reflects a deep interest in pushing land reform; it is notable that grants of title in the period immediately preceding and following Paz's second term have been about equal in average terms, and the same has held true for members of family heads affected. It is remarkable that Paz was able to

carry out this great amount of work with the small budget of the Council (see Table 7). Although we might presume that the impetus of land reform gained speed as the base of work expanded in relation to the time lag in bureaucratic operations, regardless of budget (which had to be relatively high in the beginning in order to establish the Council), the decline in titling activity after 1964 to the level of the Siles era belies such a view. As Figure 2-2 and Appendix A reveal, during all of 1968 a scant 5 477 heads of family were benefitted; and even allowing for delay, only 8 621 titles were granted during the first nine months of 1969.


General Barrientos apparently realized the urgent need of regaining the impetus of land reform which was lost after Paz's fall in 1964 (see Figure 2-3), impetus that declined especially during 1965 when he shared power with General Ovando. In order to develop peasant support as a counterweight to his own military force which he felt to be a threat to executive power (and in order to capture the MNR base of support among the peasantry), President Barrientos attempted to set up long-projected Mobile Brigades to expedite the land distribution process. In 1967 the Bolivian government announced the organization of ten Brigades to travel through the countryside resolving problems, but although such squads were to begin work in the summer of 1967, according to *El Diario* of December 31, 1967, they had not begun to function by the end of the year, no doubt because of a shortage of funds.⁷⁴

As indicated, however, the infusion in 1968 of USAID funds into the Land Reform Agency provided the necessary money to make the Mobile Brigades operative. Thus, a change in land distribution procedures instituted a special process compared with the original process. In this new method, teams of topographers and land judges are sent into the field in order to coordinate the distribution process, thus avoiding disconnected original procedures in which the length of time between visits of judges and topographers often has meant that changed conditions require further visits to clarify confusion. Although the Mobile Brigades fell 57 per cent behind their goal of

⁷³For Decree-Law 03464 (August 2, 1953) see pp. 455-491 in "La Reforma Agraria en Bolivia," *Revista Jurídica* (Universidad Mayor de San Simón, Cochabamba) 17 (1953), pp. 1-586 (this issue contains reports and decrees as well as background to understand the law). The Land Reform Council's rural inspectors are charged not only with initiating land reform process in the first instance but also with investigating to assure that lands distributed are properly used to fulfill a social function, thus making the land reform process open ended (see *ibid.*, p. 500). By law, all grantees lose title if they do not work their land for two years following its concession or if they do not use the land thereafter; see article 34 of Supreme Decree 05702 (February 10, 1961) which is printed in *Ley de la Reforma Agraria en Bolivia (Leyes Conexas; Decretos, Resoluciones y Circulares: 1871-1966)* (La Paz: Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria, 1966), pp. 225-232; and Thome, "Problems Which Obstruct the Process of Title Distribution," pp. 11-12. Furthermore, Article 1 of the Council's "Circular No. 1/66," dated April 1, 1966, specifically prohibits the sale of lands that (a) have or (b) have not been affected by the land reform process, unless sale is approved by the Council in advance. See Buenaventura Villarroel and Guillermo Barrios Avila, *Legislación Agraria y Jurisprudencia* (La Paz: n.p., 1969), p. 127.

⁷⁴The shortage of trained personnel to carry out the land reform has been a continuing problem for all governments. At the end of his first term, Paz Estenssoro noted this problem in his message to Congress in July, 1956 (*Mensaje del Presidente de la República . . . al H. Congreso Nacional* [La Paz: Editorial SPIC, 1956], p. 34).

BOLIVIA LAND REFORM DATA BY YEAR, 1955-1969



SOURCE: APPENDIX A

Figure 2-2

TABLE 10

^aAverage Monthly Bolivian Land Reform Activity

Original Data	Paz ^b 51 months	Siles 48 months	Paz 51 months	Barrientos- Ovando 21 months	Barrientos- Siles Salinas 38 months
Titles (total)	131	1 303	3 480	1 216	1 199
Individual	103	727	1 771	662	696
Collective	28	576	1 709	554	503
Heads of Family	110	834	2 312	742	764
Hectares Affected (total)	1 677	28 359	91 665	46 766	79 019
Reversion to State (subtotal)	#	435	3 901	1 440	3 047
Distributed (subtotal)	1 677	27 924	87 764	45 326	75 972
Individual					
Cultivable	677	12 566	35 845	9 351	9 841
Collective					
Cultivable	505	6 694	14 062	2 580	1 631
Pasture	495	7 908	27 304	29 765	60 440
Uncultivable	1	639	8 932	3 142	3 867
Schools	#	19	81	29	28
Sports	#	1	6	3	5
Cooperatives	#	70	885	195	84
Colonization	#	#	558	3	16
Urban Zones	#	27	92	77	60

^aCalculated from Table 9.

^bSince Paz Estenssoro did not arrive in Bolivia to assume the presidency until April 15, 1952, his first term excludes April from the first 51-month total.

Method and Source: See notes and source for Table 8.

distributing title to 100 000 heads of family in less than fifteen months, in 1968 and 1969 the Brigades did process special titles for 57 885 heads of family (see Appendix U). Because these data apparently were mostly provisional in nature, and because they do not compare with definitive, original data, these new special titles are only tangentially discussed here. Suffice it to say that at this writing no detailed breakdown was available for the new data because they will probably be fitted into a revised series which had only just been developed for 1967, the year preceding inauguration of the Mobile Brigades.

Revised statistics for 1967 are presented in Appendices V and W. While we hope that this data provides a realistic basis for understanding the development of cumulative land distribution up to 1967, be cautioned that the statistical revision was not without its own problems. Reexamination of all cases completed by the Council simply was not possible because

many individual case records have been lost or misplaced. Also, the examination of thousands of lengthy and often confusing case histories may be reviewed as too difficult a task for research assistants, who, in any event, could only hope to eliminate errors without introducing any new ones, not reclassify data. Note that one of the directors of this revision, Ronald J. Clark, chose to use original titling data instead of the revised data (see Appendix W) in a study he published in 1971.

Although revised data are discussed more fully in Chapter 4 below, a brief comparison of original figures with revised data for 1967 (Appendix W) reveals that although there is some discrepancy in the number of heads of family benefitted, the amount of hectares is about the same. Whereas the revised figures for heads of family benefitted reach only 82 per cent of the original total for Bolivia, the percentage varies by department from a low of 71 per cent for Tarija to a

BOLIVIAN LAND REFORM DATA BY PRESIDENTIAL PERIOD

PRESIDENT	PAZ	SILES	PAZ	BARRIENTOS- OVANDO	BARRIENTOS- SILES SALINAS	TOTAL
TERMS	1952 - 1956	1956 - 1960	1960 - 1964	1964 - 1966	1966 - 1969	
PERCENTAGE OF TIME IN OFFICE	24.4% 51 MONTHS	23.0% 48 MONTHS	24.4% 51 MONTHS	10.0% 21 MONTHS	18.2% 38 MONTHS	100 % 209
TITLES (TOTAL)	2.7	19.2%	56.7%	7.5%	13.9%	100 % 208,181
HEADS OF FAMILY	23	16.1%	63.6%	6.3%	11.7%	100 % 248,236
TOTAL HECTARES	9	13.5%	46.2%	9.7%	29.7%	100 % 10,106,530
CULTIVABLE (43.3% OF DISTRIBUTED LAND)		21.9%	60.3%		6.0% 10.3%	100 % 4,220,256

SOURCES: TABLES 8.9, AND 10

Figure 2-3

high of 105 percent for Pando, the latter receiving more benefits in the revised figures than in original statistics. Because of the problems inherent in the revision, however, it is difficult to say what this discrepancy means. If original figures include double counting of heads of family owing to adjustment of grants in the titling process itself, this would not necessarily indicate a deliberate attempt to juggle figures for purposes of untrue propaganda. The fact that the government itself has undertaken to revise the figures suggests a relatively honest approach to ascertaining "truth." Furthermore, the original series may reflect accurately the amount of activity in which the Council has been involved over time in each department. An awareness of this activity is important, for even though such work might have involved only adjustment of grants in a given area, it would have helped to convince the peasants that the Council was working on their behalf.

The revised amount of hectares involved in the land reform process are within 3 to 5 per cent of the original data (Appendix W). It is notable that in five of the country's nine departments, revised figures actually exceeded original data for both hectares affected and hectares distributed, indicating that simple book-keeping errors may account for the discrepancies. And since neither the original nor the revised series tell us how much land has been abandoned, ceded, share-cropped, rented, or sold, it is clearly a problem to

interpret the meaning of revised and/or original data that have been extracted from summaries of years of complicated litigation. Nevertheless, the original figures for which time-series data are available (in contrast with revised figures that exist only for 1967) offer us a method of evaluating the regional impact of land reform as seen by citizens, who in their attempt to interpret the course of Bolivian rural policy, have been as dependent upon the original series as has the Bolivian government itself. Given those limitations, the analysis of original data presented here presents one aspect of the many facets of Bolivian land reform, the type and location of which, for example, we may now examine.

Type and Location of Land Reform

The cumulative effect of the land reform program upon the different departments of Bolivia is shown in Table 11. According to original data, cultivable lands granted with individual title were concentrated in the department of La Paz by 1956 when President Paz first left office. During Siles's term, ending in 1960, emphasis upon this classification shifted to Santa Cruz, with Beni, Chuquisaca, and Potosí sharing secondarily; although La Paz declined, it was still first in importance. President Paz's second period in office not only fixed the cumulative relation-

TABLE 11
Cumulative Land Distributed by Classification
in Each Department of Bolivia

Original Data	†Percentages				
	1956	1960	1964	1966	1969
A. Individual Cultivable	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Beni	#	10.1	21.7	20.2	18.9
Chuquisaca	16.2	11.9	14.4	14.4	15.0
Cochabamba	11.4	7.1	12.3	12.7	12.6
La Paz	52.8	21.8	14.1	14.6	15.2
Oruro	4.3	8.3	3.6	3.4	3.1
Pando	#	.4	.2	.1	.2
Potosí	1.4	11.1	7.4	7.0	6.6
Santa Cruz	2.9	20.5	21.2	22.9	24.1
Tarija	11.0	8.8	5.1	4.7	4.3
B. Collective Cultivable	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Beni	#	#	.1	.1	.6
Chuquisaca	5.7	4.5	6.4	6.2	6.2
Cochabamba	36.2	17.7	17.1	17.1	17.0
La Paz	58.1	28.7	28.1	29.4	29.9
Oruro	#	18.0	15.8	15.2	14.4
Pando	#	#	#	#	#
Potosí	#	26.8	23.6	22.4	21.4
Santa Cruz	#	.9	4.4	5.3	6.4
Tarija	#	3.4	4.5	4.3	4.1
C. Collective Pasture	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Beni	#	#	#	6.4	23.3
Chuquisaca	#	9.4	17.6	16.7	12.3
Cochabamba	.1	10.6	17.2	15.5	9.4
La Paz	82.4	21.9	19.1	17.0	11.7
Oruro	17.5	17.4	5.6	4.2	2.3
Pando	#	#	#	#	.1
Potosí	#	30.5	31.8	23.8	13.2
Santa Cruz	#	#	.7	10.4	23.9
Tarija	#	10.2	8.0	6.0	3.8
D. Collective Uncultivable	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Beni	#	#	#	#	.2
Chuquisaca	#	10.6	11.2	10.8	15.7
Cochabamba	#	8.0	24.5	26.9	26.7
La Paz	100.0	40.0	43.1	41.8	38.4
Oruro	#	10.9	10.6	10.5	8.3
Pando	#	#	#	#	#
Potosí	#	30.5	8.0	7.3	6.8
Santa Cruz	#	#	2.3	2.4	3.3
Tarija	#	#	.3	.3	.6

†Calculated from Appendices B-J.

Methods and Source: See notes and source for Table 8.

ship of the departments to each other for the subsequent periods, but established Beni's importance along with Santa Cruz. Secondarily, La Paz and Chuquisaca came to share about equally in the number of individual grants for cultivable lands. (No revised figures are available in time series, however, for cumulative data through 1967—see Appendix Z.)

All types of collective titles centered in La Paz until 1956, ranging from 58.1 per cent for cultivable to 100.0 for uncultivable land. Obviously the MNR felt that its first major land reform activity should be conducted close to the seat of national government. Perhaps the MNR not only could easily see this need, but action was more convenient here because of proximity. Although only about 11 per cent of the cultivable lands in Cochabamba were granted in individual title, over 36 per cent of that land was granted for collective holdings.

From 1956 to 1960 a pattern for collective cultivable lands was established which has seen little change. La Paz remained at the vanguard with slightly under 30 per cent of the total. Potosí and Cochabamba follow in descending order.

Until 1966, collective pasture land was most important in land distribution figures for Potosí; after that Santa Cruz and Beni gained in cumulative terms at Potosí's expense. La Paz and Oruro started out with a cumulative advantage in the distribution of these lands before 1956, but their position changed after 1956 and 1960, respectively.

Distribution of collective uncultivable lands did not change much in percentage terms after Siles's presidency, except for Cochabamba which gained a high share formerly held by Potosí. Presumably lands classified as uncultivable may be included either in grants of cultivable- and pasture-land grants or in separate grants to individuals with herds of sheep and llama. Although Antonio García wrote in 1964 that uncultivable lands have predominated over all others in types of land distributed,⁷⁵ original data in Table 8 and revised data in Appendix V suggest that this has not been the case.

In all types of distribution shown in Table 11, Pando has had almost no activity; only in individual cultivable lands has Pando benefitted (.2 per cent by 1969). Beni has received minimal amounts of collective cultivable land, and in the long run Tarija has had little cumulative share in land reform activity. In order to

understand the meaning of these figures, however, it is necessary to examine land distribution in relation to usable land.

Land Reform in Relation to Bolivian Land Surface and Use

With the perspective of two presidential periods of land reform, William S. Stokes wrote:

In his address to the national congress in 1958, President Siles Zuazo estimated that it would take thirty to forty years to complete the [land] reform. However, Beltrán and Fernández (1960) have calculated that if the "rhythm" of the first period of the reform—1953-1956—were followed, it would take 485 years to redistribute the land. If the increased pace of the 1956-1959 period were to continue, it would take 108 years.⁷⁶

Yet in 1962 Casto Ferragut noted that the Council's expropriation of lands was close to termination, the principal task remaining being that of confirming title to small properties and Indian communes.⁷⁷ Certainly these very different ways of looking at the results of Bolivia's land reform require assessment.

The number of properties in Bolivia is unknown because the Agricultural Census of 1950 recorded the number of property owners and not the number of properties they owned;⁷⁸ but an effective method of assessing the total impact of land reform is to relate it to Bolivia's land surface. In order to examine land in use rather than usable land, the 1950 census surveyed only 29.8 per cent of Bolivia's total territory so it is clear that as Bolivia integrates new areas into national economic life, the work of the Council will be ongoing. Rather than examine only land distribution at any given time as a percentage of properties and total land censused in 1950,⁷⁹ Table 12 shows also the minimum and maximum amounts of hectares that may be affected. Line A gives Bolivia's total surface in hectares as 109 361 100, the maximum that may be affected. This total will never be fully distributed, but with the building of roads and dams, and with the development of new agricultural techniques, much of this territory may someday be usable for agricultural purposes (including ranching, hunting, fishing, and silviculture).

⁷⁵García, "La Reforma Agraria y el Desarrollo Social," p. 418.

⁷⁶William S. Stokes, "The *Contraproducente* Consequences of Foreign Aid in Bolivia," in Helmut Schoeck and James Wiggins (eds.), *The New Argument in Economics: The Public Versus the Private Sector* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1963), pp. 145-184. Stokes (p. 157) cites Beltrán and Fernández, *¿Dónde Va la Reforma Agraria Boliviana?*, pp. 75-76.

⁷⁷Ferragut, "La Reforma Agraria," p. 461.

⁷⁸According to Bolivia, Dirección Nacional de Estadística y Censos, *Censo Agropecuario, 1950* (La Paz: Ministerio de Hacienda, 1956), p. vii, because prior to land reform in 1953 a reduced number of persons owned as many as 3 or more properties, the census of 1950 counted properties owned by the same person as one census unit.

⁷⁹Cf. García, "La Reforma Agraria y el Desarrollo Social," pp. 458, 462; and Thome, "Problems Which Obstruct the Process of Title Distribution," pp. 3-4, 26.

TABLE 12
 Cumulative Bolivian Distribution of (A) Land Surface and
 (B) Land Censused, By Department

Department	Hectares 1950	†Cumulative Per Cent Distributed				
		1956	1960	1964	1966	1969
Total						
A Land Surface	109 361 100	.1	1.3	5.4	6.3	8.9
B Land Censused	32 749 850	.3	4.4	18.0	20.9	29.7
Beni						
A Land Surface	21 356 400	#	.3	2.5	3.3	7.9
B Land Censused	4 112 747	#	1.6	13.1	16.9	41.0
Chuquisaca						
A Land Surface	5 152 400	.1	2.6	15.5	17.8	23.7
B Land Censused	5 292 748	.1	2.5	15.1	17.4	23.1
Cochabamba						
A Land Surface	5 563 100	.2	2.7	16.6	19.1	22.1
B Land Censused	3 590 370	.4	4.2	25.7	29.7	34.2
La Paz						
A Land Surface	13 027 500	.4	2.6	9.4	10.7	12.8
B Land Censused	7 421 329	.7	4.6	16.5	18.7	22.4
Oruro						
A Land Surface	5 232 800	.1	3.6	7.9	8.1	8.4
B Land Censused	3 250 217	.2	5.8	12.7	13.1	13.5
Pando						
A Land Surface	6 382 700	#	#	.1	.1	.1
B Land Censused	1 317 112	#	.2	.3	.3	.7
Potosí						
A Land Surface	11 821 800	#	2.5	8.9	9.0	9.6
B Land Censused	2 223 403	#	13.4	47.3	47.7	50.8
Santa Cruz						
A Land Surface	37 062 100	#	.4	1.7	2.6	5.4
B Land Censused	3 778 053	#	3.6	16.6	25.8	53.0
Tarija						
A Land Surface	3 762 300	.1	2.9	8.5	8.5	9.7
B Land Censused	1 763 871	.2	6.2	18.1	18.2	20.7

†Original data.

Sources: Percentages are calculated from Table 8 and Appendices B-J; land censused is from Appendix L. Land surface is from Bolivia, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos, *Censo Demográfico, 1950* (La Paz: Editorial Argote, 1955), pp 7-10, except that Lakes Titicaca and Poopó are excluded on the basis of estimates by Federico E. Ahlfeld, *Geografía Física de Bolivia* (La Paz: "Los Amigos del Libro, 1969), pp. 106, 116 and Bolivia, Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria, *Reforma Agraria en Bolivia* (2 vols.; La Paz, 1970—), II, Appendix IV-7.

Line B gives the total of land censused in 1950 as 32 749 850 hectares. Since the latter amount represents an undercensus (see discussion of Table 13 below), it constitutes a minimum (29.7 per cent) of Bolivia's total surface that is usable for agricultural purposes. Although the minimum and maximum are unrealistic, they do provide gauges with which to test Bolivia's progress in land reform.

Note that the amount of land censused in 1950 is in all cases much less than the total surface in each entity, except for Chuquisaca where slightly more land was censused than exists in official calculation of the department's size. For this reason, about the same amount (23 per cent) of Chuquisaca's total surface and censused area has been distributed. In Potosí and Santa Cruz over half of the land censused in 1950 had been distributed by 1969, compared with a low of .7 per cent in Pando. In relation to total surface, however, Chuquisaca and Cochabamba received the highest amount by 1969, with Pando still the lowest. If less than one-third of Bolivia's censused land had been legally distributed by 1969, obviously a great deal remains to be done; but at the rate of 8.8 per cent in 38 months (the percentage of land distributed between 1966 and 1969), it would take over twenty-five years to complete redistribution of all censused land, including confirmation of titles legally held. At the Paz Estenssoro rate of 1960-1964, the program could be complete for censused lands in slightly over twenty years. At those rates and considering the vast amount of total surface not included in the census, however, the Council would have only begun its work at the end of this century unless it had established Mobile Brigades.

As new lands are opened in the future for colonization in Bolivia's eastern lowlands, the amount of land surface in use will expand. According to data supplied by the Bolivian Institute of Colonization and Rural Development, there are 1 813 000 hectares or 1.7 per cent of Bolivia's total surface immediately ready for colonization.⁸⁰ If a UN estimate is correct which places Bolivian wasteland at 37.7 per cent of total surface, that leaves 62.3 per cent usable.⁸¹ Since only 29.8 per cent of Bolivia's total extension was censused in 1950, we have a potential difference in usable but unused land of 32.5 per cent of the country's land surface. Obviously, the 1.7 per cent

immediately ready for colonization is a small portion of the land that may be used someday. According to Cornelius Zondag, increased colonization is likely to have an important impact on the development of Bolivia's forestry potential and the growth of tropical agriculture. Certainly cattle raising can be greatly expanded (along with marketing and transportation). Zondag notes that Beni's fine natural pasture could support an increase in cattle population from about 700 000 to 5 million head, thus bringing an economic boom to the area.⁸²

Problems in the Bolivian Agriculture and Ranching Census of 1950 can be seen by comparing cultivable land censused with the amount of cultivable land distributed in both individual and collective terms. Table 13 shows that by 1964 about 14 per cent more cultivable lands had been distributed than censused in 1950. Only La Paz, Oruro, and Pando were below 100 per cent of the 1950 figure; Beni had reached 849.7 per cent and Tarija was over 400 per cent.

Either the census was grossly inadequate or else mistakes and misclassification of lands distributed under the reform program can account for figures in Table 13. Obviously mistakes may enter into the problem to some extent, but certainly the land census of 1950 was incomplete. The official who wrote the introduction to the published census recognized the inadequacy of the work when he commented:

In spite of clear and definite instructions for each of the questions asked [about land use], many errors and much deficient information was found in the course of critical analysis

Since in the country land is not exploited in any intense manner, given the enormous fertile areas available, the practice of consecutive plantings was found only in isolated cases

The rest of the questions, except for the one on fallow lands, were obtained satisfactorily. Within the latter, besides "fallow lands used in normal rotation of crops," "cultivable but uncultivated lands" were included since the term "fallow" in Bolivia is generally applied to all those areas which have been used at one time, but which have been abandoned in order to take advantage of others.

⁸⁰Data prepared for the author by Departamento de Enlace Técnico, Sección Proyectos de Colonización, Instituto de Colonización y Desarrollo de Comunidades Rurales, January, 1967. On colonization see, for example, Bolivia, Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Coordinación, *Plan Bienal, 1965-1966; Sector Agropecuario* (2 vols; La Paz, n.d.), I, pp. 62-65; Kelso Lee Wessel, "An Economic Assessment of Pioneer Settlement in the Bolivian Lowlands," Ithaca: Ph.D. thesis in international agricultural development, Cornell University, 1958; Zondag, *The Bolivian Economy*; Richard W. Patch, "Bolivia's Experiments in Development without Aid," *American Universities Field Staff Reports*, June, 1964; Dozier, *Land Development and Colonization in Latin America*. See also notes 191 and 193 below.

⁸¹United Nations, Comisión Económica Para América Latina, *Análisis y Proyecciones del Desarrollo Económico, IV, El Desarrollo Económico de Bolivia* (México, D.F.: Departamento de Asuntos Económicos y Sociales, 1958), p. 254.

⁸²Zondag, *The Bolivian Economy*, pp. 150, 162-163.

TABLE 13

^aCumulative Bolivian Distribution of Cultivable Land as Percentage
of Cultivable Land Censused in 1950

Department	Cultivable Censused in ^b 1950	Cumulative Percentage Distributed				
		1956	1960	1964	1966	1969
Total	3 091 424	1.9	30.7	114.2	124.5	136.5
Beni	63 153	#	102.3	849.7	854.1	921.4
Chuquisaca	268 057	2.6	34.1	158.3	169.2	196.7
Cochabamba	293 127	4.5	36.5	165.4	180.7	199.0
La Paz	1 489 858	2.2	16.0	43.4	48.2	54.6
Oruro	402 638	.4	28.7	64.0	64.5	66.1
Pando	20 595	#	11.6	17.3	17.3	22.5
Potosí	344 992	.1	47.4	125.5	126.4	131.2
Santa Cruz	166 299	.6	80.6	342.1	402.2	486.8
Tarija	42 706	8.9	159.0	407.8	408.8	421.4

^aIndividually and collectively held land; original data.

^bCultivated and fallow hectares.

Source: Percentages are calculated from Table 8 and Appendices B-J; land censused is from Appendix L.

In this manner, it is common to find lands which are "fallow" for 20, 30 and more years for the simple reason that the country has extensive and fertile territories which are completely virgin lands.⁸³

With regard to the Revolution's failure to exploit these rich lands, it is interesting to note a criticism by Hugo Roberts Barragán. Roberts was a leader of the conservative wing of the MNR which triumphed on April 9, 1952; and he was the first and only Minister of Propaganda in the new government. Disillusioned with the radical course of the Revolution, he was accused of taking part in a counterrevolution on January 6, 1953, for which he was jailed and later exiled. Robert's views are revealed in the following oral history interview with me:

In the first place, distribution of lands was not possible because all *colonos*⁸⁴ ancestrally possessed their plots of land [*sayañas*]; they inherited them . . . from the time of the Incas. Therefore, for example, moving a *colono* from one place to the other or discharging him was a very serious problem for a landowner—even though the owner had absolute property rights. Rarely did a *colono* leave his plot [and] it was

almost impossible to take away a *sayaña* from a *colono* because if it were seized from him, his close relative occupied it immediately.

Thus, the *colonos* possessed their lands from time immemorial, and from that point of view it was impossible to distribute [their] lands; the land was already distributed. The famous landowners who theoretically had thousands of hectares, in reality did not have thousands of hectares because most of the land—95 per cent—was in the hands of the *colonos*. The landowner had 5 per cent at most. Then, this idea that the land holders owned great extensions of land was only theoretical in Bolivia.

Our idea as nationalists was to raise the social, economic, and cultural level of the Indian . . . But when the Revolution of April 9th was followed by a swing to the left with the Marxist-tinged politics of Dr. Víctor Paz, then the formula "agrarian reform" was invented, which in reality does not have anything to do with agrarian reform; it is neither reform nor is it agrarian, because a new distribution of lands must take place, and this has not been the case in Bolivia. In Bolivia, before and after the "agrarian

⁸³Bolivia, Dirección Nacional de Estadística y Censos, *Censo Agropecuario, 1950*, p. ix.

⁸⁴*Colonos* are peasants who supply service to a large estate in return for the right to possess their own small plot or *sayaña*. They often are bound to the land in debt peonage.

reform," each *colono* continued to occupy his *sayaña*, and probably will continue to occupy it for many years. Thus there has not been any land distribution, but rather a fiction about ownership, of the right to own property, in order to make the Indian believe that through a title given by the government, he automatically has become the owner of a plot of land which actually had been his since time immemorial

In reality, the only thing that the land reform has done is to do away with the *colono's* obligation to work two or three days a week for the owner. That is the only thing which the agrarian reform has accomplished.

The land reform law establishes the following: that in the first place, the Indians are owners of their plots of land, juridically—in spite of the fact that they were always proprietors. Second, . . . the property of the landowners is reduced to a minimum extension of terrain⁸⁵. . . . It also establishes a theoretical payment of bonds which has never been carried out by the state. Such bonds have not been distributed to landowners [in payment] for the lands that they have yielded to the peasants. And this [measure] has been set down for foreign consumption, without the slightest intention of carrying it out; it has been impossible to fulfill because the state has not had funds to pay for all the lands which it expropriates for the peasants

Bolivia should have opened new roads and distributed the great agricultural extensions which it has and which at this moment are unused and do not belong to anyone. I think that Bolivia is one of the few remaining countries in the world which still have enormous extension of unused lands. Imagine, the whole Department of Beni is unused lands, and those lands are rich for agriculture and grazing

This matter of communications is a very strange problem in Bolivia. Bolivia has been endowed by nature with about 10 000 kilometers of navigable rivers, at least. But these rivers have not been exploited because we have lacked 150 or 200 kilometers of road which our governments never bothered to build. The great work of a revolution would have been to carry out a new distribution of lands, thus putting into production the unused lands which have not yielded any benefit to the country."⁸⁶

Whatever the validity of Robert's critical analysis of the land reform process, he has overlooked the immediate political need of the government to legalize a de facto situation in which landlords were driven from their holdings. Also, even if peasants continue only to occupy traditionally held plots, national integration of the rural population requires distribution of title in order to offer incentive for investments of time and energy in underdeveloped holdings.

Land Distribution Compared with Population by Department

Theoretically, a government carrying out land reform will act in those departments where population pressures on the land are heaviest. Since we do not have time-series data on the agriculturally employed population. Table 14 is based upon total population as estimated by the Bolivian Statistical Agency.⁸⁷ Total population is important in calculations, not only for the purpose of assessing the impact of propaganda but also because in times of economic adversity people will return to the land in order to subsist. Moreover, in a predominantly rural economy, there are many part-time farmers who may not be included in agricultural censuses. Table 14 presents the ratio of cumulative hectares distributed to total estimated population at the end of presidential periods. All hectares distributed under the land reform program are presented here regardless of land classification since they reflect

⁸⁵Maximum amounts range from 3 to 50 000 hectares, according to the type of exploitation and zone (see Appendix M).

⁸⁶James W. Wilkie and Edna M. Wilkie, *Entrevistas de Historia Oral con Hugo Roberts Barragán*, La Paz, Bolivia, December 26, 1966.

With regard to land occupied under the reform, see William E. Carter, *Aymara Communities and the Bolivian Agrarian Reform* (Gainesville: University of Florida Monographs, 1964), p. 71, who notes that "Though the landlord had legal title to [an] entire area, he was in fact limited to an impressively small portion of it. The rest was exploited both by and for the peasants, in the same type of system used in free communities." In another case, investigators found that families in Chuquisaca continue to work the same land as before the reform; see Dwight B. Heath, Charles J. Erasmus, and Hans C. Buechler, *Land Reform and Social Revolution in Bolivia* (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 118. For a recent view with bibliography of the latest studies, see Dwight B. Heath, "New Patrons for Old: Changing Patron-Client Relationships in the Bolivian Yungas," *Ethnology* 12:1 (1973), pp. 75–98; see also William J. McEwen, *Changing Rural Bolivia* (New York?: Research Institute for the Study of Man, 1969).

With regard to government purchase of expropriated lands, Thome, "Problems Which Obstruct the Process of Title Distribution," p. 12, writes that bonds have neither been issued by the government nor demanded by the former landowners because of the low original value (five times the cadastral or assessed tax rate) of the expropriated properties, especially after the great inflation of the mid-1950's.

⁸⁷Bolivia's last official population census was taken in 1950; figures given in Table 8 and Part I of Appendix K are based upon Estimate C presented in Wilkie, *The Bolivian Revolution and U.S. Aid Since 1952*, Table 8.

TABLE 14

Ratio by Department of (A) Per Cent of Cumulative Hectares Distributed
to (B) Per Cent of Estimated Population in Bolivia

† (Hectares as a rounded percentage of population)

Department	1956			1960			1964			1966			1969		
	Hectares	Population	Ratio	Hectares	Population	Ratio	Hectares	Population	Ratio	Hectares	Population	Ratio	Hectares	Population	Ratio
Total	100.0	100.0	**	100.0	100.0	**	100.0	100.0	**	100.0	100.0	**	100.0	100.0	**
Beni	#	4.2	**	4.5	4.4	1.0	9.2	4.8	1.9	10.2	4.9	2.1	17.3	5.1	3.4
Chuquisaca	8.3	9.0	.9	9.3	8.8	1.1	13.5	8.5	1.6	13.4	8.4	1.6	12.5	8.2	1.5
Cochabamba	15.5	15.9	1.0	10.7	15.6	.7	15.6	15.3	1.0	15.5	15.2	1.0	12.6	15.0	.8
La Paz	63.1	32.0	2.0	24.0	32.4	.7	20.8	32.7	.6	20.3	32.9	.6	17.1	33.3	.5
Oruro	6.9	7.2	1.0	13.3	7.4	1.8	7.0	7.5	.9	6.2	7.6	.8	4.5	7.8	.6
Pando	#	.7	**	.2	.7	.3	.1	.7	.1	#	.7	**	.1	.7	.1
Potosí	.6	17.5	**	20.9	17.4	1.2	17.8	17.4	1.0	15.5	17.3	.9	11.6	17.1	.7
Santa Cruz	1.2	9.4	.1	9.4	9.3	1.0	10.6	9.1	1.2	14.2	9.1	1.6	20.6	9.1	2.3
Tarija	4.4	4.1	1.1	7.7	4.0	1.9	5.4	4.0	1.4	4.7	3.9	1.2	3.7	3.7	1.0

† Explanation of ratios: By 1956, for example, the ratio was 1.0 for Cochabamba because the share of hectares distributed by department was about in *balance* with the share of population by department; the 2.0 ratio for La Paz, however, meant that the capital's department had received about 100 per cent *more* land compared with its share of total population. In contrast, the .1 ratio for Santa Cruz indicated an imbalance of about 90 per cent *less* land distributed than the total share of population theoretically might have warranted for propaganda purposes. The concept of "balance" is not used to suggest that land should be equally distributed but to indicate the share of population affected.

Sources (A) Hectares are from Appendix O; original data.

(B) Calculated from Bolivia, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos, *Proyección de la Población, 1950-1962* (La Paz, 1962); and *idem*, *Boletín Estadístico* (1965), p. 1. The total population estimate for which these percentages apply is given in Appendix K (percentages of population for 1968 are estimated by author on the basis of change between 1964 and 1966), Part I. Total departmental population for 1950 is given in Appendix S.

governmental activity with political value, as may be seen in Figure 2-4.

By 1956 the Department of La Paz, with 32 per cent of the country's population, had received over 63 per cent of all lands distributed—a ratio of twice as much activity as its population theoretically might have warranted for propaganda value. Four departments (Chuquisaca, Cochabamba, Oruro, and Tarija) had ratios balancing distribution in relation to population; the remaining four had no relation in activity of distribution to population.

By 1960 Oruro and Tarija enjoyed the favorable ratio formerly held by La Paz; Beni, Potosí, and Santa Cruz also saw their cumulative distribution reach their share of national population. Only Pando had been neglected.

Ratios that were established by 1964 held constant through 1969, except for some cumulative gains in Beni and Santa Cruz during the post-MNR period. In the long run, La Paz's ratio had fallen to .5:1 and Oruro to .6:1. Pando has remained practically unaffected by the land reform. Tarija had received a small share of land distributed by 1969 (Figure 2-5); but in view of its small share of population, it always has benefitted with a balanced ratio or better.

Given sizable urban populations in the cities of La Paz and Cochabamba, these departments have shared in relative terms more than is apparent. For purposes of political analysis, however, the departmental impact of land reform revealed in Table 14


gives an approximate measure to show how Bolivia's presidents have been helped or hurt by the land program. Much of the population of the city of La Paz, for example, has been resentful that the rural population has benefitted at the expense of the city dweller; thus, Bolivian presidents have had to cope with the public opinion generated for or against land reform in different parts of the country. If Bolivia is undergoing the process of urbanization at the rate estimated by UN demographic specialists, the urban percentage of population grew between 1950 and 1965 from about one-quarter of the population to one-third; and by 1980 it will be over 40 per cent of the national total.⁸⁸ In such a process, the percentage of the population which is most prone to favor land reform may decline to the point where land distribution will be affected. This, of course, raises the issue of how much support the government has won in the countryside through the distribution of land titles.

*Heads of Family Benefitted
by Land Reform*

According to original figures the heads of family receiving either collective or individual title, or both, increased from 5 600 in 1956 to 163 578 in 1964 and to 208 181 by September 30, 1969 (Table 8). Since distribution of land has been compared with population in Table 14, it is fruitful to compare here the recipients of titles to total population in order to deter-

⁸⁸United Nations, *Statistical Bulletin for Latin America* 2:2 (1965), p. 9.

BOLIVIA:



SOURCE: TABLE 14 AND APPENDIX O


Figure 2-4

mine the percentage of Bolivians who have received benefits from land reform. Table 15 and Figure 2-6 show that by 1956, Tarija (Paz Estenssoro's home department) had the highest ratio of heads of families receiving land compared with total population estimates; three times more heads of family in Tarija received benefits than that department's population might have warranted. Chuquisaca, Cochabamba, and La Paz also enjoyed favorable ratios. During Paz's second term the ratio for Tarija fell below 1:1, but the latter three departments remained above such a ratio. By 1964 and 1969 Beni had emerged with the highest ratio of land distributed to population (Table 14); but, except for Pando, Beni has had the lowest ratio of heads of families to population (Figures 2-6 and 2-7).

Whereas Table 15 gives an indication of the

impact of the land reform program for propaganda purposes, Table 16 presents the percentage of agriculturally employed males in 1950 who have since received benefits. Although percentages can be expected to be high because some heads of families may have been counted twice in actions revising terminated cases or amplifying original grants, for example, the percentages in reality may be too low because the total number of agriculturally occupied males includes 129 490 youths in the ten to nineteen age groups (departmental figures for economically active age groups are not available).⁸⁹ Moreover, those under eighteen are generally ineligible to receive land. Data based on the year 1950 in Table 16 reveal the extent of revolutionary action since 1952. Apparently the number of agriculturally employed males has not changed much


⁸⁹Bolivia, Dirección Nacional de Estadística y Censos, *Censo Demográfico, 1950* (La Paz: Editorial Argote, 1955), pp. 144-145.



SOURCE: FIGURE 2-4

Figure 2-5

BOLIVIAN LAND REFORM BENEFITS BY DEPARTMENT RATIO OF HEADS OF FAMILY BENEFITTED TO ESTIMATED POPULATION BY 1956



SOURCE: TABLE 15

R.W. WILKIE / J.E. MARTI

Figure 2-6

BOLIVIAN LAND REFORM BENEFITS BY DEPARTMENT

RATIO OF HEADS OF FAMILY BENEFITTED TO ESTIMATED POPULATION BY 1969




Figure 2-7

TABLE 15

Ratio by Department in Bolivia of (A) Per Cent of Cumulative Heads of Family Benefitted by
Land Reform to (B) Per Cent of Estimated Population

†(Heads of family as a rounded percentage of population)

Department	1956			1960			1964			1966			1969		
	Heads	Population	Ratio	Heads	Population	Ratio	Heads	Population	Ratio	Heads	Population	Ratio	Heads	Population	Ratio
Total	100.0	100.0	**	100.0	100.0	**	100.0	100.0	**	100.0	100.0	**	100.0	100.0	**
Beni	#	4.2	**	.2	4.4	**	.3	4.8	.1	.3	4.9	.1	.5	5.1	.1
Chuquisaca	15.2	9.0	1.7	13.8	8.8	1.6	13.9	8.5	1.6	14.1	8.4	1.7	15.1	8.2	1.8
Cochabamba	24.4	15.9	1.5	19.4	15.6	1.2	25.3	15.3	1.7	26.2	15.2	1.7	25.5	15.0	1.7
La Paz	45.7	32.0	1.4	40.4	32.4	1.2	33.3	32.7	1.0	33.8	32.9	1.0	34.0	33.3	1.0
Oruro	1.6	7.2	.2	4.3	7.4	.6	3.7	7.5	.5	3.5	7.6	.5	3.2	7.8	.4
Pando	#	.7	**	.1	.7	.1	#	.7	**	#	.7	**	#	.7	**
Potosí	1.0	17.5	.1	10.1	17.4	.6	13.6	17.4	.8	12.6	17.3	.7	12.0	17.1	.7
Santa Cruz	.3	9.4	#	5.6	9.3	.6	6.4	9.1	.7	6.3	9.1	.7	6.7	9.1	.7
Tarija	11.8	4.1	2.9	6.1	4.0	1.5	3.5	4.0	.9	3.2	3.9	.8	3.0	3.7	.8

†For explanation of ratios, see Table 14.

Sources: (A) Heads of family are from Appendix T; original data.

(B) See Table 14.

since 1950; thus, taking into account the age factor, the number of males in Table 16 may be relatively accurate.

Although the last official census was taken in 1950, the Bolivian government, with the aid of the United Nations, conducted a sample population census in 1963. Its calculations shown only 1 269 500 persons economically active, compared with 1 350 782 counted in 1950—a decrease of 4.0 per cent.⁹⁰ If the population employed in agriculture decreased at the same rate from a base of 973 959 in 1950, we could expect to find 935 000 employed in agriculture in 1963. Since the sample census calculated the last figure at 869 350 while rural population increased from 65.0 to 77.8 per cent between 1950 and 1963,⁹¹ however, this marked decrease in agriculturally employed population can be questioned. A decrease of 104 609 persons employed in agriculture between censuses in 1950 and 1963 may indicate a deficiency in one of the censuses or out-migration from Bolivia may make up the difference. The latter appears to be an important factor since Cornelius Zondag has noted that by the mid-1960s some 200 000 Bolivians were living outside the country, "most of whom are peasants living in northern Argentina."⁹²

According to Table 16, 30.7 per cent of the males employed in agriculture in 1950 had received land by the time of the MNR's fall in 1964. Cochabamba had the highest percentage (43.9) with La Paz and Chuquisaca well behind but substantially ahead of all other entities. Predictably, Pando and Beni had the lowest percentages. Although totals in Figure 2-8 had increased for all of these departments by 1969, relationships held the same; Cochabamba led with 56.3 per cent. If about one-third of all Bolivian males employed in agriculture in 1950 had received land by the mid-1960s, then the land reform has accomplished much; but extensive additional land distribution is required if each potential head of a family is to own his plot, especially in those entities which fall below the national average (Beni, Oruro, Pando, Potosí, Santa Cruz, and Tarija).⁹³

Implications

If the heads of family benefitted are calculated as a percentage of the total agriculturally employed population (Appendix N), figures are obtained which allow comparison with land distribution in the Mexican Revolution. Elsewhere it has been shown that 17.9 per

⁹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 124; and Bolivia, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos, "Sample Census of Bolivia, 1963." This latter census, conducted by sampling techniques, has been very controversial and thus has not been published. It is not clear whether the Bolivian government's objections to the census are based on methodological grounds or political expediency. (Some observers claim that the census often shows less people than voters in certain districts.)

⁹¹See Part II in Appendix K.

⁹²*The Bolivian Economy*, p.16. Zondag further notes that since the Revolution "it is conservatively estimated that the negative emigration balance is at least 5,000 a year," and that about 52 000 Bolivian skilled technicians and professionals may be working outside the country.

⁹³Cf. Ferragut, "La Reforma Agraria," pp. 460–461, who calculates benefits on a family basis by estimating that each family has 4.5 members.




Bolivian smallholder demonstrating *chuño* – dried potato
(Photo by J.W. Wilkie)



**Small-scale cultivation along the southeastern shores of Lake Titicaca
(Photo by J.W. Wilkie)**



Small-scale cultivation along the southeastern shores of Lake Titicaca
(Photo by J.W. Wilkie)



SOURCE: TABLE 16

Figure 2-8

TABLE 16
Cumulative Bolivian Heads of Family Benefitted by Presidential Period as a Percentage
of Males Employed in Agriculture in 1950

Department	Males Employed in Agriculture in 1950	^a Cumulative Percentage Benefitted				
		1956	1960	1964	1966	1969
Total	^b 533 593	1.0	8.7	30.7	33.6	39.0
Beni	13 014	#	.8	4.1	4.8	8.2
Chuquisaca	63 887	1.3	9.8	35.4	39.5	49.2
Cochabamba	94 142	1.5	9.4	43.9	49.8	56.3
La Paz	150 308	1.7	12.3	36.2	40.3	47.0
Oruro	28 941	.3	6.8	21.0	21.6	23.1
Pando	4 319	#	.7	1.3	1.3	1.8
Potosí	115 421	#	4.0	19.3	19.5	21.7
Santa Cruz	44 203	#	5.8	23.8	25.4	31.6
Tarija	19 358	3.4	14.3	29.7	29.9	32.5

^aOriginal data.

^bIncludes silviculture, hunting, fishing, and ranching.

Source: Percentages are calculated from Table 8 and Appendices B-J; agriculturally employed population is from Bolivia, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos, *Censo Demográfico, 1950* (La Paz: Editorial Argote, 1955), pp. 158-172.

cent of Mexico's agriculturally employed population had received land by 1930, or twenty years after the Revolution began.⁹⁴ Bolivia reached this percentage about 1966, fourteen years after the Revolution got underway. By 1969 Bolivia had overtaken the percentage of 21.1 that Mexico had in 1934 on the eve of President Cárdenas's big push, carrying that amount to 41.6 per cent by 1940. It is notable that the Cárdenas group felt that the 1934 figure represented failure in land reform. In Mexican terms, then, Bolivian reform to date cannot be judged as very successful: President Paz in his second term distributed Bolivia's high of only 87 746 hectares per month (Table 10) compared with Cárdenas's monthly distribution of 248 700 hectares.⁹⁵

Whereas 13.0 per cent of Mexico's land surface had been cumulatively distributed by the end of Cárdenas's dramatic program,⁹⁶ Table 12 shows that 5.4 per cent of Bolivia's surface had been distributed

by the end of Paz's second administration. Although the Mexican Revolution had a much longer time to distribute over one-quarter of the country's surface, by 1964 Bolivia theoretically should have been able to capitalize on Mexico's experience and concentrate reform in a shorter period of time—especially since Bolivia did not have to waste years convincing the United States that reform was necessary, as did Mexico. By 1969 the only entities of Bolivia which approached having one-quarter of their total surface distributed were Chuquisaca and Cochabamba. Pando's .1 per cent was the lowest; but Beni, which had only .3 per cent in 1960, had reached 7.9 per cent.

Appendix A shows that Bolivia's land reform program has been affected by the vagaries of politics. Yearly peaks (in increasing order of hectares affected) coincided with relative political stability in 1961, 1962, and 1963 under Paz, and in 1968 under President Barrientos. After 1960, lows in this activity came

⁹⁴James W. Wilkie, *The Mexican Revolution: Federal Expenditure and Social Change Since 1910* (2d ed. rev.; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 194.

⁹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 188. This comparison assumes that family sizes in the two countries have been approximately the same, otherwise the country with larger families might actually have benefitted more from grants to fewer heads of families. Bolivian figures are based upon statistical registry which follows resolution by the President of Bolivia and any necessary drawing of a new survey or *replanto* to correspond to the resolution. See Thome, "Problems Which Obstruct the Process of Title Distribution," pp. 33-35. Registry precedes final execution of the resolution. Mexican figures are based upon statistical registry at time of final execution of the resolution.

⁹⁶Wilkie, *The Mexican Revolution*, p. 188.

BOLIVIA: CUMULATIVE HEADS OF FAMILY BENEFITTED BY 1969 AS A PERCENTAGE OF MALES EMPLOYED IN AGRICULTURE IN 1950




Figure 2-9

in 1964 and 1965, years of political turmoil. Peaks in total titles distributed and heads of families benefitted came only between 1960 and 1963.

In political terms, perhaps land reform legally got off to a slow start because the peasants seized land without waiting for government action; thus the government was able to concentrate instead on other pressing matters, such as nationalizing the large tin mines and resolving labor-management problems. Ironically, the MNR's neglect of the land reform problem may have created stability in a situation of postrevolutionary reconstruction which was highly volatile, especially as inflation wracked the country in the mid-1950s.⁹⁷ As long as the Land Reform Council was slow to be organized and slow to begin to work, the dispossessed landowners could hope legally to regain their property. That hope may have been vague and unrealistic, but it no doubt played a part in strengthening President Paz's moderate position with the MNR.

With the left-right split in the MNR under President Siles,⁹⁸ who broke with the left-wing miners federation over economic policy during the late 1950s, President Paz began his second term in 1960 with the need to develop new mass-based support of the MNR. Turning to Bolivia's peasants for support, Paz stepped up land reform to win their favor, but land reform did not really get underway until 1960. Unfortunately for Paz, while this activity won him friends in the countryside, it alienated the capitalistic elements whom he set out to woo after 1960 in order to create a climate for investment which would resolve Bolivia's shortage of development capital. Since wealthy Bolivians and potential foreign investors were already concerned about the nature of the Bolivian Revolution and its nationalization programs, a dramatic increase in land reform was hardly calculated to stimulate investment, regardless of political needs which required legal distribution of land titles in order to maintain stability. Thus, Paz's land and investment policies worked at cross purposes, although the contradiction may be evident only in hindsight.

If Paz had followed the program outlined by Roberts above and had distributed unused lands in eastern Bolivia, he might have been able to avoid the contradiction in his land and investment policies,

because Bolivian landowners would have emerged with their property. That policy, however, would have meant alienating the majority of peasants who have not wanted to move from their traditional habitat. To avoid unrest in the countryside, and because he did not have funds to implement costly colonization, Paz was forced to avoid the policy advocated by Roberts. Politically, then, Paz was limited by the number of options that he had open during his second term. In the aftermath of revolutionary upheaval, Paz could ill afford to transfer the agriculturally employed population from the highlands of central Bolivia to the eastern lowlands without risk of setting in motion forces beyond his control. Certainly the MNR itself was aware of the consequences that had resulted from sending the peasantry to those lowlands to engage in the Chaco War of the early 1930s; the unrest engendered by such change had contributed to the Revolution of 1952.⁹⁹

In the long run, the success of Bolivia's land reform probably will not hinge upon the number of peasants who receive land or the amount of land distributed but upon the fact that since 1952 insecurity of title has made land a very risky investment for the wealthy. If this investment can be channeled into industrialized economic development, then an emergent modern sector can speed national integration. Of course, a modern sector must have rural markets for its production; but if Mexico's experience is any guide, the former cannot wait for the latter to develop because the country would have neither the goals nor the dynamism with which to begin its task.

Some observers have felt that land reform in Bolivia has resulted in the development of *minifundia* in contrast with the *latifundia* that previously dominated the country, whereas others have seen reform as a propaganda device by which *latifundia* could be maintained.¹⁰⁰ Such views are based upon analysis of per capita distribution figures and number of cases involved in the reform. Unfortunately, neither of these analyses is particularly fruitful because distribution of land varies from zone to zone (as Appendix M reveals); in any case, we do not know the use of land granted collectively and individually, often to the same persons. Also, the number of cases involved in land reform does not necessarily have anything to do

⁹⁷Wilkie, *The Bolivian Revolution and U.S. Aid Since 1952*, Table 1.

⁹⁸Politics and economic problems of the Bolivian Revolution are discussed in *ibid.* Siles's view of land reform is discussed briefly, for example, in American University, Special Operations Research Office, *U.S. Army Area Handbook for Bolivia* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 36; and Siles's political problems are discussed in detail in Richard W. Patch, "Bolivia: Decision or Debacle; An Analysis of Bolivia's Economic and Political Plight," *American Universities Field Staff Reports*, April, 1959.

⁹⁹The impact of the Chaco War on Bolivian society is described by Edmundo Flores, "Land Reform in Bolivia," *Land Economics* 30 (1954), pp. 112-124; Richard W. Patch, "Bolivia: U.S. Assistance in a Revolutionary Setting"; and Alexander, *The Bolivian National Revolution*, Chapter 2. See also Herbert S. Klein, *Orígenes de la Revolución Nacional Boliviana; La Crisis de la Generación del Chaco* (La Paz: Editorial Juventud, 1968).

¹⁰⁰Beltrán and Fernández, *¿Dónde Va la Reforma Agraria Boliviana?*, Chapter 5; and Canelas, *Mito y Realidad*, pp. 214-224, respectively.

with the number of properties affected. Furthermore, the number of properties is calculated from the agricultural census of 1950 which counted the number of property owners and not the number of properties they owned. If the projected Bolivian agricultural and population censuses are taken in the 1970s as hoped, we may have new data both for assessing size of landholdings and for gauging the percentages of economically active and agriculturally employed populations that have received land.¹⁰¹

An important measure of the results of land reform is change in the pattern of agricultural production. In Bolivia more than in many other countries, however, production statistics are based upon inadequate samples; thus the reliability of estimates is open to question.¹⁰² Table 17 presents two estimates that overlap in three years (1950, 1958, 1959) except for oca and yuca. It is evident that for 1958 and 1959 Estimate A consistently shows production to be much less than Estimate B, with the exception of sugar cane production. Perhaps this is because the basis for 1950 is lower in half of the six comparable cases; but since the differences become tremendous by 1958 and 1959, it is clear that Estimate A has little relation to B for wheat, potatoes, and corn. The estimates are similar only for barley, rice, and perhaps sugar cane.

According to the two estimates, one can see different effects of land reform on agricultural production. Whereas, for example, Estimate A shows a decline in wheat production before the Revolution and a collapse thereafter, Estimate B charts increased production with a significant decline only by 1964 and 1965. If Estimate A is correct with regard to potatoes, production declined by half during 1954 and 1956 but

recovered somewhat by 1959; in contrast, Estimate B shows dramatic gains in potato production by 1959. Given these discrepancies, it is difficult to arrive at sound conclusions about the course of agricultural production. Estimate A is based on calculations by Bolivian and international agencies, whereas Estimate B is apparently based upon revised data. An independent analysis of wheat production by a Utah State University team cites figures on production of wheat, rice, and potatoes prepared by the Bolivian Ministry of Economy which tend to be considerably less than the figures given in Estimate B, but much higher than Estimate A. Figures for rice production tend to agree with Estimate A.¹⁰³ These figures and the latest data (which are often similar to Estimate B) are presented in Appendix R. Given the inconclusive nature of present data,¹⁰⁴ we may never know the effect of land reform on past production,¹⁰⁵ and presumably we shall have to wait for reliable census information about current production.

All the data presented here have not been analyzed from every angle; but it is hoped that the historical time series will be used by scholars investigating other aspects of land reform in Bolivia. Data can be analyzed in innumerable ways; only a few aspects of relationships have been formulated here. The appendices present raw material for many other different types of investigation.¹⁰⁶ Cumulative totals present a picture of land reform at various moments in time which have political relevance for our discussion. In showing the government's conception of its own activity, we have focused on problems in one important aspect of recent Bolivian history.

¹⁰¹ Although an agricultural census of population was originally scheduled for the late 1960's, apparently any plan to collect basic socioeconomic data has been indefinitely postponed because of instability and economic problems. In the meantime, the Statistical Agency has concentrated its efforts on census of the urban sector. See censuses for the cities of Santa Cruz (1966), Cochabamba (1967), and La Paz (1970).

¹⁰² For problems and methods, for example, see Bolivia, Ministerio de Agricultura, Departamento de Estadísticas Agropecuarias, *Estadísticas Agropecuarias; Resumen General, Año Agrícola 1957-1958*, (La Paz, 1962).

¹⁰³ Wade G. Dewey, Devere R. McAllister, and B. Delworth Gardner, *Análisis del Problema del Trigo y Harina en Bolivia* (La Paz: Utah State University and USAID/Bolivia, 1966), Appendix 1. Cf. USAID/Bolivia, *Economic and Program Statistics* 8 (1966), p. 11.

¹⁰⁴ Studies that support the view that production declined immediately after the reform include United Nations, Comisión Económica para América Latina, *Análisis y Proyecciones del Desarrollo Económico, IV, El Desarrollo Económico de Bolivia*, pp. 255ff; and Carter, *Aymara Communities and the Bolivian Agrarian Reform*, p. 13. Carter notes, however, that the bulk of the agricultural produce has been consumed by the producers themselves. Wessel, "An Economic Assessment of Pioneer Settlement in the Bolivian Lowlands," pp. 27-30, gives estimates of caloric intake for Bolivians between 1952 and 1962 to conclude that "there was not such a drastic decrease in agricultural production following the land reform as claimed." Cf. Ronald J. Clark, "Land Reform and Peasant Market Participation on the North Highlands of Bolivia," *Land Economics* 44 (1968), pp. 153-172; and Heath, Erasmus, and Buechler, *Land Reform and Social Revolution in Bolivia*, pp. 377-378.

¹⁰⁵ See Appendix Q for estimates of livestock increase in cattle, pigs, and goats and decrease in sheep, llama, and alpaca. These figures are even more unreliable than agricultural production estimates.

¹⁰⁶ Some might feel that land reform is relatively complete; for example, in the Department of Potosí by 1969 about half of the land censused in 1950 had been redistributed (Table 12). Actually, by 1969 only about one-fifth of the males employed in agriculture had received land titles (Table 16); and as Appendix P shows, the ratio of cumulative hectares distributed to males employed in agriculture was only .5:1. Clearly the results of land reform may be interpreted several ways, depending on the gauge selected.

TABLE 17
Comparative Estimates of Bolivian Agricultural Production, 1950-1965
(In Thousands of Metric Tons)

Year	Wheat		Potatoes		Corn		Barley		Rice		Sugar Cane		Oca		Yuca	
	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
1950	45.6	45.7	140.0	189.4	124.0	129.7	44.2	44.2	14.0	25.8	342.9	342.9	#	27.7	#	77.0
1951	26.0	—	193.2	—	140.2	—	45.1	—	26.3	—	349.7	—	—	—	—	—
1952	20.0	—	197.0	—	143.1	—	46.0	—	26.9	—	356.7	—	—	—	—	—
1953	20.0	—	201.0	—	145.9	—	46.9	—	27.0	—	363.9	—	—	—	—	—
1954	17.5	—	100.0	—	85.0	—	50.0	—	10.0	—	475.0	—	—	—	—	—
1955	17.5	—	120.0	—	90.0	—	45.0	—	10.5	—	500.0	—	—	—	—	—
1956	16.0	—	100.0	—	94.0	—	35.0	—	12.5	—	500.0	—	—	—	—	—
1957	25.0	—	120.0	—	130.0	—	45.0	—	10.0	—	420.0	—	—	—	—	—
1958	12.0	64.3	155.0	592.0	110.0	262.6	55.0	57.1	15.0	37.2	500.0	220.0	—	50.0	—	125.0
1959	11.0	71.5	160.0	665.7	100.0	260.6	60.0	68.0	21.0	19.5	550.0	412.2	—	50.0	—	130.0
1960	—	68.1	—	605.2	—	247.8	—	73.9	—	23.3	—	524.7	—	50.0	—	142.4
1961	—	67.2	—	617.2	—	260.1	—	78.8	—	24.0	—	960.0	—	60.0	—	151.3
1962	—	60.5	—	567.8	—	234.1	—	80.0	—	24.0	—	1056.0	—	55.0	—	160.2
1963	—	65.0	—	700.0	—	260.0	—	77.0	—	40.0	—	1161.0	—	56.0	—	163.7
1964	—	58.0	—	621.5	—	261.0	—	61.6	—	40.5	—	936.4	—	56.0	—	142.5
1965	—	42.1	—	650.0	—	238.9	—	65.2	—	42.2	—	933.0	—	63.0	—	145.0

Sources: Estimate A is from Fausto Beltrán A. and José Fernández B., *¿Dónde va la Reforma Agraria Boliviana?* (La Paz: Talleres Gráficos Bolivianos, 1960), pp. 90-101.

Estimate B is from Bolivia, Ministerio de Agricultura, División de Estudios Económicos y Estadística, "Estimaciones de la Producción Agrícola, Años 1958-1965," Cuadro 1-67, January, 1967; 1950 data are from Bolivia, Dirección Nacional de Estadística y Censos, *Censo Agropecuario, 1950* (La Paz: Ministerio de Hacienda, 1956), pp. 68-78. Cf. Laurence Whitehead, "Basic Data in Poor Countries: The Bolivian Case," *Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics* 31 (1969), pp. 205-227.

3: VENEZUELA (1959–1969)

With the return to power of Acción Democrática (AD) in 1959, the Venezuelan peasantry was free to redevelop and expand peasant labor organizations that had been disbanded by Pérez Jiménez and other military men after AD was overthrown in 1948. Since traditionally AD had encouraged peasant action for peasant rights, it is natural that this group made immediate demands on the new government to fulfill its historical promises.¹⁰⁷

As in Bolivia, the landless did not wait for government action, but undertook invasions of private property. Thus the government soon lost control of the land reform process. Whereas in Bolivia the peasants were not well organized compared with the tin miners (on whom the government depended for initial support), in Venezuela the Federación Campesina de Venezuela (FCV) was in a position to force rapid title distribution, even before a new land reform law was passed in 1960.¹⁰⁸

In the meantime, however, a series of problems arose to restrain land reform, beginning with the development of a new type of commercial agriculturist:

The climate of freedom dating from [Pérez Jiménez's fall, January 23, 1958] . . . , the continued establishment of the road network, the growth of expenditure and credit for agriculture, and protectionist policy were factors that contributed to accelerate the expansion of the agricultural frontier and the growth of production. The action of the State, intentionally or unintentionally, facilitated the creation of new farms on large extensions of land which in a good part belonged to the Nation. While the land reform was initiated by means of acquiring farms in "developed" zones, in the new areas a new

agrarian structure has grown as the support for vigorous commercial production.¹⁰⁹

During the 1950s and 1960s, it is estimated that about 1.5 million hectares were cleared of mountain or jungle forests to create the new base for agriculture, principally in the states of Portuguesa, Barinas, and Zulia.¹¹⁰

With the creation of a new class of commercial farmers, ranchers, and dairymen, local and regional organizations were formed to seek political protection of their members. In this manner, a growing interest group faced the demands of peasant labor organizations. Thus, the government would have to decide between the national interest in stimulating modern agricultural enterprises on the one hand, and the need for the landless to own land on the other. Although this choice has not been necessarily mutually exclusive, in the latter case distribution of small holdings without adequate credit and without adequate agricultural extension services has not helped beneficiaries of land reform to become suppliers and consumers for national development.

The Land Reform Law

Given the complications of what may be considered a simple problem (i.e., the need for land reform),¹¹¹ it is not surprising to find ambivalence in the Venezuelan land reform law concerning the maximum size of holdings permitted. As a member of the Instituto Agrario Nacional (IAN) directing board noted in 1970, in effect there is no maximum limit on land size except under certain conditions. If property is fulfilling a social function, its size is not limited, unless population pressure on the land cannot be solved by

¹⁰⁷For guides to investigation of Venezuelan land reform, see Land Tenure Center, *Rural Development in Venezuela: A Bibliography* (Madison: mimeo., 1972); and Graciela M. de Verburg and J. A. Verburg Moore, *Bibliografía sobre Reforma Agraria Venezolana* (Caracas: Prieto, 1965). See Alexander, *The Venezuelan Democratic Revolution*, p. 165, who states that "during the 1958 election campaign, Rómulo Betancourt made land reform the most important plank in his platform . . ." Alexander also states (p. 159) that "agrarian reform is the most fundamental economic and social change brought about by the Venezuelan Democratic Revolution." Cf. John D. Martz, *Acción Democrática: Evolution of a Modern Political Party in Venezuela* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), who does not emphasize land reform in his analysis.

¹⁰⁸This interpretation follows John D. Powell, *Political Mobilization of the Venezuelan Peasant* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971); and *idem*, "Venezuela: The Peasant Union Movement," in Henry A. Landsburger (ed.), *Latin American Peasant Movements* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), pp. 62–100. Cf. Powell's "Agrarian Reform or Agrarian Revolution in Venezuela," in Arpad von Lazar and Robert R. Kaufman (eds.), *Reform and Revolution: Readings in Latin American Politics* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1969), pp. 267–290. See also Powell's "Venezuelan Agrarian Problems in Comparative Perspective," in Philip B. Taylor (ed.), *Venezuela: 1969: Analysis of Progress* (Houston: Office of International Affairs, University of Houston, 1971), pp. 55–73.

¹⁰⁹CENDES, *La Reforma Agraria en Venezuela*, II, p. 44. This source notes that between 1953 and 1963 an estimated 580 000 hectares were cleared for agriculture and that deforestation thereafter could equal another 900 000 hectares.

¹¹⁰*Ibid.* p. 45.

¹¹¹The Venezuelan land reform is complicated by the illegal influx of landless Colombians, who enter by the same routes as those that are used to smuggle contraband cattle and coffee; see *ibid.* p. 46.

any other means except division of such lands. Thus the developing agricultural frontier generally remains unaffected by the land reform law.¹¹²

Venezuela's Land Reform Law of March 19, 1960 (Article 9), declares that land fulfills a social function if the owners (a) exploit the property efficiently, (b) do not allow land to go unused or do not harm natural resources, (c) do not violate legal wage contracts or labor laws, and (d) do not engage in indirect exploitations such as renting or sharecropping. When owners violate these provisions, their land is subject to expropriation, except for holdings ranging from 150 to 5 000 hectares (Article 29).¹¹³ According to the regulatory legislation of February 8, 1967 (Articles 238–250), these latter holdings are classified in seven categories which are scored in relation to market distance, water supply, topography, and physical, chemical, and biological conditions of the soil (see Appendix II). In this manner, farms scored as "first class" retain 150 hectares of land, in contrast with those in "seventh class" which retain 5 000 hectares. In flood zones or areas of extreme dryness, for example, the IAN is empowered to increase these maximum limitations; and in areas of high population density it may decrease the amounts by 50 per cent.

Although in special cases the IAN is empowered to expropriate even land that is fulfilling a social function, the Land Reform Law constrains such action. Any expropriations of these lands must begin with uncultivated areas before involving agricultural lands devoted to cattle raising, let alone the most efficiently exploited lands. Purchase of lands serving a social function is also more expensive because the Land Reform Law provides for combined cash payment and shorter-term bonds at higher interest rates than paid for lands not fulfilling a social function.¹¹⁴

Leftists within the AD camp soon became unhappy with the above policies, which protect large landholdings, and with the law's provision that all properties are to be purchased rather than seized.

Clearly the amount of money necessary to pay for expropriation of lands slows action, even with long-term payment in bonds for lands violating the social purpose clause. Also, lands have been purchased at market value instead of value declared for tax assessment; and the Ministry of Treasury has not penalized former proprietors more than 10 000 bolívares for any understatement of value for tax purposes.¹¹⁵ Although the AD government might have been determined to carry out land reform with compensation to former owners in order to prevent disruption of the economy as well as to maintain political strength in its coalition governments, President Betancourt no doubt also recalled that his party had been overthrown in 1948 by conservatives for alleged "radicalism."

In light of these considerations, we may better understand the pattern of land distribution which developed under AD after 1959. With the immediate problem of land invasions, the government perhaps was fortunate to work under the land law's two-stage system of land-title distribution. Provisional titles allow peasants to operate the land, while the IAN may prepare definitive titles in a calmer atmosphere.¹¹⁶

Provisional Titles

Official statistics (shown in Table 18) credit the IAN with distribution of provisional titles to more than 66 000 heads of family during Betancourt's term in the presidency. (Data are reported on a yearly basis which nearly coincides with presidential terms of office.)¹¹⁷ Although many members of AD felt that the figure should have been much higher (especially if Venezuela were to compete with the Cuban Revolution), in point of fact, much of the rebellious spirit in the countryside was quelled as these statistics became known.

Whereas historical pressures for land distribution had been created by AD, and great rural expectations had accompanied Betancourt's election to the pres-

¹¹²Interview with Antonio Merchán C., Caracas, July 21, 1970.

¹¹³Under Article 30 of the Land Reform Law, the IAN may increase maximum limitations by 15 per cent to protect watersheds; for other exceptions, see Appendix II.

¹¹⁴"Class C Bonds" are issued at market interest rates so as not to penalize the former owners of lands that fulfilled a social function. These bonds are paid off in 10 years.

Twenty- and fifteen-year "Class A" and "Class B" bonds, respectively, are paid at 3 and 4 per cent interest.

¹¹⁵Interview with Humberto Almao Tovar, Director of the IAN's Department of Lands and Valuations, Caracas, July 28, 1970. The bolívar was valued at 3.35 to the dollar from 1948 to 1964 when it became 4.50.

¹¹⁶It should be noted that no specific distinction was made between provisional and definitive title in either the agrarian reform law of 1960 or the regulatory legislation of 1967. Because provisional titles transfer no juridical rights, they leave the recipient in a precarious legal position (see CENDES, *La Reforma Agraria en Venezuela*, II, pp. 256–263). Also, with regard to what have come to be known as definitive titles, the law stipulates that even these titles are granted conditionally: Lands may be sold only with approval of the IAN; if sold, abandoned (a term not closely defined), or run negligently, they may revert to the IAN for redistribution (see Articles 74 and 83). Upon death of the recipient, lands revert to the IAN for redistribution, preferably to a relative (Article 73); see Miguel Angel Hernández Ocanto, *Legislación Agraria Venezolana* (Caracas: IAN, 1971). For background on the law, see Venezuela, Comisión de Reforma Agraria, *Reforma Agraria* (7 vols.; Caracas: Ministerio de Agricultura y Cría, 1959).

¹¹⁷Betancourt took office February 13, 1959, and was succeeded by AD's Leoni on March 11, 1964. COPEI's Rafael Caldera took office March 11, 1969. In effect, the data years correspond to the presidential period except for a few months.

TABLE 18
Official Venezuelan Data on Provisional
Title Distribution, 1959-1969

Year	Heads of Family	
	Yearly	Accumulated
1959	5 874	5 874
1960	25 221	31 095
1961	11 074	42 169
1962	14 603	56 772
1963	9 656	66 428
1964	11 527	77 955
1965	36 443	114 398
1966	16 852	131 250
1967	14 100	145 350
1968	16 791	162 141
1969	4 222	166 363

Source: Venezuela, Instituto Agrario Nacional (IAN), *Reforma Agraria en las Entidades Federales, 1959-1967*; *idem, Memoria y Cuenta, (1968)*; and *idem, Entrega de Títulos, 1969*.

idency, by 1964 (when Raúl Leoni became chief executive) the situation had changed. Not only had the Peasant Federation tended to become a bureaucracy (with a bureaucracy's stake in orderly process) but also AD had become increasingly aware that much of the country's population was not interested in spending scarce resources on land reform. Publication of the 1961 population census results revealed (as we saw in Section 1 above) that only about one-third of the population was economically employed in agriculture, down from over 41.3 per cent in 1950. Although some writers contended that improved agrarian reform was the answer to prevent "rural exodus" to the cities,¹¹⁸ AD had to face the fact that its policies conceived in the 1930s and 1940s (when over 50 per cent of the population was employed in agriculture)¹¹⁹ had increasingly less meaning for a society interested in escaping traditional rural life.

Further, organizations of commercial agriculturists complained that land reform threatened production, and private landholders in general protested that if the government would concentrate on distribution of public lands instead of private lands, no disruption of the economy would be necessary. Leoni's government,

inaugurated in 1964, felt these pressures and in any case was disposed to establish strong, rationally directed control over the land reform process. Because during 1961 and 1962 Betancourt had tended to distribute land invaded by peasants in order to prevent rural warfare, distribution of title to public lands was given second priority. In this context the Leoni government sought to overcome the following problems:

The new [Land] Law promulgated March 5, 1960, favored the participation of peasant organizations in the examination of petitions for land, in the denunciation of property not fulfilling a social function, in the formation of settlement administrative committees . . . and in the inclusion of two peasant organization representatives among the five board directors of the IAN . . .

At this stage, all action and resources of the IAN were necessarily devoted to satisfying petitions presented by the peasants and to solving or preventing problems of land invasions. Change of the agrarian structure and breakup of latifundia was postponed by pragmatic considerations of the moment, then, and therefore all careful consideration and study of priorities was governed by peasant petitions . . . and not by any deliberate action.

The avalanche of petitions (nearly 700 farms and 60 000 petitioners) during this first stage [1959-1960], the incidence of invasions and de facto situations, and the response of land reform administrators . . . also postponed a series of formal land grant actions which apparently did not have urgency. Thus [definitive] delimitation and distribution of parcels (including decision on the size of plots), control by beneficiaries, and award of titles either was carried out by the peasants themselves or had to wait for a more propitious time.¹²⁰

As shown below, the definitive distribution of titles was not really developed until 1967, when the regulatory legislation of the land reform finally became law.

Although the Leoni government intended to emphasize grants for public lands,¹²¹ official data in Table 19 shows that the Betancourt pattern was little changed by 1968. Whereas Betancourt distributed 50.9

¹¹⁸Pola C. Ortiz and Yolanda D. Shaya, *El Problema del Exodo Rural en Venezuela y Medidas Tendientes a su Solución* (Caracas: Ministerio de Agricultura y Cría, 1964).

¹¹⁹According to the population census of 1941, 51.2 per cent of the economically active population was employed in agriculture; see Tercera Conferencia Interamericana de Agricultura, *Compendio Estadístico de Venezuela* (Caracas: Casa de Especialidades, 1954), p. 9.

¹²⁰CENDES, *La Reforma Agraria en Venezuela*, II, pp. 54-56.

¹²¹Venezuela, IAN, *Memoria y Cuenta* (1964), pp. 2-3.

per cent of provisional title to peasants on public lands, Leoni increased this only to 52.4 per cent.

A comparison of Tables 18 and 19 suggests that if during AD's two terms in the presidency it had chosen to distribute titles to heads of family solely on public lands, it could have avoided any private expropriations between 1959 and 1964. From another point of view which gives the same results, according to the agricultural census of 1961, 94 021 persons were renting or occupying public lands; if most of them were peasants, mere confirmation of their holdings would have occupied all of the IAN's activity during the entire period of Betancourt.¹²² A program of land distribution devoted only to public lands would not have been feasible because of the threat of rural warfare, but these figures do show the extent of Venezuela's special public land problem.

Regardless of programs that might have been, questions were raised early about the true extent of existing activity. In May 1961, Ramón Quijada called attention to an evaluation by the Federación Campesina de Venezuela which challenged the official data given above. Quijada, founder and president of the Federation, claimed that while the official propaganda gave about 40 000 beneficiaries, his organization could find only 27 597 heads of family.¹²³ His figures, however, were considerably higher than those given in the agricultural census of February-May, 1961, which listed only 16 040 informants as holding provisional titles.¹²⁴

Such conflicting views of reality generated a number of subsequent surveys, one of the most complete being taken in September 1961.¹²⁵ This survey found 65 126 recipients of land, including heads of family living on lands administered by the IAN since prior to 1959. Subtraction of this pre-1959 group¹²⁶ leaves 60 332 recipients as of late 1961. This total is much higher than official data, even excluding some 6 000 peasants granted land during the years from 1945 to 1948 when AD was in power (as discussed in Section 1).¹²⁷

Further, given probable abandonment of the land by some recipients, one would have expected to find the 1961 survey lower than official figures. With such contradictory views on the extent of land reform, it is understandable why the government's figures seemed credible, both inside and outside official circles.

Propaganda in Official Data for Provisional Titles

Governmental success in diffusing potential rural violence through land distribution meant that its political health depended upon the continuation of such a program. Unfortunately, AD faced a contracting economy after taking power. As usually happens in the face of impending social and economic revolution, the private sector became cautious in making new investments. Further, the government took the view that Pérez Jiménez's public works programs had harmed the Venezuelan economy and, with the cautious attitude that budgets should be balanced, cut expenditures. The effect of financial conservatism in the private and public sectors was to depress the modern sector of the economy, which in any case feared that governmental emphasis would be shifted to the traditional peasant sector.¹²⁸

Economic problems were compounded by inter-related problems. Betancourt's insistence on paying off the preceding regime's short-term debts immediately rather than negotiating for terms more favorable to the new government came at the very time when federal expenditure was necessary to compensate for the flight of capital.¹²⁹ Unfortunately this AD effort to reassure the foreign sector of the new government's fiscal responsibility was undone by implementation of exchange controls. These controls to curb the flight of capital discouraged new foreign investment, negating any benefits of immediately paying off the country's old debts. Also, announcement that the government would grant no new oil concessions put an end to heavy investment in search of petroleum. And with urban construction at a near halt, the unemployment problem inherited by AD became critical.

Not surprisingly, deflationary governmental activity was reflected both in the budget of the IAN and in the rate of land distribution. Thus, Venezuela's rural sector was to be shortchanged along with the urban sector. The government reported (Table 18) that in 1963 grants of provisional titles dropped to a post-1959 low; and data in Table 20 show a decline in funds necessary to undertake land reform at rates promised by the government.

Venezuela's land reform institute received 2 to 3 per cent of central government expenditure between

¹²²Venezuela, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos Nacionales, *Censo Agropecuario, 1961*, A, p. 3.

¹²³Quoted in CENDES, *La Reforma Agraria en Venezuela*, II, p. 65.

¹²⁴Venezuela, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos Nacionales, *Censo Agropecuario, 1961*, A, p. 3.

¹²⁵[Luis B. Ortiz], *Encuesta sobre el Desarrollo de la Reforma Agraria de Venezuela: Principales Resultados de la Encuesta para Evaluar la Marcha de la Reforma Agraria, 1961* (Caracas: Ministerio de Agricultura y Cría, et al., 1962), p. 15.

¹²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 31, gives 3 571 recipients as having received land before 1958; Venezuela, IAN, *Tierras Adjudicadas en Propiedad: Familias Asentadas, 1958-1959-1960*, gives 1 237 beneficiaries for 1958. These sums give a total of 4 808 pre-1959 recipients of land.

¹²⁷Final adjustments after exclusion of ITIC total equals 54 332.

¹²⁸CENDES, *La Reforma Agraria en Venezuela*, II, pp. 20-38; and Alexander, *The Venezuelan Democratic Revolution*, Chapter 11.

¹²⁹Alexander, *The Venezuelan Democratic Revolution*, pp. 60-61.

TABLE 19
Official Data on Distribution of Provisional
Title to Heads of Family on Public
and Private Lands in Venezuela

Presidential Period	Total Titles	Per Cent	
		Public Land	Private Land
^b Betancourt	66 428	50.9	49.1
^c Leoni	95 713	52.4	47.6
^d Caldera	4 222	10.0	90.0

^aTotals = 100.0 per cent

^b1959-1963.

^c1964-1968.

^d1969.

Source: See Appendix VV.

1960 and 1969, except for 1963 when its share of funds slipped to the 1959-1960 level. The relative affluence of the Venezuelan agency stands in sharp contrast with the relative unimportance of the Bolivian agency's role in its country's outlay (Table 7). Since Bolivia has been dealing with almost one-third more farm families who are eligible for land reform, and Venezuelan central government absolute expenditure in 1966 was over twenty-five times more than that of Bolivia, the difference becomes startling.¹³⁰

In order to justify expenditure on land reform in the face of increasing criticism from commercial agricultural organizations as well as from the urban sector, the IAN took advantage of the provisional titling process to introduce in 1963 a major element of propaganda. Because provisional titles are granted on an interim basis while the government decides how many persons a particular property is capable of supporting (and to be sure that the land is being worked), the definitive title may increase or decrease the number of persons given initial rights to the land. If official data on provisional titles were to be based on the capacity of the land to support peasants in the first instance (rather than on the number of persons soliciting the land), the government could show its program in the best light because the land capacity generally has been judged to exceed the actual number of provisional title holders. Or as one high IAN official explained to me, since the number of persons receiving provisional title may be adjusted up or down in the final titling process, provisional figures are misleading, especially because the definitive titling program may

take many years. In the meantime, it is helpful for the Venezuelan citizenry to know the capacity of land processed by IAN technicians.

The reasoning was never made public nor was it implemented with discussion in IAN's *Memoria y Cuenta* (yearly report) of 1963. Instead, change in the method of data reporting was made quietly by change in terminology in one easy move.¹³¹ Whereas the 1963 yearly report began to use the term "capacity of recipients" in regard to lands for which provisional title was granted (in contrast with the number of petitioners actually awarded title), all other publications of the IAN used the new data but retained the old term "recipients of provisional title" without change. Thus at one simple stroke the government had improved its image. Whether this decision on how to report data was made at the presidential level or within the IAN is

TABLE 20
Per Cent of Venezuelan Central Government
Expenditure on Land Reform, 1959-1969

Year	^a Per Cent
1959-1960	1.9
1960-1961	3.0
^b 1961	2.2
1962	2.2
1963	1.9
1964	2.4
1965	2.1
1966	2.5
1967	2.5
1968	2.7
1969	2.3

^aIncludes support, bonds, credits, and ministerial transfers.

^b2d semester.

Source: Data from 1959-1961 are from a manuscript by Gustavo Pinto Cohen, Antonio Gaffe, and Maria Eugenia de Rabinovich, "Los Recursos Financieros Públicos para el Sector Agrícola-Rural de Venezuela, 1936/37 a 1968." For 1962-1968 see Venezuela, IAN, *Memoria y Cuenta*. For 1969 see *idem*, *Balance General y Ejecución Presupuestaria* (1969). Data on central government expenditure is from Venezuela, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos Nacionales, *Anuario Estadístico* (1968), p. 222; and Alliance for Progress, Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress (CIAP), *Domestic Efforts and the Needs for External Financing for the Development of Venezuela* (Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union, 1970), p. 32.

¹³⁰Calculations are based on sources in Table 20 and in Wilkie, *The Bolivian Revolution and U.S. Aid Since 1952*, p. 26.

¹³¹In 1970 this investigator found that some officials of the IAN still were unaware of a problem in terminology.

unknown, but both AD and the IAN stood to gain in terms by increasing the ratio of benefits to costs.

Although Bolivia faced an even more serious shortage of funds, its land reform was not given the priority that the Venezuelan land reform was given because the government did not look to the peasantry for political support until after it lost the support of the tin miners. Thus land reform policy was affected not so much by the inflationary period preceding the stabilization of the late 1950s as by the struggle for political power between the miners and the MNR, a struggle that emerged over the effects of deflationary programs. As seen above in Sections 1 and 2, not until 1960, when Paz Estenssoro's second term began, did land title distribution seriously get under way.

Whereas the Bolivian peasantry seized private landholdings, peasant invasions in Venezuela were of a sporadic nature. Many landowners connived with the FCV to conduct invasions in order to sell off their lands that otherwise might not have brought favorable prices. Because Bolivians already occupied the land, they could wait for title (as could the Venezuelan peasant settled on public lands). For this reason, Bolivia did not have the immediate pressure to grant or deny title (in Venezuela decisions on provisional title must be made within sixty days of petition) nor has it granted provisional titles which presumably are more subject to manipulation than are final titles.

Revised Provisional Title Data

An independent revision of Venezuelan statistics on provisional title distribution was undertaken in 1967 by the Center for the Study of Development (CENDES) of the Central University of Venezuela.¹³² Jointly sponsored by the Inter-American Committee for Agricultural Development (CIDA), CENDES examined ten diverse sources, including data obtained from the field offices of the IAN, to prepare a listing of all titles granted between 1959 and 1967. This list was checked against IAN records with high officials of the agency in order to develop revised data (Table 21). (From this revised list,¹³³ a 1.5 per cent sample was

selected for an extended census presented by CENDES in a multivolume study.)¹³⁴

In Table 21, the revised series is carried forward for 1968 and 1969. Although the 1968 data are official figures, they may be valid because the IAN was under unusual pressure. The drastically revised CENDES estimates had been developed with the IAN in 1967, and some elements in the government feared (and attempted unsuccessfully to stop publication of) embarrassing data in the CENDES work which appeared in 1968. Also, because data on the number of titles distributed became an issue in the presidential campaign of 1968, one might expect the IAN to be somewhat more realistic in compilation of data.¹³⁵ In 1969, the COPEI victory brought an explicit change in the IAN's reporting of data, with figures being reported for number of recipients rather than for capacity of land.

A comparison of official and revised data for provisional titles is presented by state according to presidential terms in Figure 3-1 and Table 22. This breakdown of summaries given in Tables 18 and 21 shows that figures have been revised downward in all but three states.¹³⁶ Only in Apure, Monagas, and Nueva Esparta did the CENDES study find more peasants with title than listed by the IAN. In the states of Barinas, Guárico, and Táchira, official data were about 100 per cent higher than revisions. Further, a comparison of Tables 18 and 21 shows in cumulative terms that revised total figures were only 70 per cent of official figures in 1962 as well as in 1968. If the same discrepancy is seen before and after the reporting of data was changed from number of beneficiaries to capacity of the land to support beneficiaries, then one may wonder about the discrepancy between the two series, especially in light of the 1961 survey discussed above.

CENDES has justified the accuracy of its figures by comparing revised estimates given in Table 22 with the government's First National Census of Small Property Holders in 1964.¹³⁷ That Census found 45 185 plot holders, which CENDES adjusted upward to 48 240 for omissions.¹³⁸ This total was 7.8 per

¹³²CENDES, *La Reforma Agraria en Venezuela*.

¹³³*Ibid.*, II, Anexo E.

¹³⁴CENDES volumes include: 1 *El Proceso de Adquisición de Tierras* (1968); 2, *El Proceso de Dotación de Tierras* (1968); 3, *Evolución del Ingreso y del Nivel de Vida de los Asentaminos* (1968); 4, *Datos Económicos de los Beneficiarios* (1969); 5, *Datos Sociales de los Beneficiarios* (1969); 6, *Metodología de la Encuesta*; 7, *Seis Trabajos Sobre Reforma Agraria* (1969); 8, *Los Campesinos Venezolanos* (1969); 9, *Cooperativas Campesinas y Cambio en Venezuela* (1970). And the following works in manuscript in 1970: 10, *Recursos Disponibles*; 11, *Costos de la Reforma Agraria*; 12, *Informe de Recomendaciones*.

¹³⁵Although given the successful manipulation of data for propaganda purposes in the past, AD might well have decided to let the figures be "padded" one final time.


¹³⁶Note that no revisions are available for Table 19.

¹³⁷Venezuela, *Primer Censo Nacional de Parcelarios de la Reforma Agraria; Documento I: Descripción de Trabajos y Resultados Preliminares* . . . 1964.

¹³⁸CENDES, *La Reforma Agraria en Venezuela*, II, p. a/32.



Small-scale Andean mixed farming, State of Mérida, Venezuela
(Photo by K. Ruddle)



SOURCE: TABLES 18 AND 21

Figure 3-1

TABLE 21

† Revised Venezuelan Data on Provisional
Title Distribution Since 1959

Year	Heads of Family Receiving Provisional Titles	
	Yearly	Accumulated
1959	4 423	4 423
1960	17 594	22 017
1961	9 263	31 280
1962	8 702	39 982
1963	6 222	46 204
1964	6 130	52 334
1965	19 255	71 589
1966	13 341	84 930
1967	11 343	96 273
1968	16 791	113 064
1969	4 222	117 286

† 1959-1967 estimated by CENDES (see text); 1968-1969 are official data (see text for problems in reporting of figures).

Source: Table 18; and CENDES, *La Reforma Agraria en Venezuela*, II, Anexo E. Cf. Table 41, below.

cent less than CENDES estimates in Table 21; therefore CENDES has calculated the rate of land abandonment to be about 8 per cent at any given time.¹³⁹

Although an 8 per cent rate of land abandonment seems to be low when some estimates place the rate to be as high as 50 per cent,¹⁴⁰ a comparison of the adjusted 1961 survey data and the 1965 census figures indicates that the rate of abandonment was not more than 11 per cent.¹⁴¹ Thus CENDES's calculation of 8 per cent appears fairly sound, especially since it approximates the change of 9 per cent between 1950 and 1960 in the economically employed population working in agriculture.¹⁴²

After COPEI took over the presidency in 1969, the IAN carried out a land tenure census in late 1969 and early 1970 of holdings which it administers. The IAN processed 121 845 schedules for 108 444 plots of land. The results give a total of 95 320 persons working the lands *at the time of the census*; thus this

final figure must be adjusted to determine the total number including those who are no longer working the land. First, the difference between the number of schedules and the number of plots is only partly explained by the fact that some heads of family hold more than one plot. Second, because some plots were being worked by a person other than the original beneficiary (who had died, ceded, or abandoned the plot), in some cases there are duplicate schedules—one for the original and one for the actual occupant. Finally, many plots had been abandoned and were unoccupied.¹⁴³ The minimum rate of abandonment may be calculated at 8.6 per cent (the percentage change between the number of heads of family actually occupying land in Appendix NN and the number of schedules, deducting for double-counted plots and duplicate schedules in Appendix OO). The basis for this calculation is the total of those who had received land by 1969 or 104 287 persons of whom 8 967 abandoned their new land. This figure for total beneficiaries (and the estimate developed here for rate of abandonment) may be compared with data given in Table 21 (and the CENDES estimate of an 8 per cent abandonment rate).

Although to some IAN officials this IAN census was intended to show once and for all the number of beneficiaries of the land reform process, clearly the problems involved in calculating the number of total beneficiaries (as distinguished from the number of occupants at the time of the census) suggest the tentative nature of the data. Furthermore, as discussed in Section 4, not only are figures on the rate of abandonment incomplete but also the existing abandonment-rate data raise questions about the IAN census information on date of initial land distribution to heads of families. For these reasons, we must acknowledge that there is no single measurement that will tell us once and for all what has been the outcome of a process that is constantly changing. Thus the CENDES revisions will continue to provide a valuable source for gauging the political tempo of land reform activity.

Average rates of title distribution to heads of family are given for revised and for official data in Table 23. The tempo of monthly activity was relatively rapid during AD's first term, especially when compared with the MNR's first term in Bolivia (Table 10). Once the MNR program gained force, however, the rate greatly exceeded any activity in Venezuela.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*; and Gustavo Pinto Cohen, "Sobre el Número de Beneficiarios de la Reforma Agraria," publication forthcoming.

¹⁴⁰ Warriner, *Land Reform in Principle and Practice*, p. 354.

¹⁴¹ For 1961 data see note 125 above; for 1965 figures see note 138.

¹⁴² Venezuela, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos Nacionales, *Censo de Población, 1961*, A, pp. 134, 198; and UCLA *Statistical Abstract of Latin America* (1961), p. 19.

¹⁴³ Venezuela, IAN, *Resultados del Programa de Investigación de la Tenencia* (3 vols.; Caracas, 1970), I, p. 2 (in chapter entitled "Análisis de los Resultados del Programa de Investigación de la Tenencia").

TABLE 22
Comparison of Official and Revised Provisional Title Data
by State and for Presidential Periods in Venezuela

State	Heads of Family Receiving Provisional Title				^c Caldera ^e Official
	^a Betancourt		^b Leoni		
	Official	Revised	Official	^d Revised	
Total	66 428	46 204	95 713	66 860	4 222
^f Amazonas	#	#	#	#	#
Anzoátegui	2 512	1 345	4 967	3 194	51
Apure	973	1 004	1 683	1 549	378
Aragua	2 040	1 768	2 770	2 391	144
Barinas	2 065	1 191	7 408	4 283	130
Bolívar	1 795	1 432	2 752	2 308	89
Carabobo	5 131	3 890	4 402	2 556	93
Cojedes	1 330	906	5 248	3 093	427
^f Delta Amacuro	1 830	1 090	722	570	#
Distrito Federal	364	321	744	576	17
Falcón	2 678	1 520	4 156	2 976	79
Guárico	3 248	1 464	6 861	3 307	281
Lara	2 775	2 358	4 775	3 485	289
Mérida	2 776	1 686	2 927	2 359	18
Miranda	3 104	3 015	3 033	2 066	188
Monagas	5 327	3 375	5 481	3 983	228
Nueva Esparta	39	42	30	41	#
Portuguesa	7 388	4 321	7 546	4 460	247
Sucre	1 994	1 593	5 046	3 601	60
Táchira	1 545	762	1 052	812	394
Trujillo	3 277	2 473	2 990	2 192	502
Yaracuy	7 377	5 768	4 104	3 372	318
Zulia	6 860	4 880	17 016	13 686	289

^a1959-1963.

^b1964-1968.

^c1969; for 1970 see Appendix RR.

^dIncludes 1968 official data (see text).

^eEquivalent of revised data (see text).

^fFederal Territory.

Source: Calculated from data in Appendices BB and CC. Official data are from IAN; revised data are basically from CENDES (see Table 21).

TABLE 23
Average Monthly Provisional Title Distribution
to Heads of Family in Venezuela

Data	Heads of Family Benefitted		
	Betancourt 1959-1963 ^a 60 Months	Leoni 1964-1968 ^b 60 Months	Caldera 1969 ^c 12 Months
Official	1 107	1 595	^d 352
Revised	770	1 114	—

^aIncludes all of 1959, even though Betancourt did not take office until February 13, 1959.

^bIncludes 2.4 months of the termination of the Betancourt government in 1964.

^cIncludes 2.4 months of the termination of the Leoni government in 1969.

^dConsidered as the equivalent of revised data.

Source: See Table 22.

With some confusion in Venezuela about what land reform had actually accomplished, the administration of land distribution in Venezuela became an important plank in COPEI's bid for the presidency in 1968. Caldera called for a respite in the reform process, a period needed for consolidation of existing activity and an emphasis in distributing public rather than private lands.¹⁴⁴

The results of Caldera's first year show (Table 23) that he was successful in slowing the land redistribution process. This tempo quickened during 1970 (see Appendix WW) when the average increased to 1 017 families benefitted per month. Until 1970, however, the Caldera government was not so successful in carrying out distribution of public land. As seen in Table 19, in 1969 the new President of Venezuela did not even maintain the nearly 50:50 ratio of public-private land distribution for which AD had been widely

criticized. Probably because Caldera did not have control of the bureaucracy, his policy was not carried out. In the confusion of change in some key posts at the IAN, only 10 per cent of titles went to heads of family on public lands. Owing to a time lag, one could argue that the Caldera government simply brought to a conclusion cases begun under AD; but since thousands of cases are still pending, it is unlikely that this ratio was the conscious outcome of programs that contradicted presidential policy. No wonder the IAN did not publish this aspect of 1969 data. It shows that governmental policy is meaningless without an understanding of and control over the methods and means of program implementation.¹⁴⁵

Governments of AD also suffered when the IAN did not carry out prescribed policy. AD's policy problems (compounded by shifting AD coalition politics at the national level) were especially severe during the epoch of numerous land invasions. Although during the early 1960s the IAN lost the initiative in the land distribution process, as we have seen, AD was still held responsible for activity over which it had little control.

The IAN has been particularly difficult for the government to supervise because it is an autonomous agency. The President of Venezuela appoints the president and the four members of the board of directors; however, its finances are independent of the national treasury.¹⁴⁶ Thus, effective control over the agency is amorphous.

Amount of Land Distributed with Provisional Title

Official data on the amount of land distributed apparently was not affected by problems of propaganda because confusion in the number of recipients of land was sufficient to resolve political issues. The IAN was especially concerned with keeping adequate records on lands involved in order to pay private landholders for expropriated properties as well as to delimit its sphere of activity on public lands. This view

¹⁴⁴At least this was the feeling in government agencies, including the IAN. The problem in distinguishing between AD and COPEI policy is that the two parties both favor mass-based land reform and that they have cooperated in the administration of the IAN. As a typical case in which Latin American leaders of different political parties pay lip service to the same goals in vague rhetoric which shows little appreciation of how programs might actually be carried out, it is often necessary to look for general understandings rather than specific statements. Thus, for example, the "II Congreso Nacional de Profesionales y Técnicos de COPEI e Independientes Socialcristianos" called for protection of private lands in order to respect agricultural enterprises fulfilling a social function (*Acta Final* [Caracas, 1966], p. 18). Since in 1966 AD's President Leoni had announced a limitation on the IAN's purchase of private lands (except in those cases of peasant occupation which require immediate legal action to prevent national problems), a general feeling developed that if AD could not fulfill such a promise, perhaps a new breed of socially responsible professionals and technicians could be placed in a position to bring special skills to the problem under the aegis of COPEI (Leoni's policy is quoted in Carlos Acedo Mendoza, *Venezuela: Ruta y Destino*, prologue by Rafael Caldera [2 vols.; Barcelona, España: Ediciones Ariel, 1966], p. 293). Once Caldera gained power, shifts were indeed made in IAN appointments and policy, but the results were often unexpected.

¹⁴⁵For the years 1963-1968 when data are available, AD always placed a heavy emphasis on distributing titles to heads of family on public lands (see Appendix WW).

¹⁴⁶Venezuela, Ministerio de Agricultura y Cría, *Organización y Administración del Sector Agropecuario de Venezuela* (Caracas: Instituto Interamericano de Ciencias Agrícolas de la Organización de Estados Americanos, 1969), p. 461.

is confirmed by CENDES investigators who consider official data on hectares distributed to be relatively accurate.¹⁴⁷

Cumulative figures are presented in Table 24 along with yearly data. Highest yearly activity came in 1960 with the promulgation of the land reform law. Thereafter budgetary constraints reduced the number of hectares distributed to an AD low in 1963. Betancourt left office, however, having distributed almost two million hectares of land. His successor, Leoni, was responsible for recovery in the total level of activity, distributing more than 700 000 hectares in 1965 and 1968. Leoni left office with more than 2.5 million hectares distributed during his tenure (see Appendix EE). COPEI's Caldera, however, brought the land reform process to a relative halt during his first year, 1969.

Caldera's land reform policy is revealed in the average rate of activity given in Table 25 and Figure 3-2. Compared with Betancourt and Leoni, Caldera's program was very small during his first year, averaging only about 9 000 hectares a month or four and one-half times less than his predecessor. Data for 1970, however, indicate that this rate will be increased; during 1970 the IAN averaged more than 34 050 hectares distributed per month.¹⁴⁸

Leoni's record of 42 013 hectares per month was less than half of Paz Estenssoro's rate of 1960–1964 and not equal to the Barrientos-Ovando rate of 45 766 hectares distributed definitively each month in Bolivia (see Table 10) after the MNR regime was overthrown. Betancourt's relatively low rate was clearly related to economic problems of his own making, as were low rates in Bolivia before 1960.

Although Betancourt and Leoni distributed titles about equally to heads of family on public and private lands, Table 26 shows that the two AD presidents varied concerning public and private shares of land distributed. Leoni did not follow Betancourt's policy of land distribution, shifting from a 50:50 ratio to emphasize distribution of public holdings. A comparison of Tables 19 and 26 reveals that two-thirds of Leoni's activity concerned public lands.¹⁴⁹

Caldera's 1969 record of greater distribution of private over public lands is almost as surprising as his policy of distributing private titles to heads of family. In the former case the figure was 10 per cent; in the latter case it was 15.6 per cent. Although Caldera's record in 1970 was to be very different than in 1969 (in 1970 public lands comprised 70.6 per cent), figures in Table 26 suggest that IAN's expropriation of private

lands may not have been purely accidental as would have been the case if few private lands with many persons had been redistributed (see Appendices SS, UU, and VV). During 1969 the IAN gave private lands in only seven of the twenty-one states where distribution took place. In Zulia and Portuguesa, two states where new commercial agricultural holdings have developed rapidly, Betancourt and Caldera emphasized distribution of private over public lands, in contrast with Leoni. In Barinas, public land distribution was stressed by Leoni and Caldera.

During the period from 1959 to 1969, distribution of the share of public over private lands was heavily predominant in Apure, Bolívar, Cojedes, Falcón, Mérida, Monagas, Sucre, Zulia, and Amazonas. Distribution of private holdings predominated in the Distrito Federal, Aragua, Barinas, Carabobo, Lara, Miranda, and Yaracuy. Shares were about equal in Anzoátegui, Guárico, Portuguesa, Táchira, and Trujillo. The range in emphasis should certainly belie any sweeping generalizations about the effect of land reform in Venezuelan affairs. According to topography, production patterns, and distance to market, for example, the life of the country is affected by changing tempo of land distribution activity in each state.

TABLE 24
Amount of Venezuelan Land Distributed
with Provisional Title, 1959-1969

Year	Hectares Distributed	
	Yearly	Accumulated
1959	460 769	460 769
1960	900 823	1 361 592
1961	180 892	1 542 484
1962	261 492	1 803 976
1963	171 003	1 974 979
1964	202 864	2 177 843
1965	784 250	2 926 093
1966	445 457	3 407 550
1967	380 000	3 787 550
1968	708 205	4 495 755
1969	109 839	4 605 594

Source: See Table 18; *official* data. Cf. Appendix PP.

¹⁴⁷Interview with CENDES's Ricardo Alezones, Caracas, August 10, 1970. Cf. Cipriano Jaimes Salas, *Informe Presentado por la Delegación Agraria del Estado Cojedes San Carlos, Junio de 1969* (N.p.: Talleres Tipográficos del Gobierno del Estado Cojedes, n.d.) who notes a lack of IAN knowledge at the Delegation level regarding lands obtained by the IAN, lack of data on lands being acquired, and lack of information on lands being purchased by the IAN.

¹⁴⁸Venezuela, IAN, *Memoria y Cuenta* (1970), p. 114.

¹⁴⁹AD emphasized distribution of public lands in all years except 1961–1962 (see Appendix VV).

Cumulative percentages of land distributed are shown in Table 27 for three presidents. By the end of Betancourt's term in 1963, 2.2 per cent of Venezuela's land surface had been redistributed; but this figure had increased to 5.0 per cent by the time AD turned over the presidency to COPEI. As in Bolivia, the total of 100 per cent never will be reached, but it gives a rough gauge of activity as Venezuela expands land usage.

Of land censused in 1961, IAN had distributed 7.6 per cent by 1963 and almost 10 per cent more by the end of Leoni's term. Caldera's activity in 1969 did not appreciably change these percentages. Since lands included in the 1961 agricultural census were only about 29 per cent of the country's surface, this total certainly will expand in the future.

Land reform activity has taken place in all federal entities except the Amazonas, where only .1 per cent of the entire Federal Territory was in use in 1961. In Delta Amacuro, the other Federal Territory, more than twice as much land has been distributed as was censused in 1961. Yet not even 4 per cent of that territory's land surface has been affected by the IAN. One quarter or more of state area has been distributed only in Carabobo and Yaracuy, compared with ten states in which over one-quarter of censused land had been distributed by 1969.

The changing impact of land policy on the subnational level is shown in Table 27. Betancourt's policy affected the most shares of censused land in Delta Amacuro, Yaracuy, and Carabobo. Also, regardless of physical size or population, Nueva Esparta was the least affected state, with only 2.8 per cent of the censused land involved in land reform. This situation remained unchanged by 1969; therefore, it can be surmised that because some landowners in the state have not been much affected, they have not been preoccupied with IAN policy.

During Leoni's term of office, the greatest impact of land reform activity in relation to hectares censused came in Delta Amacuro, Carabobo, Monagas, Sucre, Trujillo, and Zulia. The most important agricultural state affected by the Leoni administration was Zulia, where the percentage of lands distributed jumped from 8.8 to 46.8 per cent of lands in use. Such activity was bound to make Zulia a center of debate for and against land reform, along with the important states of Barinas and Portuguesa. Since these three states contain about 18 per cent of the country's total population, the debate over land reform activity came to be related to distribution of population.

Population Factors

Table 28 shows that by 1968 eight states, each with over 4 per cent of the country's population, had received almost 40 per cent of the hectares redistributed by the IAN.¹⁵⁰ Excluding the Distrito

Federal (which had almost 19 per cent of the population and .5 per cent of the total hectares), fourteen states with about 31 per cent of the populace received nearly 60 per cent of the land. Highest ratios of lands distributed to population came in Delta Amacuro, Barinas, and Apure. Lowest nonnegligible ratios came in Táchira, Anzoátegui, Aragua, Lara, and Sucre. These highs and lows ranged from 11.3 to .4 by 1968. This recent pattern was the same in 1963 for low ratios, but Apure and Barinas had the high cumulative ratios, 9.2 and 7.7 respectively. (Figure 3-5 presents the pattern in relation to males employed in agriculture.)

With regard to the changing propaganda impact of land reform activity in relation to populations in Venezuelan political units, six states increased the percentage of distributed hectares compared with the percentage of the country's population, while eleven states saw a decline. This ratio remained the same in three states, and there were two in which the ratio did not apply (Amazonas and Nueva Esparta).

In political terms, the meaning of such data is complex. Much land reform involves government support by the beneficiaries of title as well as opposition from those who involuntarily have given up their land. And the ensuing public debate between these sectors extends beyond the rural sector to the urban centers which provide supplies and services to agriculturalists. Although fewer persons in Venezuela than in Bolivia probably return to the land in times of economic adversity, as in Bolivia the total population of affected states is drawn into support or rejection of reform, depending upon attitudes as to the success or failure of land distribution.

Since increasing land reform activity has led to articulate opposition from commercial agriculturalists, in political terms the percentage of the population benefitting from land reform becomes an important element in the influencing of public policy. Table 29 shows official and revised ratios of such activity for 1963 and 1968. (Data for 1969 are omitted because, as may be seen in Table 27, low figures for that one year's activity do not much change cumulative totals through 1968.) The 1963 ratio of beneficiaries to distribution of the total population was 1:1 or more for revised figures in thirteen states, with this number increasing to fourteen in 1968. Thus Figure 3-5 looks very different than Figure 3-4 as one compares geographical relationships.

A comparison of Tables 28 and 29 shows that by 1968 seven states (Apure, Barinas, Cojedes, Delta Amacuro, Monagas, Portuguesa, Yaracuy) stand out as being most important in ratios of hectares distributed and persons benefitted in relation to population. The seven states comprised only about 13 per cent of the country's population. In this view, the impact of land reform has been less than might have been supposed.

¹⁵⁰In alphabetical order, the eight states with more than 4 per cent of the country's population were Anzoátegui, Aragua, Carabobo, Lara, Miranda, Sucre, Táchira, and Zulia.

TABLE 25
Average Monthly Distribution of Hectares
with Provisional Title in Venezuela

Betancourt 1959-1963 ^a 60 Months	Leoni 1964-1968 ^b 60 Months	Caldera 1969 ^c 12 Months
32 916	42 013	9 153

^aIncludes all of 1959, even though Betancourt did not take office until February 13, 1959.

^bIncludes 2.4 months of the termination of the Betancourt government in 1964.

^cIncludes 2.4 months of the termination of the Leoni government in 1969.

Source: Calculated from Appendix EE; *official* data.

Analysis is incomplete, however, without taking into account the percentage of males employed in agriculture who have actually received title to lands under the land reform program. Table 30 reveals that from 6 to 9 per cent had been benefitted by 1963, depending on whether official or revised statistics are taken into account. This increased to between 15 and 22 per cent by 1968. Of the seven outstanding states given in Tables 29 and 30, only Apure did not reach the national average of distribution. Three other states, however, exceeded the national average (Bolívar, Carabobo, and Zulia).

Although Table 30 and Figure 3-6 allow us to compare official and revised figures for an important segment of the population, the table is based on data for 1961. Thus, if the composition of males employed in agriculture has shifted, the table could be potentially misleading. Until the population census data for 1971 is available, however, one may hypothesize that these figures are fairly accurate because the growth of agriculturally occupied population probably is offset by migration to cities. It is notable that in 1961 the absolute number of males employed in agriculture differed only 4 per cent from 1950. The total number of agriculturally employed population differed less than 3 per cent between 1950 and 1961.¹⁵¹

Even if official percentages of over 30 per cent are reduced to the revised levels, by 1968 land reform had a significant impact which affected almost one-

third of the eligible population in Cojedes, Yaracuy, and Zulia. Only two states were well below 10 per cent. Further, these figures in reality may be an understatement of the percentage of eligible citizenry benefitted, because data in Table 30 contain persons below the minimum age of 18 required for land petitioners. If we deduct 155 016 agriculturally employed males in the ten to nineteen age group,¹⁵² it would make the official and revised percentages for 1968 28.1 and 20.0, respectively. For the Betancourt term the percentage would be 11.5 and 8.0 per cent.¹⁵³ Also, all heads of families do not necessarily want to be landowners, particularly those receiving more income as laborers (often with fewer hours of work) than those beneficiaries of land reform who work inadequate holdings.

The analysis above is based upon several presumptions. First, women (who in any case constitute a small group working in agriculture) are presumed to be dependent family members rather than heads of family eligible to receive land title.¹⁵⁴ Second, since theoretically IAN grantees may not sell their land (except to IAN-approved beneficiaries) and title reverts to the IAN for redistribution if the land is not properly worked,¹⁵⁵ it may be presumed that a growing pool of holdings will be occupied by IAN recipients, regardless of land abandonment. Even if in practice land may be sold illegally or abandoned to whomever may want it, in a de facto sense such holdings were made possible by the IAN, albeit indirectly. Thus figures presented here help us to understand the impact of land on the Venezuelan population.

Purchase of Properties by the IAN

In contrast with the Bolivian case where land seizure and inflation made irrelevant the need or the demand for payment (see n. 86), in Venezuela payment has been important. To evaluate the impact of title redistribution on landholders affected by the IAN, some contradictory statistics concerning compensation paid for expropriated properties bear examination. Table 31 presents two official ("X" and "Y") and one independent (CENDES) series of amounts paid for lands and land improvement. Though the IAN "X" series and the CENDES series come to nearly the same total for the period 1960-1965, year-to-year comparisons show wide variation. One might expect CENDES

¹⁵¹Venezuela, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos Nacionales, *Censo de Población, 1961*, A, p. 210. Figures here exclude unemployed.


¹⁵²*Ibid.*, B, p. 501. Data include one year too many—19 year olds.

¹⁵³Calculation based upon data in Appendix AA.

¹⁵⁴In 1961 there were 26 465 women employed in agriculture (the difference between data in Appendix KK and Table 30), but 3 925 were in the age group 10-19 (Venezuela, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos Nacionales, *Censo de Población, 1961*, B, p. 513).

¹⁵⁵Articles 73 and 83 of the Land Reform Law; see note 115.

VENEZUELA: LAND DISTRIBUTED BY YEAR AND PRESIDENTIAL TERM 1959 - 1969



PRESIDENT & TIME IN OFFICE	BETANCOURT 60 MONTHS 45.5%	LEONI 60 MONTHS 45.5%	CALDERA 12 MONTHS 90	132 MONTHS 100%
TOTAL LAND DISTRIBUTED	1,974,979 42.9%	2,520,776 54.7%	109,839 2.4%	4,605,594 100%
AVERAGE MONTHLY DISTRIBUTION OF HECTARES	32,916	42,013	9,153	

SOURCE: TABLES 24, 25, AND APPENDIX EE

Figure 3-2

to have revised IAN figures downward, but in half the cases IAN totals are the same or less than CENDES totals.

The main problem with the IAN "X" and CENDES series, however, is that they do not show any distinction between amounts *obligated* for payment and amounts *actually* paid to former owners. Thus the

IAN has circulated widely series "X" for propaganda consumption,¹⁵⁶ leading the populace to misunderstand year-to-year activity of the agency. Further, IAN's own yearly report,¹⁵⁷ which is mainly for internal governmental use, has presented a confused accounting picture. Yearly reports for 1964, 1966, and 1967, for example, present obligations assumed by the

¹⁵⁶For example, Venezuela, IAN, *La Reforma Agraria en las Entidades Federales, 1959-1963*; and *idem, La Reforma Agraria en las Entidades Federales, 1959-1967*.

¹⁵⁷*Memoria y Cuenta*.

TABLE 26
Public and Private Lands Distributed with Provisional Title in Venezuela
^a(Totals = 100.0 Per Cent for Each President)

State	Hectares Distributed					
	Betancourt		Leoni		^b Caldera	
	Public	Private	Public	Private	Public	Private
Total	49.2	50.8	68.4	31.6	15.6	84.4
Amazonas	#	#	#	#	#	#
Anzoátegui	59.7	40.3	54.4	45.6	#	100.0
Apure	64.3	35.7	76.1	23.9	#	100.0
Aragua	28.6	71.4	18.8	81.2	#	100.0
Barinas	28.6	71.4	54.8	45.2	80.0	20.0
Bolívar	93.1	6.9	91.7	8.3	100.0	#
Carabobo	17.8	82.2	7.3	92.7	#	100.0
Cojedes	79.0	21.0	77.3	22.7	#	100.0
Delta Amacuro	100.0	#	100.0	#	#	#
Distrito Federal	24.0	76.0	#	100.0	#	100.0
Falcón	27.0	73.0	82.6	17.4	71.4	28.6
Guárico	47.0	53.0	51.2	48.8	#	100.0
Lara	40.0	60.0	8.7	91.3	#	100.0
Mérida	95.0	5.0	67.3	32.7	100.0	#
Miranda	1.6	98.4	15.0	85.0	#	100.0
Monagas	78.2	21.8	90.2	9.8	15.6	84.4
Nueva Esparta	#	100.0	#	100.0	#	#
Portuguesa	41.0	59.0	57.6	42.4	#	100.0
Sucre	77.1	22.9	77.1	22.9	#	100.0
Táchira	52.7	47.3	54.3	45.7	23.0	77.0
Trujillo	26.2	73.8	60.9	39.1	#	100.0
Yaracuy	49.5	50.5	12.7	87.3	#	100.0
Zulia	43.7	56.3	89.5	10.5	26.0	74.0

^aAbsolute totals are given in Appendix EE; for yearly totals see Appendix VV. Official data.

^b1969; for 1970 data see Appendix SS.

government, but reports for 1965 and 1968 give data for obligations and actual payments. Unfortunately, at least in the 1968 report, some of the actual payments were not made in 1968, as in the case of a 7 000-hectare property ("Carduware") in the state of Lara, which had been owned by Marcos Alvarez Santeliz. Although this former owner received about 500 000 bolívares in cash and about 1.5 million in bonds, the promised 1.4 million in bonds was not paid either in 1968 or 1969.¹⁵⁸

Confusion in IAN yearly reports may be seen also in several other examples, such as the case of a

Carabobo property ("El Banco") purchase by IAN in 1966. The yearly report lists the amount of over 3 million bolívares as the purchase price without stating that the amount was merely an obligation of the government; by 1969 none of that amount had been paid. The owners of another property, ("Chorobobo") in the state of Lara, fared slightly better. During 1969 they received about 2.9 million bolívares in cash for lands purchased in 1967; however, about 2.7 million in bonds remained in the form of an obligation for future government issue.¹⁵⁹ By 1969 205 such cases had accumulated, involving an amount

¹⁵⁸Venezuela, IAN, *Balance General y Ejecución Presupuestaria*, 1969, p. 92.

¹⁵⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 91–92.

TABLE 27
Cumulative Provisional Distribution of (A) Land Surface and
(B) Land Censused, by State in Venezuela

State		Hectares ^a 1961	^b Per Cent Distributed		
			1963	1968	1969
Total	A Land Surface	89 721 000	2.2	5.0	5.1
	B Land Censused	26 002 228	7.6	17.3	17.7
Amazonas	A Land Surface	17 575 000	#	#	#
	B Land Censused	20 136	#	#	#
Anzoátegui	A Land Surface	4 330 000	.9	2.7	2.7
	B Land Censused	1 640 796	2.3	7.1	7.1
Apure	A Land Surface	7 650 000	3.8	4.7	4.9
	B Land Censused	4 423 770	6.6	8.2	8.5
Aragua	A Land Surface	588 000	6.5	14.7	15.5
	B Land Censused	569 651	6.8	15.2	16.0
Barinas	A Land Surface	3 520 000	8.2	14.3	14.5
	B Land Censused	2 027 913	14.2	24.7	25.1
Bolívar	A Land Surface	23 800 000	.2	.5	.5
	B Land Censused	2 772 965	2.0	4.3	4.4
Carabobo	A Land Surface	540 000	19.3	38.7	39.1
	B Land Censused	416 739	25.0	50.1	50.7
Cojedes	A Land Surface	1 480 000	3.0	12.3	12.7
	B Land Censused	1 368 343	3.2	13.3	13.8
Delta Amacuro	A Land Surface	4 020 000	.9	3.8	3.8
	B Land Censused	64 415	57.8	235.6	235.6
Distrito Federal	A Land Surface	193 000	5.9	11.4	11.6
	B Land Censused	60 645	18.9	36.4	36.8
Falcón	A Land Surface	2 480 000	1.7	6.6	6.7
	B Land Censused	850 452	4.8	19.2	19.4
Guárico	A Land Surface	6 499 000	2.4	4.6	4.8
	B Land Censused	4 124 923	3.7	7.3	7.5
Lara	A Land Surface	1 980 000	3.2	7.0	7.7
	B Land Censused	1 032 309	6.2	13.5	14.7
Mérida	A Land Surface	1 130 000	4.8	7.8	7.9
	B Land Censused	665 766	8.2	13.3	13.4
Miranda	A Land Surface	795 000	6.9	11.9	12.4
	B Land Censused	592 600	9.3	16.0	16.7

TABLE 27 (Cont'd)
 Cumulative Provisional Distribution of (A) Land Surface and
 (B) Land Censused, by State in Venezuela

State		Hectares ^a 1961	^b Per Cent Distributed		
			1963	1968	1969
Monagas	A Land Surface	2 890 000	3.9	10.4	10.6
	B Land Censused	847 128	13.4	35.6	36.1
Nueva Esparta	A Land Surface	115 000	.5	.8	.8
	B Land Censused	21 897	2.8	4.3	4.3
Portuguesa	A Land Surface	1 520 000	8.7	17.3	17.5
	B Land Censused	681 861	19.5	38.6	39.0
Sucre	A Land Surface	1 180 000	4.8	10.8	10.9
	B Land Censused	331 066	17.2	38.5	38.8
Táchira	A Land Surface	1 110 000	5.2	7.2	8.2
	B Land Censused	784 230	7.4	10.2	11.7
Trujillo	A Land Surface	740 000	7.4	19.2	20.2
	B Land Censused	462 095	11.9	30.8	32.4
Yaracuy	A Land Surface	710 000	16.5	24.3	24.6
	B Land Censused	363 182	32.3	47.5	48.0
Zulia	A Land Surface	4 876 000	3.4	17.9	18.0
	B Land Censused	1 879 167	8.8	46.4	46.8

^aExcludes Lake Maracaibo, Lake Valencia, and island dependencies.

^bOfficial data.

Source: Percentages are calculated from Appendix EE; land censused is from Appendix HH; land surface is from CENDES, *La Reforma Agraria en Venezuela*, II, pp. a/15, and Venezuela, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos Nacionales, *Anuario Estadístico* (1967), p. 3.

of about 70 million bolívares.¹⁶⁰ While there may be very valid reasons for delay in payment, failure of IAN's propaganda and yearly reports to distinguish between amounts obligated and amounts actually paid to former landowners prevents yearly public assessment of the impact of land distribution in each state.

Although the IAN "X" series is faulty, the "Y" series gives some indication of the yearly amounts actually paid for lands. This series includes amounts paid for obligations of prior years, as in 1965 when 10.2 million of the 62.9 million bolívares outlay apparently went to cover sums obligated in earlier years.¹⁶¹


On the one hand it is advantageous politically to report obligations with the impression that these amounts are actually paid (thereby "proving" that the

government compensates former landowners); but on the other hand the actual cost per year may seem too high (as when one compares Table 18 with IAN series "X" to see that the average land cost for each peasant was high in 1963 and low in 1964). In the latter case, the average obligation for cost of land purchased for each IAN recipient was 5 320 bolívares in 1963 compared with 2 642 in 1964. Using IAN "Y" series data, the same averages would be nearly equal for actual outlay (about 3 700 in 1963 and 3 900 bolívares in 1964). Since all figures are questionable (and there is no need to confuse the cost of obligations), the point is currently only academic. When COPEI took office, the problem was solved beginning in 1969 by not publishing the usual financial statement in the yearly report.¹⁶²

¹⁶⁰The amount was 51.1 million in bonds and 18.4 million bolívares in cash; see *ibid.*, p.98.

¹⁶¹This 10.2 million represents the difference between 52.7 million bolívares actually spent during 1965 and the total outlay for land acquired by the IAN; see Venezuela, IAN, *Memoria y Cuenta* (1965).

¹⁶²The *Memoria y Cuenta*, by its very title, is charged with making such a report. For the 1969 statement see Venezuela, IAN, *Balance General y Ejecución Presupuestaria* (1969).



SOURCE: TABLE 27

Figure 3-3

If the Venezuelan electorate is to evaluate intelligently the country's land reform activity, it would be helpful for the government to circulate widely information on the actual yearly land debt payments as well as land debts for which no provision has been made for payment. This information for 1969 is shown in Table 32. Of the 38 million bolívares paid out by the IAN, almost half the total was in cash, with the former landowners in Portuguesa receiving 70 per cent in cash for the greatest share of payments to any state. Of the nearly 70 million bolívares for which no arrangements had been made by 1969 to make cash payments or to issue bonds, only about 27 per cent

had been promised in cash. In only three states did cash obligations exceed 50 per cent.

Inclusion of such data in widely distributed government documents, however, raises the question of how much information the public needs to know about government operations. Indeed, my colleagues in the United States and in Latin America generally have been surprised that government agencies have opened their doors to independent scholars, let alone to the general public. Many people have assumed that governments, by their very nature, set up bureaucratic systems to hide rather than to distribute information. Often, these persons have reasoned that bureaucratic self-protection

TABLE 28
 Ratio by State of (A) Per Cent of Cumulative Hectares Provisionally
 Distributed to (B) Per Cent of Estimated Venezuelan Population
 †(Hectares as a rounded percentage of population)

State	1963			1968		
	Hectares	Population	Ratio	Hectares	Population	Ratio
Total	100.0	100.0	**	100.0	100.0	**
Amazonas	#	.1	**	#	.1	**
Anzoátegui	1.9	5.0	.4	2.6	4.8	.5
Apure	14.7	1.6	9.2	8.1	1.7	4.8
Aragua	1.9	4.2	.5	1.9	4.1	.5
Barinas	14.6	1.9	7.7	11.2	2.1	5.3
Bolívar	2.7	3.0	.9	2.7	3.2	.8
Carabobo	5.3	5.0	1.1	4.6	4.9	.9
Cojedes	2.2	1.0	2.2	4.0	1.0	4.0
Delta Amacuro	1.9	.4	4.8	3.4	.3	11.3
Distrito Federal	.6	17.3	#	.5	18.7	#
Falcón	2.1	4.3	.5	3.6	3.8	.9
Guárico	7.8	3.3	2.4	6.7	3.3	2.0
Lara	3.3	6.3	.5	3.1	5.8	.5
Mérida	2.8	3.5	.8	2.0	3.3	.6
Miranda	2.8	6.6	.4	2.1	6.7	.3
Monagas	5.7	3.2	1.8	6.7	3.1	2.2
Nueva Esparta	#	1.1	**	#	1.0	**
Portuguesa	6.8	2.8	2.4	5.8	2.9	2.0
Sucre	2.9	5.2	.6	2.8	4.9	.6
Táchira	2.9	5.2	.6	1.8	5.1	.4
Trujillo	2.8	4.2	.7	3.2	3.8	.8
Yaracuy	5.9	2.2	2.7	3.8	2.1	1.8
Zulia	8.4	12.6	.7	19.4	13.3	1.5

† Because the rate of IAN activity was low during 1969, the ratio is essentially the same as for accumulated 1968 data; therefore, figures for 1969 are omitted here. Hectares are *official* data.


Source: Calculated from Appendices DD and EE. For explanation of ratio, see Table 14.

is probably inevitable and hardly worth questioning. While this may be true, my view is as follows: In many cases because governments are swamped by data (as well as by the crises of day-to-day action) and because they do not have time to develop conceptual categories which give meaning to data, they tend not to understand how data can be used.

Ironically, the Venezuelan land reform law was developed with a complicated statistical system of land classification which has made it practically useless for purpose of interpretation. Whereas Bolivia's classification of land may be judged overly simple, at least it

has more meaning than the idealistic classification scheme developed in Venezuela. Venezuelan land is not judged on a Bolivian-type scale which classifies land as "cultivable," "incultivable," or "pasture" land; rather, seven categories involving a varied scoring pattern obscure the use of the land in order to make a determination related to demographic pressure, distance to market, and climatic as well as agricultural conditions (see Appendix II). In effect, the system is so idealistic that no "first class" lands exist because it is practically impossible to assign to any lands the weighted 90 to 100 points required for such a

VENEZUELAN LAND REFORM BENEFITS BY STATE TO 1968:
RATIO OF PER CENT OF CUMULATIVE HECTARES PROVISIONALLY DISTRIBUTED
TO PER CENT OF MALES EMPLOYED IN AGRICULTURE IN 1961



SOURCE: APPENDIX JJ

Figure 3-4

classification.¹⁶³ Also, perhaps because the classification has no standard meaning (especially since some of the factors are changed by such activity as construction of water supply and new access roads), the IAN has not maintained any statistical summaries on the type of land involved in the reform process.¹⁶⁴ Data on grants of definitive title to lands also have involved problems.

Definitive Titles

Total figures on distribution of definitive title were not included in the IAN yearly report until 1967; and data by state were not published by the government until Caldera became President in 1969.¹⁶⁵

Yearly totals (Table 33) reveal that no heads of family were benefitted with final title until 1962 and not many definitive titles were granted until 1967 and 1968. (No collective titles were distributed until 1967; and by 1969 only slightly more than 1 000 heads of family, or about 3 per cent of persons receiving final title, had chosen to work the land on a collective basis.) Only part of this delay could be attributed to the requirement that beneficiaries prove that they in fact are working the land, and bureaucratic slowness may have influenced the political situation.

Table 34 presents data of political importance, cumulative data by state for heads of family receiving definitive title through 1967. These figures, presented

¹⁶³Interview with the IAN's Humberto Almao Tovar, Caracas, July 28, 1970.

¹⁶⁴For some admittedly questionable estimates regarding the type of lands involved through 1965, see CENDES, *La Reforma Agraria en Venezuela*, I, pp. 121-136.

¹⁶⁵Venezuela, IAN, *Entrega de Títulos*, 1969.

TABLE 29

Ratio by State of (A) Per Cent of Cumulative Heads of Family Provisionally Benefitted to (B) Per Cent of Estimated Venezuelan Population
 †(Heads of family as a rounded percentage of population)

State	1963					1968				
	Heads		Population	Official Ratio	Revised Ratio	Heads		Population	Official Ratio	Revised Ratio
	Official	Revised				Official	Revised			
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	**	**	100.0	100.0	100.0	**	**
Amazonas	#	#	.1	**	**	#	#	.1	**	**
Anzoátegui	3.8	2.9	5.0	.8	.6	4.6	4.0	4.8	1.0	.8
Apure	1.5	2.2	1.6	.9	1.4	1.6	2.3	1.7	.9	1.4
Aragua	3.1	3.8	4.2	.7	.9	3.0	3.7	4.1	.7	.9
Barinas	3.1	2.6	1.9	1.6	1.4	5.8	4.8	2.1	2.8	2.3
Bolívar	2.7	3.1	3.0	.9	1.0	2.8	3.3	3.2	.9	1.0
Carabobo	7.7	8.4	5.0	1.5	1.7	5.9	5.7	4.9	1.2	1.2
Cojedes	2.0	2.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	4.0	3.5	1.0	4.0	3.5
Delta Amacuro	2.8	2.4	.4	7.0	6.0	1.6	1.5	.3	5.3	5.0
Distrito Federal	.5	.7	17.3	#	#	.7	.8	18.7	#	#
Falcón	4.0	3.3	4.3	.9	.8	4.2	4.0	3.8	1.1	1.1
Guárico	4.9	3.2	3.3	1.5	1.0	6.2	4.2	3.3	1.9	1.3
Lara	4.2	5.1	6.3	.7	.8	4.7	5.2	5.8	.8	.9
Mérida	4.2	3.6	3.5	1.2	1.0	3.5	3.6	3.3	1.1	1.1
Miranda	4.7	6.5	6.6	.7	1.0	3.8	4.5	6.7	.6	.7
Monagas	8.0	7.3	3.2	2.5	2.3	6.7	6.5	3.1	2.2	2.1
Nueva Esparta	.1	.1	1.1	.1	.1	#	.1	1.0	**	.1
Portuguesa	11.1	9.3	2.8	4.0	3.3	9.2	7.7	2.9	3.2	2.7
Sucre	3.0	3.4	5.2	.6	.7	4.3	4.6	4.9	.9	.9
Táchira	2.3	1.6	5.2	.4	.3	1.6	1.4	5.1	.3	.3
Trujillo	4.9	5.4	4.2	1.2	1.3	3.9	4.1	3.8	1.0	1.1
Yaracuy	11.1	12.5	2.2	5.0	5.7	7.1	8.1	2.1	3.4	3.9
Zulia	10.3	10.6	12.6	.8	.8	14.7	16.4	13.3	1.1	1.2

†For explanation of ratios, see Table 14.

Source: Calculated from Table 22 and Appendices AA and KK.

as a percentage of heads of family who had received provisional title, point up a problematic situation in the countryside on the eve of the 1968 presidential campaign. If less than a quarter of the peasants receiving land had gained final title, many may have been displeased with the government, which presumably believed that provisional distribution was more important than the definitive titling process. After receiving land, however, many radical peasants who earlier supported AD must have felt that a process consolidating final rights was more important than a

continuation of early AD policy. If Caldera's promise to consolidate peasant gains (at the expense of rapid provisional distribution of title) gained the support of even a few peasants awaiting final determination of their provisional titles, COPEI policy was successful. Caldera won the presidency by only 29 595 votes over a divided AD in an election where more than 3.7 million votes were cast.¹⁶⁶

With regard to hectares involved in definitive grants of title, clear data are published for heads of family only beginning in 1969. Acción Democrática

¹⁶⁶UCLA *Statistical Abstract of Latin America* (1968), p. 179. According to CENDES, *La Reforma Agraria en Venezuela*, V, p. 18, 96.2 per cent of the peasants interviewed in the CENDES sample felt that it is important to have title to the land, as compared with 1.6 per cent who did not feel that titles are important and 2.2 per cent who did not know or did not answer the question.

VENEZUELAN STATES BENEFITTED BY 1968:
 RATIO OF PER CENT OF CUMULATIVE HEADS OF FAMILY PROVISIONALLY
 BENEFITTED TO PER CENT OF ESTIMATED POPULATION

(Revised Data)




Figure 3-5

may have been reluctant to publish such data because of the fear it would show the party in a disadvantageous light, but some leaders may have realized that final titling itself could have political problems. Since in some cases more persons had received land provisionally than could be accommodated in definitive terms, perhaps AD was reluctant to create yet another type of discontent in the countryside.

One may further hypothesize that since so many heads of family still await final title, some peasants probably have not been willing to invest time and energy on lands that they may not receive definitively. Thus, an important share of the peasants may not yet have become producers and consumers in the national economy, as many of Venezuela's leaders have claimed. This problem is related both to problems in conceptualization of data gathered by the government and to the effect of land reform on agricultural production levels.

Agricultural Production Data

With several possible sources of discontent in the countryside, one might expect to find a drop in agricultural production since 1960. Further, since land reform in most countries has been accompanied by a dramatic decline in output during the early years of structural upheaval, one could reasonably expect Venezuela to follow the same pattern. Table 35 reveals, however, that not only was there no drop but also that solid gains in production volume were made during the 1960s over the 1950s in such important categories as corn, rice, coffee, yuca, and sesame. Similarly, production of hogs, cattle, eggs, and milk increased dramatically after 1959, even allowing for population growth (see Appendix DD). The only two series in Table 35 which show quite erratic growth involve data on bananas and plantains. According to this official data, a decline in production did come for some items during

TABLE 30
Cumulative Venezuelan Heads of Family Provisionally Benefitted by Land Reform
as a Percentage of Males Employed in Agriculture in 1961

State	Males Employed in † Agriculture in 1961	Cumulative Percentage Benefitted			
		1963		1968	
		Official	Revised	Official	Revised
Total	732 857	9.1	6.3	22.1	15.4
Amazonas	1 415	#	#	#	#
Anzoátegui	34 566	7.3	3.9	21.6	13.1
Apure	20 809	4.7	4.8	12.8	12.3
Aragua	23 095	8.8	7.7	20.8	18.0
Barinas	26 489	7.8	4.5	35.8	20.7
Bolívar	19 272	9.3	7.4	23.6	19.4
Carabobo	25 620	20.0	15.2	37.2	25.2
Cojedes	13 177	10.1	6.9	49.9	30.3
Delta Amacuro	6 348	28.8	17.2	40.2	26.1
Distrito Federal	9 535	3.8	3.4	11.6	9.4
Falcón	34 500	7.8	4.4	19.8	13.0
Guárico	38 441	8.4	3.8	26.3	12.4
Lara	54 268	5.1	4.3	13.9	10.8
Mérida	48 676	5.7	3.5	11.7	8.3
Miranda	35 049	8.9	8.6	17.5	14.5
Monagas	34 551	15.4	9.8	31.3	21.2
Nueva Esparta	6 232	.6	.7	1.1	1.3
Portuguesa	40 852	18.1	10.6	36.6	21.5
Sucre	58 558	3.4	2.7	12.0	8.9
Táchira	56 805	2.7	1.3	4.6	2.8
Trujillo	54 012	6.1	4.6	11.6	8.6
Yaracuy	29 309	25.2	19.7	39.2	31.2
Zulia	61 278	11.2	8.0	39.0	30.3

† Includes silviculture, hunting, ranching, and fishing; data are for employed and unemployed workers.

Source: Percentages are calculated from Appendix AA; figures on males employed in agriculture are from Venezuela, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos Nacionales, *Censo de Población, 1961*, A, pp. 200-201. For distinction between "official" and "revised" series, see Table 21.


the period 1945–1948 when AD originally attempted to inaugurate land reform; however, except for rice, production generally made a recovery during the 1950s.

The increasing IAN-held land share in the value of national agricultural production is shown in Table 36. In current prices, total Venezuelan output increased 170 per cent between 1958 and 1968. Even allowing for inflation, this was an increase of about 150 per cent. During the same period, the IAN-held land share increased from 2.6 to 17.5 per cent of the total. Thus it appears that land reform did not discourage production by either the private sector or

the new IAN beneficiaries, whether they had received provisional or final title.

If the value of the IAN-generated share in production is divided by the cumulative official number of IAN recipients, however, one may surmise that (in terms that account for deflation) the average pre- and post-1959 land reform recipient has fared about equally in income. In 1958 some 11 767 recipients for the first AD period and the Pérez Jiménez era received an average income from agricultural products of 3 200 standard bolívares. This decreased to 2 567 by the end of the Betancourt government in 1963, but had recovered to 3 510 by 1968 when Leoni left office.


CUMULATIVE HEADS OF FAMILY PROVISIONALLY BENEFITTED BY 1963 AND 1968 AS A PERCENTAGE OF MALES EMPLOYED IN AGRICULTURE IN 1961



SOURCE: TABLE 30

Figure 3-6

VENEZUELAN MALES IN AGRICULTURE BENEFITTED BY LAND REFORM TO 1968:
 CUMULATIVE HEADS OF FAMILY PROVISIONALLY BENEFITTED AS A
 PERCENTAGE OF MALES EMPLOYED IN AGRICULTURE IN 1961



SOURCE: TABLE 30

Figure 3-7



Private cattle ranches established in the late 1950's by clearing tropical forest, State of Zulia, Venezuela
(Photo by K. Ruddle)

Modern hacienda, State of Zulia, Venezuela
(Photo by K. Ruddle)

TABLE 31
Venezuelan Purchase of Properties by IAN
(In Millions of Bolívares)

Year	CENDES Series	IAN "X" Series	IAN "Y" Series
1959	**	1.1	—
1960	98.1	108.1	—
1961	82.0	82.2	—
1962	77.6	48.6	—
1963	12.5	51.4	36.4
1964	41.3	30.5	45.7
1965	78.3	95.0	62.9
1966	—	44.6	76.5
1967	—	38.6	32.7
1968	**	40.1	55.9
1969	**	36.3	38.2

Source: CENDES Series is from CENDES, *La Reforma Agraria en Venezuela*, I, p. a/56.

IAN "X" Series is from Venezuela, IAN, *La Reforma Agraria en las Entidades Federales, 1959-1967*; and *idem*, *Memoria y Cuenta* (1968). For 1969 see source below.

IAN "Y" Series is from Venezuela, IAN, *Memoria y Cuenta*, yearly; except *idem*, *Balance General y Ejecución Presupuestaria* (1969).

Income in each of these three years was derived principally from crops, with animal value never reaching more than 500 standard bolívares. Revised figures on recipients show a slightly higher income per head of family, with the total being about 1 000 bolívares more than for data using the unrevised official number of recipients.

Although we saw earlier that revised figures on the number of recipients seems to make sense, CENDES sample data on income of 1.5 per cent of the IAN beneficiaries in 1967 gave an average family income of 3 321 bolívares,¹⁶⁷ an amount remarkably close to the official figure given in Table 36. This total was only slightly less than 1 000 dollars,¹⁶⁸ not a large amount especially if there was little change in income between 1958 and 1968, while the cost of living remained high.

Part of the reason for an apparent lack of gain in the financial position of beneficiaries is the decreasing average number of hectares worked per family (Table 37). Without taking into account heads of family, in 1958 more than 50 000 hectares were harvested on IAN lands, an amount increasing to more than 532 000 by 1968. There is some question whether this latter total declined in 1969 to about 470 000 hectares because of bad weather or because the new COPEI government made more realistic estimates; but in either case, these amounts divided by the number of official recipients show that the average hectares harvested fell from more than 4 hectares to about 3 per recipient. If revised figures are used, this average declined from more than 5 hectares to 4 per family.

Although at least half of the direct recipients interviewed in the CENDES sample earned less than 2 500 bolívares per year before receiving government lands, over 40 per cent felt that their economic position had not improved as a result of receiving land from the IAN.¹⁶⁹ And the average plot worked by persons included in the CENDES sample was 10.6 hectares, two or three times more than the official or revised averages discussed above.¹⁷⁰

If the impact of land reform on the peasantry has been very mixed, what of the impact of land redistribution on the value of agricultural production by state? Table 38 reveals some interesting patterns. In those states in which the greatest share of land was distributed by 1968 (Zulia, Barinas, Apure, Guárico, Monagas, and Portuguesa all had over 5 per cent of the total), the share of total value did not seem either to grow or decline much, except in Portuguesa where the share in production increased from over 5 to almost 9 per cent. The record for Zulia appears to have declined since 1963, but the figure for 1968 is an increase over 1960. A negative relationship between land reform and value of production appears to have existed only in Lara, Trujillo, and Yaracuy.

The relationship between land reform and value of production may also be shown by examining Table 39. Thus 13.5 per cent of Lara's land censused in 1961 had been distributed by 1968, but IAN recipients contributed only 6.7 per cent to the state's total production value. The result was more balanced in Yaracuy, where 48 per cent of the land censused had

¹⁶⁷CENDES, *La Reforma Agraria en Venezuela*, IV, p. 13. The CENDES total of 3 321 bolívares is deflated from 3 553 for terms of 1963 with a Venezuelan wholesale price index of 107; see Venezuela, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos Nacionales, *Anuario Estadístico* (1967), p. 213 (base converted to 1963)—this index is for national goods in contrast with the index for Caracas given in Table XII:1. See also, Frederick A. Jaspersen, "The Economic Impact of the Venezuelan Agrarian Reform," Bloomington: Ph.D. thesis in economics, University of Indiana, 1969; David N. Holmes, Jr., "The Economic Nature of the Credit Union and Its Role in Rural Development: A Case Study in Venezuela," Los Angeles, Ph.D. thesis in economics, University of California, 1965).

¹⁶⁸According to the UCLA *Statistical Abstract of Latin America* (1968), p. 166, the rate of exchange in 1963 was 3.35 bolívares to the dollar.

¹⁶⁹CENDES, *La Reforma Agraria en Venezuela*, V, pp. 5 and 17.

¹⁷⁰*Ibid.*, II, p. 253.

TABLE 32
Status of Venezuelan Land Purchases, 1969
(In Per Cent)

State	Purchase of Land in 1969		No Provision for Payment by 1969	
	Share by State	Cash Share in Each State	Share by State	Cash Share in Each State
Total	^a 100.0	**	^b 100.0	**
Amazonas	#	#	#	#
Anzoátegui	1.2	28.3	2.4	18.1
Apure	.1	100.0	2.3	41.5
Aragua	2.3	52.8	9.1	17.0
Barinas	3.3	7.9	1.7	18.8
Bolívar	.1	100.0	.3	76.0
Carabobo	1.2	28.8	10.2	25.0
Cojedes	5.8	32.8	.5	8.5
Delta Amacuro	#	100.0	#	#
Distrito Federal	#	100.0	5.5	32.0
Falcón	4.8	48.3	2.8	26.9
Guárico	3.2	51.5	5.1	41.3
Lara	8.4	10.2	11.1	5.8
Mérida	.9	57.5	2.2	28.4
Miranda	3.5	28.1	14.8	20.1
Monagas	2.1	55.7	1.8	43.7
Nueva Esparta	#	100.0	#	#
Portuguesa	19.4	70.3	3.3	33.5
Sucre	9.7	30.1	2.5	60.0
Táchira	3.1	75.5	1.6	71.4
Trujillo	10.6	67.7	15.9	33.8
Yaracuy	11.0	41.9	3.5	32.9
Zulia	9.3	60.2	3.4	29.1

^a38 272 224 bolívares.

^b69 846 344 bolívares.

Source: Venezuela, IAN *Balance General y Ejecución Presupuestario* (1969).

been distributed and IAN recipients contributed about 46 per cent of the state's production value. In Trujillo the relationship was positive in that value was about 8 per cent more than the percentage of land distributed. This was also the case for nine other states, leaving a negative relationship in twelve states, including Lara and Yaracuy. The states that had the most serious discrepancy between land distributed and land reform were Delta Amacuro, Zulia, and Carabobo. In the first state, where more than twice as much land had been distributed as censused, IAN production value was only about 35 per cent. Either the census was

grossly inadequate in 1961 or, subsequently, private interests have greatly developed new holdings without fear of land reform. IAN holdings in Zulia produced less than 10 per cent of the value of total agricultural output in that state in 1968, even though about 47 per cent of the land censused had been distributed. Since there was almost a 20 per cent discrepancy of the same kind in Carabobo, one can hypothesize that IAN holdings are remarkably unproductive because most of the land was in use in 1961 (Table 27). Publication within the next few years of the 1971 agricultural census should answer questions raised here about

TABLE 33
 Heads of Family Having Received Definitive Land Title in Venezuela

Year	Total Heads of Family		Subtotal Individual		Subtotal Collective	
	Yearly	Accumulated	Yearly	Accumulated	Yearly	Accumulated
1959	#	#	#	#	#	#
1960	#	#	#	#	#	#
1961	#	#	#	#	#	#
1962	2 306	2 306	2 306	2 306	#	#
1963	3 534	5 840	3 534	5 840	#	#
1964	3 589	9 429	3 589	9 429	#	#
1965	3 732	13 161	3 732	13 161	#	#
1966	1 478	14 639	1 478	14 639	#	#
1967	†8 050	22 689	7 638	22 277	412	412
1968	9 042	31 731	8 910	31 187	132	544
1969	4 325	36 056	3 722	34 909	603	1 147

† IAN yearly report gives 8 440.

Source: 1962-1967 data are from CENDES, *La Reforma Agraria en Venezuela*, II, p. a/47; 1968 data are from Venezuela, IAN, *Memoria y Cuenta* (1968); figures for 1969 are from *idem*, *Entrega de Títulos, 1969*. Data for differentiation between collective and individual titles in 1968 were not prepared at the time but were reconstructed for me in 1970 by IAN's División de Tenencia, Oficina de Dotaciones Campesinas. Cf. Appendix LL.

whether the IAN holdings are unproductive in some other states and whether their output has kept pace with an expanding private sector.

In any case, the above analysis shows that in spite of extensive land reform, agricultural production has not declined and that the private sector has not chosen to shift investment out of the countryside. Although production by IAN beneficiaries apparently has not been impressive in some states, in others the results are surprisingly high.

Since all of the above data are compiled by governmental agencies that do not necessarily cooperate, and since the total data itself has limitations, certain problems should be noted which qualify interpretation here. Survey of commercial activity was made for rice, corn, sorghum, wheat, beans, potatoes, yuca, sesame, cotton, coconut, maní, sisal, plantains, bananas, pineapple, garlic, onion, tomato, coffee, cacao, sugar cane, and tobacco; also, data is available for commercial production of milk, hogs, cattle, fowl, and eggs. Production of a number of items, however, is only estimated by the government. In 1968, about 11 per cent of the revised total production (Table 36) involved estimation. Further, the Ministry of Agriculture, which now maintains agricultural production series, revises only the yearly totals, making data by

state published in its statistical yearbook out of date. In this manner, it is necessary to use unrevised state data for 1968 in Table 39 compared with a revised total (which is 16 per cent higher) used in Table 36.

Whereas the IAN may use different methods of estimating production on holdings that it administers, and whereas it maintains its data in current prices, the Ministry of Agriculture deflates yearly figures. This creates a problem for comparing data, especially since the Ministry has used a 1957 and a 1968 base; and in the latter case it has changed the 1968 price deflations for 1968 revisions and for 1969 preliminary figures. The problem would not be serious if the Ministry would present data in nondeflated as well as deflated terms so that investigators could use the wholesale price index to deflate totals, as done in Table 36 for data supplied in current terms by the Central Bank of Venezuela for 1960 and 1963. (Data for 1968 are in current terms because that is the present base year.) As conceptualization of data now stands, the Ministry does not present data comparable from year to year on a long-term basis nor does it revise totals by state. There is no excuse for expensively presenting figures with such limitations, but the Ministry justifies its action on the basis that it really is not concerned with presenting data that are of use to other agencies or

TABLE 34
Cumulative Venezuelan Heads of Family with Definitive
Title as a Per Cent of Provisional Beneficiaries, 1967

State	Official Data	Revised Data
Total	15.6	23.6
Amazonas	#	#
Anzoátegui	15.7	28.6
Apure	3.2	3.4
Aragua	23.6	27.4
Barinas	5.1	9.5
Bolívar	16.5	20.4
Carabobo	12.9	19.5
Cojedes	11.2	19.0
Delta Amacuro	22.5	34.5
Distrito Federal	#	#
Falcón	8.5	14.2
Guárico	10.5	22.6
Lara	22.6	30.9
Mérida	15.3	23.5
Miranda	16.1	19.6
Monagas	30.8	45.5
Nueva Esparta	94.2	78.3
Portuguesa	15.9	27.3
Sucre	12.5	17.6
Táchira	1.3	2.1
Trujillo	7.5	10.1
Yaracuy	32.9	41.7
Zulia	10.1	15.3

Source: Calculated from Appendices BB, CC, LL, and MM. For distinction between "official" (IAN) and "revised" (basically CENDES) data, see Table 21.

investigators attempting to make sense out of Venezuelan development.¹⁷¹ So parochial a view greatly impedes the process of Venezuelan planning and obscures the meaning of past development.

Perhaps an even more serious problem is that the Ministry of Agriculture gathers the basic agricultural production data. Because the Ministry is charged with fostering production as well as with gathering the basic series on production achievements, there is a tendency for the Ministry to introduce an element of propaganda into the data. As one official put the matter, if production does not increase every year, the image of the Ministry suffers as a result. Given serious problems in the presentation of data and absence of independent analyses, it is not possible to know the accuracy of agricultural production data. Since the agricultural extension of the Ministry is deficient (74 per cent of the peasants interviewed in the CENDES sample indicated in 1967 that they had never even talked with an extension agent), and given the shortage of agricultural credit (only 13 per cent of the peasants sampled said that they had received sufficient credit from the government),¹⁷² obviously the Ministry overvalues its effect on Venezuelan production. But probably any government agency would be inclined to present a favorable view of production figures in order to win credit within the bureaucracy.

¹⁷¹ Interviews with governmental officials inside and outside of the Ministry of Agriculture.

¹⁷² CENDES, *La Reforma Agraria en Venezuela*, V, pp. 20, 24.

TABLE 35
Venezuelan Agricultural Production, 1945-1969

Year	Thousands of Metric Tons					^a Bunches		^b Head		^b Units	^b Liter
	Corn	Rice	Coffee	Yuca	Sesame	Banana	Plantain	Hogs	Cattle	Eggs	Milk
1945	300.0	17.1	45.7	85.6	.5	—	—	282	328	—	—
1946	280.0	11.3	57.8	87.3	2.0	—	—	312	363	—	—
1947	300.0	8.8	48.9	90.4	2.8	—	—	293	357	—	—
1948	223.7	41.7	54.7	95.9	1.8	—	—	344	345	—	—
1949	323.5	35.9	41.5	148.6	6.3	62.0	467.8	395	392	—	—
1950	310.3	38.6	38.5	197.3	8.2	36.0	500.0	403	406	60	174
1951	312.9	40.0	36.2	188.5	5.3	46.0	524.0	383	450	64	192
1952	343.2	49.3	49.2	159.1	2.2	46.0	553.0	415	466	69	227
1953	334.9	57.9	64.5	153.3	1.6	45.0	540.0	477	490	73	256
1954	326.3	102.3	46.9	193.5	7.0	45.0	569.0	479	481	79	284
1955	317.4	60.0	53.0	156.8	9.1	63.9	690.7	445	495	79	309
1956	350.1	47.0	46.1	182.9	13.0	44.8	703.1	468	508	81	312
1957	340.1	21.8	60.0	190.3	12.7	61.4	808.0	555	571	86	313
1958	357.6	19.1	60.1	180.1	21.0	52.8	656.3	582	647	92	373
1959	336.5	38.6	60.8	217.9	19.8	54.5	800.5	620	673	165	375
1960	439.5	71.9	59.0	340.2	16.2	66.6	889.1	618	707	189	421
1961	419.5	80.7	57.1	339.2	24.9	50.2	860.5	621	773	273	444
1962	540.5	103.1	54.2	322.8	28.1	43.7	788.5	606	782	405	481
1963	430.2	131.1	60.7	342.4	30.9	51.4	792.4	621	826	300	521
1964	475.0	165.8	56.1	311.7	46.6	49.5	821.1	663	896	436	585
1965	521.0	199.9	54.3	301.4	54.1	55.0	812.1	672	915	508	626
1966	557.5	195.0	61.0	320.0	60.0	56.0	798.7	686	994	585	663
1967	633.4	223.1	61.8	315.6	80.0	57.3	742.2	721	1 024	569	696
1968	660.8	244.6	59.2	340.9	76.2	63.2	839.6	725	1 049	1 071	730
1969	670.3	243.9	60.6	309.8	82.6	63.2	980.2	827	1 161	1 186	767

^aMillions.^bThousands.

Source: Venezuela, Ministerio de Agricultura y Cría., *Anuario Estadístico* (yearly, 1968-1970). Cf. Louis E. Heaton, *The Agricultural Development of Venezuela* (New York: Praeger, 1969); Walter H. Ebling, *Agricultural Data Collecting and Reporting in Venezuela* (Madison: Land Tenure Center, mimeo., 1964); and Gustavo Pinto Cohen, Ricardo Alezones, María Eugenia de Rabinovich, *Estimación del Producto Agrícola de Venezuela por Entidad Federativa* (Caracas: CENDES, 1969).

TABLE 36

Value of Agricultural Production in Venezuela (Total and Share Generated by IAN Land Recipients)

Crop and Animal Production Value

Year	Venezuela Thousands ^a Bolívares	IAN ^b Share	IAN Per Cent	Price Index	IAN Share ^c Deflated	Cumulative Official ^d Recipients	IAN ^e Average	Cumulative Revised ^f Recipients	IAN ^e Average
1958	1 422 347	^g 37 275(W)	2.6	99	37 651	11 767	3 200	**	**
1963	2 008 419	200 691	10.0	100	200 691	78 195	2 567	46 204	4 343
1968	^g 3 847 326	671 571	17.5	110	610 519	173 908	3 510	113 064	5 400

Crop Production Value

1958	910 280	33 546(W)	3.7	99	33 885	11 767	2 880	**	**
1963	1 215 614	181 075	14.9	100	181 075	78 195	2 316	46 204	3 919
1968	1 975 581	582 783	29.5	110	529 803	173 908	3 046	113 064	4 686

Animal Production Value

1958	512 067	3 728(W)	.7	99	3 766	11 767	320	**	**
1963	792 805	19 616	2.5	100	19 616	78 195	251	46 204	424
1968	1 871 745	88 788	4.7	110	80 716	173 908	464	113 064	714

^aNondeflated^bThousands, nondeflated.^cThousands, deflated.^dIncludes pre-1959 beneficiaries; see notes 40 and 41.^eDeflated.^fExcludes pre-1959 beneficiaries.^gMy estimate based on the fact that in 1963 animal production was 10 per cent of the IAN total.

Source: Averages per beneficiary are calculated from Table 18 (official figures are adjusted according to sources in notes 40 and 41) and Table 21. Venezuelan production figures are from Venezuela, Ministerio de Agricultura y Cría, *Anuario Estadístico* (1964), (1968); and Venezuela, Banco Central de Venezuela, *Informe Económico* (1964), Table 25-68. The IAN generated share is from Venezuela, IAN, *Estadísticas Agropecuarias, 1960-1965*; and *idem, Memoria y Cuenta* (1968). Wholesale price index is from note 167.

TABLE 37

Venezuela's Area Harvested by IAN Beneficiaries

Year	Hectares Harvested	Cumulative Official [†] Recipients	Average	Cumulative Revised [†] Recipients	Average
1958	51 642	11 767	4.4	**	**
1963	253 898	78 195	3.2	46 204	5.5
1968	532 566	173 195	3.1	113 064	4.7
1969	470 425	178 130	2.6	117 286	4.0

[†]See Table 36.

Source: Publications by Venezuela's IAN: *Informaciones Estadísticas sobre las Principales Actividades Realizadas por el Instituto Nacional Agrario, 1-7-49/31-12-60*; *Estadísticas Agropecuarias, 1960-1965*; and *Memoria y Cuenta*, (1968). Data for 1969 are from Venezuela, Ministerio de Agricultura y Cría, *Anuario Estadístico* (1969).

TABLE 38
Cumulative Hectares Distributed by 1968 Compared with State Value of Total Venezuelan
Agricultural Production in 1960, 1963, and 1968
(In Per Cent)

State	Cumulative Hectares	Total Value		
		1960	1963	1968
Total	^a 100.0	^b 100.0	^c 100.0	^d 100.0
Amazonas	#	#	.1	#
Anzoátegui	2.6	3.5	3.0	3.2
Apure	8.1	3.8	3.8	3.9
Aragua	1.9	5.7	5.2	4.6
Barinas	11.2	2.9	3.2	3.5
Bolívar	2.7	1.8	1.8	2.5
Carabobo	4.6	5.6	5.1	5.2
Cojedes	4.0	2.3	1.6	2.0
Delta Amacuro	3.4	.5	.4	1.0
Distrito Federal	.5	.6	.8	1.7
Falcón	3.6	2.7	2.9	3.3
Guárico	6.7	5.8	5.1	5.8
Lara	3.1	8.4	8.3	7.3
Mérida	2.0	4.1	4.0	3.9
Miranda	2.1	5.3	6.5	6.0
Monagas	6.7	3.2	3.2	3.2
Nueva Esparta	#	.1	.1	.5
Portuguesa	5.8	5.3	6.9	8.9
Sucre	2.8	7.0	5.7	6.3
Táchira	1.8	5.7	5.4	4.2
Trujillo	3.2	4.3	3.3	3.4
Yaracuy	3.8	5.8	3.6	3.0
Zulia	19.4	15.6	20.0	16.6

^a4 495 755 hectares; Official data.

^b1 653 104 current bolívares.

^c2 008 419 current bolívares.

^d3 306 918 current bolívares, unrevised.

Source: Cumulative hectares are from Table 28. Values for 1960 and 1963 are from Venezuela, Banco Central de Venezuela, *Informe Económico* (1964), Tables 25-70 and 25-73. Values for 1968 (revised not available by state) are from Venezuela, Ministerio de Agricultura y Cría, *Anuario Estadístico* (1968).

TABLE 39
Land Distribution in Venezuela Compared with the IAN Value of Agricultural Production

	†Cumulative Land Distributed by 1968 as a Per Cent of Land Censused in 1961	IAN Share in Production Value		
		1960	1963	1968
Total	17.3	4.9	10.0	20.3
Amazonas	#	#	#	90.4
Anzoátegui	7.1	1.3	5.3	10.4
Apure	8.2	#	.3	6.3
Aragua	15.2	3.3	9.7	19.4
Barinas	24.7	#	1.5	11.0
Bolívar	4.3	2.6	21.8	17.9
Carabobo	50.1	9.4	20.2	32.1
Cojedes	13.3	.7	14.9	31.5
Delta Amacuro	235.6	#	#	34.7
Distrito Federal	36.4	#	17.2	29.5
Falcón	19.2	4.4	17.5	23.2
Guárico	7.3	13.1	3.2	15.8
Lara	13.5	1.5	5.0	6.7
Mérida	13.3	1.4	16.6	24.3
Miranda	16.0	5.0	3.3	7.0
Monagas	35.6	1.4	12.6	23.0
Nueva Esparta	4.3	#	2.2	.4
Portuguesa	38.6	27.2	41.1	46.7
Sucre	38.5	2.1	3.0	18.2
Táchira	10.2	2.8	5.4	21.0
Trujillo	30.8	3.8	26.0	40.3
Yaracuy	47.5	2.9	13.5	45.5
Zulia	46.4	.5	2.0	9.2

† From Table 27; official data.

Source: See Table 38.

4. POLICY DILEMMAS AND EDUCATIONAL PROBLEMS

If the reader feels overwhelmed by data presented in this chapter on land reform, imagine the flow of information that swamps policymakers. It is little wonder, then, that when *técnicos* offer to reorganize the data (either by abandoning "old" time series in favor of "new" figures or by reducing the complexity of statistics to a few coefficients) they are welcomed as saviors. Unfortunately, so simple a solution is more often than not self-defeating because it tends to reinforce faith that governments can solve all problems by gaining more power. Knowledge about subtleties of diversity and about contradiction in policy thus is lost; and the problems generated by policy are compounded. Rather than seek more power in such cases, leaders often might more profitably undertake to understand the impact of their programs that seek to change society.

The present study of land reform in two South American countries shows some of the problems confronting policymakers. In analyzing these problems we may see that in the study of politics and economics the social factor cannot be separated out of the complex business of national affairs. Only by taking into account the outlook and education of those who make policy and those who are affected by it can governments begin to identify and resolve policy dilemmas. By way of illustration, let us (a) discuss ramifications of land reform data and (b) analyze the dilemmas created by statistics which have been inflated to show a great number of persons benefitted; so that (c) we may discuss political problems that might be resolved by education of leaders as well as followers.

Some Ramifications of Land Reform Data

In the preceding pages we have seen several alternative realities, generated not only by different views of the same data but also by ever new revisions of statistics on the number of families benefitting from land distribution. That the revisions have been undertaken is commendable; it is ironic, however, that they have been undertaken for the wrong reason of finding out "once and for all" how many persons have been involved. Needless to say that task is as impossible as the goal of "completing the land reform process." Not only do families themselves multiply and divide as the children of original beneficiaries grow up to have their own children, but, in addition, people seem to have a tendency to treat their titles in ways that do not fit neatly into a bureaucratic record-keeping system. Land

titles are sold, rented, ceded, leased, abandoned, sharecropped, subdivided, left unused for periods of time, and/or consolidated with other lands to circumvent the social goals intended by the reformers. Migration, shifting land uses, and changing national needs would require that if the land reform undertaken is to be successful it will have to be part of an open-ended, continuous process. This means that periodic censuses and surveys must be taken in order to understand the changing rural landscape.

The revisions that we have discussed are more complete in the Venezuelan case than in the Bolivian; the latter has not conducted a census of its land reform beneficiaries as has the former. Moreover, in the Bolivian case the process of revising original data was overtaken by the formation of Mobil Brigades which began to distribute land, often with a potential problem because of distribution on a provisional basis in contrast with the original method which stressed definitive title. The total number of beneficiaries listed as having received land title by 1969 varies from as low as 170 211 to as high as 266 066 persons (see Table 40). Of the four alternative numbers of beneficiaries in Table 40, Hypothesis B (the latter figure) is problematic because of inclusion of numbers benefitting from the Mobil Brigades. Hypothesis C (the former figure) offers neither consistency in method of titling nor full coverage. Hypothesis D (228 096) may be low in terms of number of persons receiving title under the original method and high in terms of the inclusion of Mobil Brigade activity; errors may cancel each other out, but since no time-series data is available for the type of analysis developed in this study, it is not feasible to use Hypothesis D here. We are left, then, with a figure in Hypothesis A of 208 181 beneficiaries, a total that is not only a reasonable figure but one for which consistent and time-series data are available. Also, we may use this figure with some confidence because it is close to the other viable figure in Hypothesis D, the convergence of data being clear.

Alternative series on the number of Venezuelan land reform beneficiaries by 1969 are resumed in Table 41. The "official series" was generated for propaganda purposes and hence clearly is inflated. The IAN "census series" (95 320) is questionable for three reasons: First, it does not include beneficiaries (amounting to 8.6 per cent of the total) whose abandoned lands have remained unoccupied.¹⁷³ Second, of the 70 029 heads of family found to be in a precarious legal position, 15 per cent were occupying lands illegally (i.e., without even provisional title). In

¹⁷³Venezuela, IAN, *Resultados del Programa de Investigación de la Tenencia*, I, Table 1-2.

TABLE 40
Alternative Hypotheses for Estimating Cumulative Number of Heads of Family
Having Benefitted from Bolivian Land Distribution by 1969

Hypothesis	Heads of Family Benefitted
A. Original Title [†] data, ^{a,b} excluding activity of Mobile Brigades	208 181
B. Revision I: Original Title [†] data ^{a,b} plus Special ^{††} titles distributed by Mobile Brigades during 1968-1969 ^c	@266 066
C. Revision II: SNRA's revised data as of 1967 ^d plus original data for 1968 and 1969 ^{a,e}	170 211
D. Revision III: Revision II plus Special ^{††} titles distributed by Mobile Brigades during 1968-1969 ^c	@228 096

[†]Definitive title grants.

^{††}No distinction between provisional and definitive grants.

@It is notable that in 1971 one of the persons involved in developing Revision III, Ronald J. Clark, used Revision I in his published analysis of the Bolivian land reform — Revision I is based upon original title data that his team set out to correct (see Clark, "Agrarian Reform: Bolivia," pp. 129-164 in Peter Dorner (ed.), *Land Reform in Latin America: Issues and Cases* (Madison: Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin, 1971))

^aThrough September 30, 1969.

^bData from Table 8.

^cData from Appendix U.

^dData from Appendix W.

^eData from Appendix A.

this manner we may calculate that the effective rate of desertion was at least 23.6 per cent,¹⁷⁴ all but the above 8.6 per cent giving up their lands to others after receiving the original grant of title. This means that about 10 500 families received land provisionally, moved off the land, and were replaced by 10 500 different families.¹⁷⁵ Third, illegal occupants may or may not have correctly remembered the date on which they occupied their plot. The CENDES series based on IAN documents does not suffer from such problems as the third category and offers the advantage of confirming official data on the number of hectares involved in the land distribution program. Moreover, the CENDES total of beneficiaries not only falls between the official and IAN extremes but also is not subject to the undercounting that usually takes place in censuses, especially in one examining the legality of ownership rights.

Although both the Bolivian and Venezuelan revised data series tend to show that the official series on the amount of land distributed is relatively accurate, problems also are noted here. Compared with inflations of 18 per cent and 30 per cent for official number of beneficiaries in the two countries,¹⁷⁶ official data on hectares involved was inflated by only 5 per cent for Bolivia and either not at all or by 73 per cent for Venezuela, depending on which revision is used. In spite of the fact that the official Bolivian figures by department appear very reliable, data in Appendix V call into question distribution by type of land. Although revisions by type of land are themselves questionable,¹⁷⁷ it is important to note the possible margin of error with which we have worked in our analysis of Bolivia. Regardless of error, however, the "old" image of reality and the methodology used for description is still valid. In any case, it is best to use

¹⁷⁴*Ibid.*, Table IV-1 (persons with IAN authorization subtracted from those not awaiting IAN adjudication). The rate of abandonment for definitive holdings was 27.5 per cent—see *ibid.*, Table II-2.

¹⁷⁵One problem in the calculation of this data is that the 15 per cent figure is based upon number of parcels rather than number of beneficiaries.

¹⁷⁶See also discussion of Tables 10 and 21, above.

¹⁷⁷See discussion of Table 10; specifically, the distinction between cultivable and pasture lands may not always be clear, especially to research assistants examining complicated files in La Paz.

TABLE 41
Comparison of Official, CENDES, and IAN Census
Data on Yearly Distribution of Provisional
Titles to Venezuelan Heads of Family

Years	Official Series	CENDES Series	IAN ^a Census
Total	166 363	117 286	^a 95 320
1959	5 874	4 423	^b 17 540
1960	25 221	17 594	4 601
1961	11 074	9 263	3 112
1962	14 603	8 702	5 085
1963	9 656	6 222	5 757
1964	11 527	6 130	6 902
1965	36 443	19 255	7 123
1966	16 852	13 341	7 240
1967	14 100	11 343	12 230
1968	16 791	^c 16 791	12 775
1969	4 222	^c 4 222	10 599

^aIncludes 2 356 recipients for which there is no information by year. Data, reported in IAN census of 1969, include heads of family illegally occupying IAN lands as well as persons holding only provisional titles.

^bBefore 1960.

^cOfficial data (in contrast with CENDES data).

Source: Official data are from Table 18 above; CENDES figures are from Table 21 above; and IAN census statistics are from Venezuela, IAN, *Resultados del Programa de Investigación de la Tenencia* (3 Vols., Caracas, 1970), I, Table I-7.

both the official and revised views to understand a complex picture, one in which the former landowners appear to have done better than might have been expected. Appendix Y shows that former landowners received about 54 per cent of all lands distributed, 21 per cent of the cultivable land, and 57 per cent of the pasture land. And, according to Appendix X, only 30 per cent of the holdings expropriated involved latifundia. Over 40 per cent of lands distributed involved small and medium properties which theoretically filled a social purpose; also, under the same definition of social purpose, agricultural enterprises (making up 28

per cent of lands affected) may well have been distributed contrary to the spirit of the law.

With regard to Venezuelan lands distributed, whereas CENDES concluded that hectares involved did not need questioning, the IAN census of 1969 showed only 27 per cent of the official amount of land actually occupied (Appendix PP). Even allowing for an 8.6 per cent increase to count abandoned land, this figure does not seem credible, unless 73 per cent of all land distributed was useless. It would appear that the problem here is one of calculation by the IAN, which arrived at the low figures of 1.25 million hectares by multiplying the number of recipients times their *average* occupancy of hectares. The temptation of a peasant to understate the size of his holdings to government officials may also account for much of the difference.

Given the above problems, it is obvious that, depending upon the data selected, very different interpretations may be made of land reform. In the Venezuelan case, for example, the IAN published its 1969–1970 census results in order to develop the following critical self-evaluation: (a) Over 80 per cent of IAN lands are occupied by persons without IAN authorization and only 21 per cent had received credit from the agricultural bank (Appendix XX); (b) some lands acquired by the IAN neither have been divided among recipients nor developed, giving rise to de facto and anarchical occupation of property by men of economic means who also sometimes extend their boundaries over fields not cared for by the IAN or its beneficiaries; (c) in many cases beneficiaries have become peons, working on their own land as an employee of agricultural enterprises; (d) some farms have been purchased by the IAN without requiring departure of large- and medium-scale operators; (e) some public lands have neither been transferred to the IAN nor surveyed to nullify the “rights” of large landowners who have illegally occupied the lands; (f) farms owned by autonomous institutes, especially the IAN and the Agricultural Bank (Banco Agrícola y Pecuario—BAP), have been sold to private parties, especially public officials, contravening constitutional provisions on land reform.¹⁷⁸ The low percentage of definitive titles granted by 1970 meant that only about 20 per cent of those having received grants were not living in a precarious legal position, particularly with regard to making investment in or obtaining credit to develop the land.

Self-criticism by the IAN was greeted with cynicism by some newsmen who in 1972 began to publish articles on the “failure” of the land reform, utilizing the IAN’s data as if generated by reporterial investigation.¹⁷⁹ The director of the IAN responded

¹⁷⁸Venezuela, IAN, *Memoria y Cuenta* (1970), pp. 23–25. See also, Víctor Giménez Landínez, *Reforma Agraria: Política y Programa, 1970* (Caracas: [IAN?], 1971), which is a revised introduction to the yearbook.

¹⁷⁹Germán Carías S., “La Cosecha del Fracaso,” *El Nacional* (Caracas), March 1–March 8, 1972.

by defending the IAN's attempt to develop self-criticism without destroying the good works accomplished in the course of land reform.¹⁸⁰ Since the IAN's own data is so damaging to the cause of land reform, supporters of land reform might question the wisdom of publishing such material to officially bring public attention to problems, the extent of which previously had been only rumor.

Venezuela's Federación Campesina took advantage in 1972 of the "Day of the Venezuelan Peasant" to defend land reform against its detractors, noting that the reform could not be blamed for failure to stop cityward migration. According to the Federation, the country's rural population has decreased in percentage terms but not in absolute terms.¹⁸¹ Such a statement is only partly right. Between 1936 and 1971 the population living in areas with less than 1 000 persons declined to the following levels: 65 per cent, 61 per cent, 46 per cent, 33 per cent, and 22 per cent of the total population in 1936, 1941, 1950, 1961, and 1971, respectively. Absolute population has declined only since 1961, however, showing the following tendency for the areas under 1 000 persons in the above years: 2 196 308; 2 334 327; 2 325 494; 2 450 154; and 2 317 189 persons.¹⁸² The Federation itself cited no statistics in its 1972 defense of land reform to back up claims that qualitatively the peasant lives better today because the old equation of latifundist production has been broken. The Federation simply noted that Venezuela had created a human dimension of rural justice which gives a social and political stability in the countryside, a stability that does not exist in neighboring Colombia where violence and rural warfare have resulted because the "landed oligarchy has impeded land reform." The only statistics cited by the Federation were to call attention to the fact that between 250 000 and 300 000 Venezuelan families still await lands; and those who have received lands await efficient and sufficient agricultural credit.¹⁸³

If the IAN got into difficulties by printing its self-critical data, the Federation may in the future regret that it even began to mention data. By calling attention to the decreasing share of rural population, the Federation may further endanger its leverage to obtain scarce development funds. And the statistics it mentions concerning number of families awaiting land are open to question. The IAN originally estimated

(1960) that 228 503 families needed land, with this figure leaving enough rural manpower to operate large-scale agricultural enterprises as well as to work on small- and medium-sized properties protected by the land reform law.¹⁸⁴ If we subtract the 117 286 beneficiaries between 1959 and 1969, and the 10 500 families who left lands to be occupied illegally by the same number of families, that would leave the IAN a task of granting lands to only 100 717 more families to reach the original goal, or about one-third the number quoted by the Federación. Given the decline in absolute population of areas less than 1 000 persons, it does not seem possible that the number of families eligible for land reform could reach 200 000 without threatening the labor supply on the large-scale enterprises that are so necessary to supply the country's food.

With the days of rural unrest in the past, continuing urbanization, and the IAN-land problems revealed publicly, it would seem that support for further land reform will not easily be forthcoming. The Caldera government's plans of distributing land to 100 000 persons during his presidency seemed almost impossible to achieve given the fact that during the first two years of his quinquennium only 16 426 heads of family had received provisional title. Caldera would have had to do what it took AD two terms to accomplish at the time he was under pressure to shift IAN's activity into granting definitive titles instead of more provisional titles.

If Venezuelan land reform appeared to have a questionable future, what of Bolivia where events apparently have taken a strange twist since 1969? At the time Mobile Brigades were speeding up land distribution, the rate and extent of which had been questioned by the SNRA itself, General Ovando was expropriating Gulf Oil holdings. With the rise of leftist General Torres in 1970, university students attempted to forge a link with landless peasants by invading farms throughout the country, particularly in the Santa Cruz area. That department, undergoing an eclipse of its oil-based prosperity, however, saw an apparently novel alliance develop. Peasants joined with the area's landowners and businessmen "to put the brakes on communism."¹⁸⁵ Students found themselves with few allies after several much publicized cases in which they invaded lands that already had been distributed under

¹⁸⁰Antonio Merchán C., "Carta del Presidente del IAN Sobre el Proceso de Reforma Agraria," *El Nacional*, March 10, 1972. Merchán notes that 16 569 definitive titles had been issued by the Caldera government to beneficiaries, bringing the total to 47 000 definitive titles.

¹⁸¹"Federación Campesina de Venezuela Reconoce Logros en Reforma Agraria," *El Nacional*, March 8, 1972.

¹⁸²For source, see Table 15 in the Afterword; note that in that table I have defined rural population as under the 2 500-person level.

¹⁸³See note 181.

¹⁸⁴CENDES, *La Reforma Agraria en Venezuela*, II, 145ff. CENDES itself estimated the total number of families to range between 264 453 and 384 243.

¹⁸⁵*Los Angeles Times*, March 4, 1971; and *Times of the Americas*, March 24, 1971 (for information on land invasions, see also August 18, 1971).

the land reform law. Invasions of land brought protest demonstrations not only from landowners (including land reform recipients) and businessmen but also from peasants working on large commercial farms which already were feeling a decline in sales as oil-company spending came to a halt.

Because leftists from La Paz had come to count on automatic peasant support for "revolutionary" acts, they were surprised at first. On second thought they must have realized that the type of land reform in which individual rights are given had indeed tended to create the anti-collectivist thinking which they had feared would come about with promulgation of the 1953 land reform law. And it was their complaint that lands should be collectivized that led them into some of the invasions in the first place. Unfortunately for these leftists from La Paz, given the peasant's right to choose under the land reform law between individual or collective title, the idea of collective holdings had never won much acceptance in Bolivia.¹⁸⁶ In this manner, agitators from the city trying to spark unrest in the countryside were met with hostility; in its own way this hostility helped bring the downfall of General Torres and the establishment of a moderate government under General Banzer, with the latter supported by two old mutual enemies—Paz Estenssoro on the left and the Bolivian Falange on the right.

The so-called peasant mentality has been the subject of much debate, especially in relation to how it is affected by massive land reform. One view expressed lucidly by Dwight B. Heath is the following:

The patron-client type of functional relationship has been reconstituted in a new form in which the syndical (or sometimes its secretary-general) assumes the dominant paternalistic status formerly held by the

hacendado and the ex-colono occupies a relatively dependent and servile status.

At the same time, it is noteworthy that, for certain limited purposes, ex-colonos are happy to retain the old patron-client relationship that linked them as dependents of specific ex-hacendados, despite their resentment of years of "slavery" and their rallying slogan of "class warfare."¹⁸⁷

In another view, regardless of results in agricultural production or the possibility that the peasant without agricultural credit may not live materially any better than he did before 1952, land reform has forced change in Bolivia's economic and social organization, especially in sociological or in psychological terms. The peasant has begun to feel that he has a voice, or at least a stake, in some national developments: The channeling of Bolivian investment into modern forms of diversified production has begun to change the outlook of the entire society, particularly through internal travel to engage in market activities. Analysis of this phenomena in Bolivia is seen most frequently in terms of anthropological observation.¹⁸⁸

With regard to rural studies, it is notable that although we lack the comprehensive survey research for Bolivia which was undertaken in Venezuela, we have in Bolivia a number of community studies lacking for Venezuela. Venezuelan data for 1967 show the following: 56 per cent of the beneficiaries believed that their economic position had improved; 74 per cent said that the future would bring improvement; 78 per cent noted that they were content with the lands received; and 85 per cent claimed that they would not accept a salaried job at higher pay.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁶In the division of all hacienda lands even the minimum 10 per cent required for collective use was generally illegally divided for individual use after departure of the land reform authorities; see Bolivia, Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria, *Reforma Agraria en Bolivia*, II, Chapter IV, p. 27. For historical origins of decline in collective holdings, see also Ronald J. Clark, *Temas sobre la Propiedad Rural y la Reforma Agraria en Bolivia* (La Paz: Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria, 1970), pp. 22–27.

¹⁸⁷Dwight B. Heath, "New Patrons for Old: Changing Patron-Client Relationships in the Bolivian Yungas," *Ethnology* 12:1 (1973), pp. 75–98, quote is from p. 93. According to Heath (p. 83): "The groundwork for syndical organization was laid primarily by representatives of MNR, who toured the area in the early 1950s under the auspices of the party and the newly created Ministry of Campesino Affairs. Changes at the local level were integrally related to other changes at the provincial, departmental, and national levels. New administrative institutions were created, and some old ones were ignored or by-passed. Syndicalism quickly became a potent movement, in which local syndicates were organized into provincial federations and these in turn were grouped into departmental federations, all of those comprising a national confederation. . . . Although the syndicates were constituted primarily as means of securing title to land, they gradually came to serve other functions as well. They were effective organizations for political socialization and indoctrination by a small cadre skilled in demagoguery and able to channel small-scale patronage. What the clients in this relationship had to offer was occasional support for MNR by participating in political demonstrations, both locally and in the national capital. Because of the difficulty of transportation, campesinos in the yungas were less often rallied than were those nearer the larger cities. When, however there was a real or supposed threat to MNR incumbency they would crowd into trucks when summoned and would race to La Paz, where their militant shouts of "Viva! ", reinforced by their weapons and sheer numbers, often intimidated the opposition."

¹⁸⁸These concepts are synthesized from Hans C. Buechler and Judith-Maria Buechler, *The Bolivian Aymara* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971); McEwen, *Changing Rural Bolivia*; and Richard W. Patch, "Social Implications of the Bolivian Agrarian Reform," Ithaca: Ph.D. thesis in anthropology, Cornell University, 1956.

¹⁸⁹CENDES, *La Reforma Agraria en Venezuela*, V, pp. 17–18. The first CENDES community study of Venezuela is presented in economic terms and has no social and psychological approach; see John R. Mathiason and Eric B. Shearer, *Caicara de Maturin (Case Study of an Agrarian Reform Settlement in Venezuela)* (Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Committee for Agricultural Development, Research Paper 1, 1967).

Given available Bolivian data, it is not possible to sum up the outcomes for the individual of land reform with Venezuelan conciseness, except to note that the two qualitative views of Bolivia discussed above are not mutually exclusive. In the words of William Carter:

It is true that the reform has upset a great deal of the traditional formal structure on the level of the larger society. In informal relationships, however, the Indian has remained in his definitely subordinate position. Moreover, except for the still nascent program of colonization in places like Caranavi and Santa Cruz, the reform has done nothing to meet the problems of demographic expansion. And in the matters of land tenure, it has tended only to create new legal sanctions that reinforce subsistence patterns apparently long followed on the Altiplano.¹⁹⁰

Psychological explanation also has been advanced to explain a disinclination of Bolivian peasants to become involved in colonization projects. Some commentators believe that it is unrealistic to expect the peasantry to leave readily its native habitat in the highlands in order to move to the tropical eastern lowlands. Since the peasant tends to be conservative by nature, a move to new lands in a different climate may be a serious threat to his concept of stability and tradition.¹⁹¹

Of the 64 500 heads of family involved in Bolivian colonization between 1964 and 1969 (Table 4), at least 30 per cent had given up their attempt to be relocated or to relocate themselves.¹⁹² Given the number of "spontaneous colonists" included in this figure who were not sponsored by the Bolivian Institute of Colonization, it is difficult to assess the government's role. According to the director of Supervised Colonization, General Néstor Valenzuela, the program undertaken between 1964 and 1970 with the loan from the Inter-American Development Bank was supposed to settle 8 000 persons in thirty months. The project actually took seventy-two months and in the meantime the number of families to be settled was

reduced to 5 000, with the proviso that all would be classified as "semi-spontaneous" colonists rather than supervised. The final report expresses the pessimism of General Valenzuela, noting the following problems: (a) delay in getting the project underway while waiting for the Bank Mission from Washington; (b) delay in beginning work because of a lack of preliminary studies; (c) delay in road building in the area, occasioned not only by failure of the contractors to meet their obligations but by adverse weather conditions and premature deterioration of equipment; (d) delay of project while wood bridges were replaced by structures that would not deteriorate because of environmental factors; (e) delay in obtaining seeds, developing production plans, and acquiring materials of all kinds; and (f) delay in adopting methods to overcome factors in the peasant mentality and character that led to disillusion. Needless to say, none of the colonists had received title by 1970.¹⁹³

How many families remain to receive title in Bolivia? If we use Casto Ferragut's figure on the number of families eligible we have a base number of 318 767.¹⁹⁴ From this amount we can subtract 64 500 heads of family involved in colonization, 57 885 Mobil Brigade beneficiaries, and 208 181 persons having heads of title under the original titling method, leaving a total of 11 799 families to receive land as the 1960s came to an end. This calculation assumes that there has been no change in the number of families eligible since Ferragut made his estimate in the early 1960s; that all families are to receive title, presumably leaving little or no labor for agricultural enterprises; and that no lands have been abandoned, ceded, sold, etc., to others. If we take into account abandoned lands, now occupied illegally by families who have replaced those who departed (for urban areas?), Bolivian land reform may be ready to move from the stage of basically granting first titles to the stage of concentrating its efforts on monitoring changes in ownership and redistributing abandoned lands.

¹⁹⁰Carter, *Aymara Communities and the Bolivian Agrarian Reform*, p. 87. See also Heath, Erasmus, and Buechler, *Land Reform and Social Revolution in Bolivia*.

¹⁹¹Psychological aspects of colonization are examined by Dozier, *Land Development and Colonization in Latin America*; Dwight B. Heath, "Los Indios Aimara y las Revoluciones de Bolivia," *Comunidad* 8 (1967), pp. 376–383; Heath, Erasmus, and Buechler, *Land Reform and Social Revolution in Bolivia*; Richard W. Patch, "Peasantry and National Revolution: Bolivia," in K. H. Silvert (ed.), *Expectant Peoples: Nationalism and Development* (New York: Random House, 1963), pp. 95–126; Richard W. Patch, "A Note on Bolivia and Peru," *American Universities Field Staff Reports*, July, 1959; and Patch, "Bolivia: U.S. Aid in a Revolutionary Setting." Writing in Heath, Erasmus, and Buechler, *Land Reform and Social Revolution in Bolivia*, p. 394, Heath takes issue with the psychological variable and sees peasants as willing to move; this optimistic view should be read as counterpoint to the following view developed by General Valenzuela.

¹⁹²Interview with General Néstor Valenzuela, La Paz, October 26, 1970.

¹⁹³Instituto Nacional de Colonización/Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, *Programa de Colonización, Informe Final, I-1964/VI-1970* (La Paz: mimeo., 1970).

¹⁹⁴Ferragut, "La Reforma Agraria," p. 461. Others use 400 000 to 500 000 families, but do not give a breakdown as to how figures are calculated as does Ferragut; see Alexander, *The Bolivian National Revolution*, p. 66; and Zondag, *The Bolivian Economy*, p. 147.

Policy Dilemmas

As we have seen with regard to both Bolivia and Venezuela, governments have felt a political pressure to show that a large number of families have been benefitted, this figure being a measure of each president's so-called revolutionaryness. Inflation of the number of recipients, however, has a serious drawback in that with time younger generations living in the city tend to judge land reform on the basis of its contribution of agricultural supply to the nation. Thus these younger city folk tend to place more importance on agricultural reform than upon land reform per se. Since they have not lived with the aspirations of the peasant (aspirations that place land title above all else), they tend to gauge "revolutionaryness" of presidents in material terms rather than psychological: how much credit has been made available so that the peasant can improve his life through improved production?¹⁹⁵ Ironically, peasants who prefer to work for large-scale commercial entrepreneurs and/or who have abandoned unproductive holdings may prefer to see rural funds allocated to employers instead of being spent on agricultural credit for or to provide titles to the landless. In this case, they are aware of the problem that if the land is poor and is divided among an ever expanding pool of land reform beneficiaries, land reform tends to create *minifundia*, a new "evil."¹⁹⁶ How do presidents make policy in this situation to create the image so necessary for holding on to the reins of government? Obviously there is no easy answer, especially if they are not fully aware of the dilemma.

Table 42 shows the problem Bolivian presidents have faced. If they had held the number of land reform recipients down instead of speeding up redistribution of titles, their record would have looked much better in the matter of agricultural credit; the same amount of scarce funds would have been divided among fewer persons, increasing the average size of each loan (as well as of each plot). There are three aspects to this problem. First, governments must consider the number of real pesos that they make available for credit in relation to all persons employed agriculturally. Here we can see that this amount declined in real terms to only 6 pesos in 1962, doubled in the mid-1960s compared with the mid-1950s and rose to a high point in 1969—if

52 pesos or 88 U.S. cents can be considered high. Second, the amount theoretically available for the total number of accumulated beneficiaries tended to hold steady after the first grants of title in 1955 but the number of beneficiaries increased, causing a spectacular decline in pesos available; increasing allocations after 1963 had not caught up with the rise in recipients by 1969. Third, we may see that since 1965 when data are available on percentage allocation of credit to peasants (in contrast with entrepreneurs of large commercial holdings), a shift took place in 1967 to favor entrepreneurs. And the number of peasants receiving credit in any one year declined from less than 900 in 1965 to less than 500 in 1969. The number of entrepreneurs receiving credit did not pass 100 until 1968. In 1969 the average loan to peasants was 46 184 pesos or 767 dollars and to entrepreneurs 147 832 pesos or 2 464 dollars (these amounts are in real terms of 1951 with pesos converted at the rate of exchange for that year).

Venezuelan agricultural credit data involves the same dilemma: if scarce funds are used to speed land reform, not only is less money available for credit but the amount has to be spread more thinly. As Table 43 shows, the real value of average loans to peasants and entrepreneurs in 1969 was 1 123 and 4 769 dollars, respectively. In both these cases, however, not only was the average loan higher than in Bolivia, but also the number of persons involved was much greater, with the peasants generally receiving about half of all funds made available. Nevertheless, whereas the totals available in relation to the agriculturally employed population was apparently increasing in Bolivia, in Venezuela this amount was holding fairly even, falling below 255 pesos or 76 dollars in 1958, 1960, 1961, and 1964. It is truly astounding to note the different levels of wealth involved in the two countries. Although Bolivia had an average of only 8 dollars available for all beneficiaries for each year between 1955 and 1969, Venezuela averaged 830 dollars for each year between 1959 and 1969.¹⁹⁷

Problems of determining "who should get what" in the way of funds are compounded for the Bolivian and Venezuelan governments when we consider some of the dilemmas that impinge on the making of policy. Factors include, among others, employment and economic contribution to national development by type of economic activity, imports and national production of

¹⁹⁵ Interestingly enough, according to the CENDES study (*La Reforma Agraria en Venezuela*, V, pp. 24–25), of the number of direct beneficiaries (those holding provisional or definitive title), about two-thirds felt that credit did not improve their situation but either left them the same or worse off than before. But this fact may be related to the report that over 85 per cent reported receiving insufficient amounts; and the receipt of credit may have caused ambitious undertakings doomed to fail with limited funds.

¹⁹⁶ It is important to note that in the following averages in size by hectares of lands distributed by country, only Chile apparently did not create *minifundia* by 1969. The problem, however, is that these averages may be inflated by large-sized grants necessary for ranching: Chile, 132.5; Bolivia, 46.8; Nicaragua, 44.1; Venezuela, 39.3; Colombia, 30.8; Peru, 26.9; Mexico, 23.5; Brazil, 20.6; Honduras, 18.9; Guatemala, 15.5; Costa Rica, 15.4; Panama, 14.4; Ecuador, 12.0; Dominican Republic, 4.7 (data calculated from Table 3, above).

¹⁹⁷ Total amounts available divided by the total number of years in columns 5 and 10 of Tables 42 and 43, respectively.

TABLE 42

Bolivian Agricultural Credit, 1955-1969
Part I: Actual Nondeflated and Deflated Expenditures by the Banco Agrícola

Year	Thousands of ^a Pesos (1)	Cost of Living ^b Index (2)	Millions of Real ^c Pesos (3)	Real (Deflated) Pesos	
				Available per Persons Employed Agriculturally ^d in 1951 (4)	Theoretically Available for Accumulated ^e Beneficiaries (5)
1955	1 124	11	10.2	10	3 631
1956-1957	6 949	48	14.5	15	986
1958	9 700	67	14.5	15	710
1959	6 732	80	8.4	9	258
1960	7 848	89	8.8	9	160
1961	7 119	95	7.5	8	90
1962	5 795	101	5.7	6	51
1963	10 416	100	10.4	11	68
1964	41 493	110	37.7	39	230
1965	35 964	113	31.8	33	183
1966	36 232	121	29.9	31	162
1967	42 792	135	31.7	33	163
1968	46 083	142	32.5	33	163
1969	73 475	145	50.7	52	244

^aIncludes USAID Supervised Agricultural Credit. Bolivia converted its currency in 1963 to pesos from bolivianos at a ratio of 1 to 1 000 — for consistency, pesos are used here. Dollar exchange rate was 4.26, 7.75, 8.57 for 1955, 1956, 1957, respectively; after 1958 it held at 11.88 — see *UCLA Statistical Abstract of Latin America* (1964), pp 98-99; and (1969), pp 290-291. The dollar exchange rate was 60 in 1951.

^b1963 = 100 (base converted from 1931 = 100 and 1958 = 100), City of La Paz index for 53 items; figure for 1956-1957 is an average of 30 and 65, respectively.

^cColumn 1 divided by column 2.

^d973 959 persons; see Appendix N.

^eCalculated with original data from Appendix A (by year) in contrast with data in Table 8 (by presidential period); assumption is that entire amount available for peasants, but see Part II, Column 6, which shows reality.

Sources: Pesos through 1964 are from United States, Agency for International Development, USAID/Bolivia, *Estadísticas Económicas* 3 (1962), p 10; and 8 (1966), p. 36. Pesos since 1965 were prepared for the author by Felipe Nava Mendoza of the Banco Agrícola, November 30, 1970. Cost of living index is from *SNP* — XII:1.

agricultural commodities, and distribution of peasants by zone in relation to such problems as illiteracy. If governments hope to resolve development problems, first they must balance (a) the long-range need to help the poorest and least productive peasants, thus creating larger national markets for industry and (b) the immediate need to assist large-scale entrepreneurs in stimulating agricultural production, thus feeding inexpensively an expanding urban population. Second, they must reconcile (c) the credit needs of illiterate peasants and (d) the need to give credit to the literate population which theoretically can best maximize use of the funds. Third, they must balance (e) the need to grant land titles without consideration of social and economic characteristics and (f) needs to select beneficiaries

for credit so that dependence upon imports of foreign agricultural goods can be immediately reduced. Dilemmas such as these cannot be resolved without raising the issue of "who is the government?" Unfortunately, political leaders must also reconcile (g) the need to stay in power; and (h) the need to plan for "national good"; therefore, as the latter becomes confused with the former (especially in the face of day-to-day crises), long-term priorities are sacrificed to short-term considerations. In the long run, of course, the problem of political survival depends upon how well *all* demands are satisfied. The easy solution often becomes the hardest: funds are spread so widely that no fruits are visible and no one is satisfied. These dilemmas hardly represent the full nature of rural

TABLE 42 (Cont'd)

PART II: Bolivian Loans to Peasants and Entrepreneurs, 1965-1969

Year	Per Cent of Column 1 Actually Spent on ^a Peasants (6)	^b Real (Deflated) Pesos			
		For Peasants		For Entrepreneurs	
		Number (7)	Average (8)	Number (9)	Average (10)
1965	64.3	854	23 956	36	315 806
1966	58.3	891	19 590	46	271 478
1967	34.1	647	16 686	96	217 719
1968	37.2	400	30 215	162	154 288
1969	44.6	489	46 184	190	147 832

^aNo data available before 1965.

^bCalculated from data in part I above and Part III below.

Source: See Part I above; see Table 43, Part II, for methodology.

Part III: Absolute Totals of Loans, 1965-1969

Year	^a Nondeflated		^b Real (Deflated) Pesos	
	For Peasants (11)	For Entrepreneurs (12)	For Peasants (13)	For Entrepreneurs (14)
1965	23 117	12 847	20 458	11 369
1966	21 121	15 111	17 455	12 488
1967	14 575	28 217	10 796	20 901
1968	17 162	28 921	12 086	20 366
1969	32 747	40 728	22 584	28 088

^aNo data available before 1965; for total see column 1.

^bCalculated by dividing columns 11 and 12 by column 2; for total see column 3.

Source: See Part I above.

decisions to be made concerning the rural area's place in national development, but they do let us see some difficulties more clearly.

With regard to employment and economic contribution, Tables 44 and 45 show the share of economically active population employed in agriculture. In Bolivia, the total did not shift much away from 70 per cent between 1950 and 1963; in Venezuela the total fell from about 40 per cent to about 30 per cent of the workers between 1950 and 1961, the last date for which data are available. In the meantime, in both countries the contribution of agriculture to the value of total goods and services produced nationally declined, although not as much in Venezuela as in Bolivia. These data generally help in both countries to build the case against placing great government emphasis on the rural sector.

Data in Tables 46 and 47 permit us to examine the dilemma concerning food imports. In spite of (or perhaps because of) land reform, both countries have been able to reduce percentage shares of imported foodstuffs, Bolivia's per cent being halved since 1953 and Venezuela's declining about 38 per cent. Bolivian data show greater fluctuation, not falling consistently below 24 per cent until the 1960s. Venezuelan data have moved downward slowly but steadily to reach about 10 per cent by the end of the 1960s. If we left off with our analysis here, the case for continued support of land reform would not be compromised; but, a glance at the absolute data on increasing amounts of money paid out for imports of food contributes to the argument that land reform has not been successful. In this view, land reform has not stemmed the outflow of needed foreign exchange

TABLE 43
 Agricultural Credit In Venezuela, 1953-1969
 Part I: Actual Nondeflated Expenditures by the Banco Agrícola y Pecuario (BAP)

Year	Millions of Bolívares			Per Cent for Peasants (4)	Millions of Bolívares	
	For Peasants (1)	Entrepreneurs (2)	Subtotal (3)		Subtotal †Development (5)	Total (6)
^a 1953-1957	#	189.6	189.6	#	**	189.6
^b 1958	#	145.0	145.0	#	**	145.0
^c 1959	56.9	106.8	163.7	34.8	66.4	230.1
1960	75.5	54.2	129.7	58.2	13.4	143.1
1961	70.9	56.6	127.5	55.6	52.9	180.4
1962	83.3	92.1	175.4	47.5	51.5	226.9
1963	78.0	74.4	152.4	51.1	60.5	212.9
1964	111.0	108.0	219.0	50.7	44.0	263.0
1965	115.1	99.9	215.0	53.5	51.6	266.6
1966	133.0	109.7	242.7	54.8	42.3	292.0
1967	124.0	123.0	247.0	50.2	53.7	300.7
1968	117.8	110.5	228.3	51.6	63.9	292.2
1969	123.3	121.8	245.1	50.3	67.0	312.1

† Includes funds supplied by the Ministerio de Agricultura y Cría; these funds are used for agricultural development and experiments as well as for credits to both the peasant and commercial agricultural sectors. The dollar exchange rate was 3.35 until 1964 when it became 4.50.

^aData for 1950-1958 published by IAN do not agree (see Venezuela, IAN, *Créditos Movilizados . . . 1950-1958*).

^bExpenditures by post-Pérez Jiménez, preconstitutional government.

^cBeginning of constitutional government expenditures.

Sources: Publications by Venezuela's Banco Agrícola y Pecuario (BAP): *Síntesis . . . 1959-1963*, p. 9; and *Informe Anual* (1969), p. 200. For dollar exchange rates, see *UCLA Statistical Abstract of Latin America* (1964), pp. 98-99; and (1969), pp. 290-291.

which could be better spent on machinery and equipment necessary to keep pace with technological revolution. Nevertheless, while the amounts have increased, they have decreasing importance in the national economies of both countries, and on balance, one can say that progress has been made to make imports of food less important than was the case before land reform.

We have yet to analyze per capita level of food production before we understand to what extent national production has taken up the decline in food imports (or, conversely, to see to what extent the supply of food available nationally may have declined). As Table 47 shows, Bolivian and Venezuelan production have made strong gains, in both cases the gains coming immediately after land reform. Between 1952 and 1963, Bolivia's gain came to 45 per cent before leveling off. During the 1960s Venezuela's gain amounted to about 30 per cent, overcoming relative "no growth" during the 1950s. In contrast, the Latin

American total per capita agricultural production remained at about the same level during the 1950s and 1960s, the period for which data are available. In light of population increases, this pattern for Latin America is more encouraging than we may have supposed. Nevertheless, the Latin American total varies from country to country, with gains in such countries as Bolivia and Venezuela being offset by losses in Argentina, Chile, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Paraguay, and Uruguay (*SNP* — X:1).

Although these agricultural gains appear to hold up under two tests (declining imports and increased per capita production), the governments of Bolivia and Venezuela now face the argument that improvement would have come in spite of land reform. This thesis often is developed along the following lines: Whereas land reform may have been beneficial because it forced large-scale agricultural holdings to become highly efficient and to pay fair wages to agricultural employees,

TABLE 43 (Cont'd)

Agricultural Credit In Venezuela, 1953-1969

Part II: BAP Outlays in Real (Deflated) Terms

Year	Wholesale Price ^a Index (7)	Millions of 1963 Bolívares		Real Bolívares	
		^b Total Real (8)	Subtotal Available ^c for Peasants (9)	Available per Accumulated ^d Beneficiary (10)	Available per Person Employed ^e in Agriculture (11)
1953-1957	^f 98	193.5	#	#	255
1958	99	146.5	#	#	193
1959	99	232.4	57.5	13 000	306
1960	98	146.0	77.0	3 497	192
1961	100	180.4	70.9	2 267	238
1962	99	229.2	84.1	2 103	302
1963	100	212.9	78.0	1 688	280
1964	104	182.0	106.7	2 039	240
1965	107	249.2	107.6	1 503	328
1966	109	267.9	121.1	1 426	353
1967	107	281.0	115.9	1 204	370
1968	110	265.6	107.1	947	350
1969	112	278.7	110.1	939	367

^a1963 = 100 (base converted from 1938 = 100); national index for 82 items. Differs from home-import price index for Caracas given in Table XII:1.

^bTotal funds (column 6) divided by price index (column 7). Sum of columns 9 and 14.

^cLoans to peasants (column 1) divided by price index (column 7).

^dMillions of real 1963 bolívares available for peasants (column 9) divided by number of land reform beneficiaries, CENDES series (Table 21).

^eReal total (column 8) divided by total population agriculturally employed in 1961, 759 322 persons (Appendix KK). Assumption is that total remains constant over period.

^fFive-year average ranging from 97 to 100.

Source: Price index is from Venezuela, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos Nacionales, *Anuario Estadístico* (1967), p. 213; and unpublished data supplied by *idem*, Centro de Informaciones Estadísticas.

in many cases productive lands have been expropriated even though they fill their social purpose. And it is commercial holdings that are producing the new gains, in contrast with unproductive agricultural holdings that are operated under the aegis of the land reform agencies, mainly in the form of subsistence, *minifundia* plots. In this argument, land reform has not yet irreparably damaged entrepreneurial production for market, but if it continues to its ultimate end of eventually affecting all properties as population pressures grow, the lands necessary to feed the city folk will be inevitably and unjustifiably divided into small holdings that are economically useless to the nation as a whole, even though valuable psychologically to the small percentage of peasants involved.

It is impossible to test this argument with present statistics; we are dealing in complexities that involve logical arguments without proof. Data in Tables 36 and 37 do tend to show IAN beneficiaries producing less than 20 per cent of the total agricultural value in 1968 (Table 36), with the IAN share not keeping pace with percentage increase in total value between 1963 and 1968. Perhaps this data reflects decreases, shown in Table 37, of the average-sized IAN holding. Data in Table 38, however, show that in those states where the greatest amount of land reform has taken place the share in value of production generally has risen. Our problem in the latter case is that we do not know (a) if production gains came from the IAN sector or (b) if land reform forced private sector gains,

TABLE 43 (Cont'd)
 Agricultural Credit in Venezuela, 1953-1969
 PART III: Average Real Amount per BAP Loan

Year	For Peasants		For Entrepreneurs		
	^a Number (12)	^b Average (13)	Real Credit Subtotal ^c (Millions) (14)	^a Number (15)	^d Average (16)
^e 1959	51 540	1 116	162.4	38 343	4 235
1960	99 598	773	55.3	8 854	6 246
1961	66 187	1 071	56.6	3 825	14 797
1962	70 105	1 200	93.0	5 609	16 580
1963	67 774	1 151	74.4	4 511	16 493
1964	66 042	1 616	103.8	6 075	17 086
1965	52 436	2 052	93.4	6 111	15 284
1966	44 065	2 748	100.6	6 614	15 210
1967	33 785	3 431	115.0	6 639	17 323
1968	32 307	3 315	100.1	5 497	18 210
1969	29 269	3 762	108.8	6 810	15 977

^aNumber of loans neither necessarily all paid nor equal to number of persons benefitted.

^bColumn 10 divided by column 12.

^cColumn 2 divided by column 7.

^dColumn 14 divided by column 15.

^eNo data available for number of loans before 1959.

Source: Numbers of loans are from Venezuela, BAP, *Informe Anual* (1969), p. 200. Includes USAID Supervised Agricultural Credit.

as hypothesized by those who would bring the reform to an end.

Assessment is all the more difficult when we take into account distribution of agricultural credit by state (Table 49) and compare it and production with social characteristics such as literacy (Table 50). We can examine both aspects of the problem regionally, but again we do not know if the people who received credit were literate or if they contributed more to production than those who did not have help. This would appear to be a logical hypothesis, and one could develop several kinds of factor analysis to juxtapose this data, but the end result would leave us with the same doubts.

Data for Bolivia are even more sketchy since we do not have the equivalent of Tables 36, 37, and 38. Clearly the department of Chuquisaca had the highest share of illiteracy (Table 50) yet it did not receive the lowest share of agricultural credit (Table 48). And, although there is not necessarily any causal connection, one cannot help but imagine government officials sensing the need to favor one area over another. Officials in many cases have to use their intuition to

decide (a) which areas and (b) which applicants for credit would best serve immediate and/or long-term production needs. One essence of their dilemma is that they must be resolved without much information.

In order to gather one kind of data which would assist planners, both Bolivia and Venezuela have developed unfulfilled plans to implement land registry and cadastral systems. Writing on the problem of Venezuela, José Mariá Franco G., currently secretary-general of the Instituto Iberoamericano de Derecho Agrario y Reforma Agraria of the University of the Andes in Mérida, has noted that given the origin of land ownership which goes back to the era of discovery, conquest, and colonization by Spain, the peasant cannot be consolidated into the nation until insecurity of land titles is resolved with clear individual titles. And such title requires a complete survey of all lands in order to establish who legally has title to what lands, with all subsequent changes duly registered for every piece of property.¹⁹⁸

With regard to problems in administration of land reform, Bolivian and Venezuelan similarities go beyond those of land registry. Neither Bolivia nor

¹⁹⁸José Mariá Franco G., "The Legal Insecurity of Landed Property in Venezuela: A Case Study of the Registry and Cadastral Systems," Madison: Ph.D. thesis in law and agricultural economics, University of Wisconsin, 1970.

TABLE 44
Employment by Sector of Economically Active Population in Bolivia and Venezuela
(In Per Cent)

Sector	Bolivia		Venezuela	
	1950	1963	1950	1961
[†] Total	^a 100.0	^b 100.0	^c 100.0	^d 100.0
Agriculture, Forestry, Hunting, Fishing	71.5	67.1	41.3	32.3
Mining and Petroleum	3.2	3.3	2.6	2.3
Manufacturing	8.0	8.4	10.1	12.2
Construction	1.9	1.7	5.3	5.6
Electricity, Gas, Water, Sanitary Services	^e .1	.1	.3	1.0
Commerce and Finance	4.2	6.0	8.8	12.6
Transport, Storage, Communications	1.6	2.1	3.1	5.0
Public and Private Services	^e 8.1	10.2	20.0	23.3
Other or Unknown	1.4	1.1	8.5	5.7

[†]National population censuses for age 10 and over, except Bolivian sample census of 1963 divided for urban-age 15 and over (see note b below).

^aAbsolute total = 1 361 227 including unemployed transferred here from the 1950 census economically inactive category.

^bAbsolute total of sample census = 1 296 500. Although this total is less than the Ohio State University Center for Human Resource Research estimate of 1 810 000 in 1967 (excluding unemployed), the percentage of distribution by sector is within about 1 per cent; see *Human Resources in Bolivia* (Columbus, 1971), pp. 60-66.

^cAbsolute total = 1 706 321.

^dAbsolute total = 2 351 291.

^eCorrects misclassification of "public administration and general services" by *América en Cifras* (1970), Table 408-02, (pp. 111 and 117), a category of 3 per cent here included in services.

Sources: Bolivian data are from Dirección General de Estadística y Censos: *Censo Demográfico, 1950*, pp. 144, 146, 148, 161; and "Sample population Census of 1963," unpublished.

Venezuelan data are from *América en Cifras* (1960), Table 74-12 (pp. 46-49); and *América en Cifras* (1970), Table 48-02 (pp. 114-115, 120-121). See also Venezuela, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos Nacionales, *Censo de Población, 1961*, B and C, p. 469.

Venezuela have had the manpower, funds, or educational facilities to implement land registry. In attitude toward private holdings, Venezuelan peasants hold the same general view as do Bolivian peasants who have declined to accept collective ownership. Perhaps the Venezuelan government has been more forthright in recognizing the fact of individual preference than Bolivia because it did not have a noteworthy Indian heritage that was allegedly based upon collective equality.¹⁹⁹ In both countries, moreover, there is confusion as to which agencies control public lands. In Venezuela, public lands are held by the Ministry of Agriculture (MAC) until officially transferred to the IAN; in the meantime, it is possible to grant provisional title but no definitive grants can be made until the

transfers are completed, with approval by the cabinet, attorney general, and publication of the decree.²⁰⁰ Certainly such a process explains not only part of the delay in granting definitive titles but also problems in granting public lands as opposed to private lands. It would seem unfortunate that bureaucratic rights to distribute public lands are in the hands of the IAN while the lands themselves are controlled by MAC, unless those who framed the land legislation felt that some check needed to be placed on the IAN. Nevertheless, on balance, it appears that the "check" has made it easier to distribute private land rather than public. In any case the latter land may be involved in the future jurisdictional disputes between the IAN and MAC.

¹⁹⁹See note 186.

²⁰⁰Interview with the IAN's Oscar Martínez Boscán, Caracas, October 19, 1970. For information on some lands transferred all at once to IAN, see CENDES, *La Reforma Agraria en Venezuela*, II, p. 83ff.

TABLE 45
Bolivian and Venezuelan Agricultural Contribution to Domestic Product, 1950-1969

Year	Bolivia		Venezuela	
	GDP (Millions of ^a 1958 Dollars)	Per Cent Agriculture	GDP (Millions of ^b 1957 Dollars)	Per Cent Agriculture
1950	355.9	33.2	3.799	8.0
1951	378.6	31.2	4.242	8.1
1952	387.8	29.2	4.551	8.1
1953	343.7	30.8	4.833	7.9
1954	346.2	29.4	5.298	7.2
1955	371.3	29.0	5.769	7.0
1956	354.8	29.4	6.378	6.8
1957	342.9	32.3	7.118	6.3
1958	353.7	31.7	7.213	6.5
1959	352.7	32.4	7.781	6.3
1960	367.7	31.0	8.094	7.3
1961	375.5	31.9	8.501	7.0
1962	396.5	29.9	9.278	6.8
1963	421.9	29.7	9.917	6.7
1964	442.2	28.7	10.880	6.6
1965	467.1	28.0	11.524	6.6
1966	496.7	26.8	11.789	6.7
1967	525.5	24.3	12.264	6.8
1968	563.2	23.3	12.916	6.8
1969	^c 589.5	23.1	13.369	6.8

^aCalculated with a 1958 exchange rate of 9.5 pesos per dollar.

^bCalculated with a 1957 exchange rate of 3.35 bolivianos per dollar.

^cPreliminary

Sources: Bolivian data through 1966 are from Wilkie, *The Bolivian Revolution and U.S. Aid Since 1952*, Table 2 and Appendix I; post-1966 data are from United States, Agency for International Development, USAID/Bolivia, *Estadísticas Económicas* 11 (1970), p. 9.

Venezuelan data are from Venezuela, Banco Central, *La Economía Venezolana en los Ultimos Treinta Años* (Caracas, 1971), pp. 93 and 97.

In Bolivia, relations between the SNRA and the Colonization Institute have led to some serious problems, but the future problems promise to be even worse. Created in 1965, the Institute previously formed part of the Ministry of Agriculture and was involved in some problems with the SNRA, as when it granted a tract of 35 000 hectares in the Santa Cruz area for establishment of a Japanese immigrant colony. Not having been notified of this grant, the SNRA awarded much of the same land to peasants in the region, resulting in great friction. According to Dwight B. Heath, open warfare was narrowly avoided when a special commission from La Paz ruled in favor of the Japanese.²⁰¹ Although a coordinating commis-

sion exists to prevent such problems, cooperation is extremely difficult. Since both the Colonization Institute and the SNRA are engaged in so many activities, it is not possible to clear all work in advance without adding to the bureaucratic slowness already causing tremendous problems. In any case, the agencies are in a large sense strong competitors as each seeks to gain public relations credit which seems to become ever more scarce.

The potential Bolivian problem is even more serious: Under the decree setting up the colonization process, lands that revert to the state through activity of the SNRA are specifically made available for colonization, as are all public lands. Where then will

²⁰¹Heath, Erasmus, Buechler, *Land Reform and Social Revolution in Bolivia*, p. 395.

TABLE 46
Bolivian and Venezuelan Imports of Foodstuffs

Part I: Bolivia, 1950-1968			Part II: Venezuela, 1960-1970		
Year	Total Imports Million Dollars	Food Imports As a Percentage † of Total Imports	Year	Total Imports Million Dollars	Food Imports As a Percentage ‡ of Total Imports
1950	55.8	35.5	1960	1 045	16.0
1951	85.8	29.1	1961	1 036	15.8
1952	92.6	30.0	1962	1 139	12.8
1953	68.0	37.8	1963	1 079	13.7
1954	65.5	35.2	1964	1 338	13.6
1955	82.4	29.9	1965	1 508	11.9
1956	84.1	25.6	1966	1 474	10.6
1957	90.3	30.4	1967	1 530	12.0
1958	79.6	19.4	1968	1 773	11.3
1959	65.0	24.7	1969	1 819	10.9
1960	71.5	19.5	1970	1 994	9.8
1961	77.7	24.5			
1962	97.0	21.2			
1963	103.3	22.1			
1964	102.7	17.8			
1965	133.8	19.2			
1966	138.4	18.6			
1967	151.0	20.5			
1968	152.8	17.6			

† Includes foods, fats, oils, beverages, tobacco, and live animals. Source: Data through 1966 are from *SNP - IV:3*; post 1966 data are from United States, Agency for International Development, USAID/Bolivia, *Estadísticas Económicas 11* (1970), p. 25.

‡ Includes foods, fats, oils, beverages, and tobacco. Excludes live animals which are grouped in "other category," the total for which comprised only .4 and .7 per cent of all imports in 1960 and 1970, respectively. Source: Venezuela, Banco Central, *Informe Económico* (1969), Appendix A-X-12; and *ibid.*, (1970), Appendix A-X-15. Total Imports are from *SNP - XV:2*.

the SNRA operate? If colonized lands are abandoned, does not the SNRA then have the police power to redistribute them? In short, the problem is: Who is the state? The SNRA can claim a longer real role, but the Institute can claim a longer history dating back to the 1920s. The SNRA is charged with continuous evaluation of holdings to see that they are being used according to the laws of social function; and, if the Institute wishes to open the country's frontier, does it want to assume the same role of policeman in areas that have been colonized? On the one hand, it could be argued that, with two agencies competing to see that social purposes of the land are carried out, the interests of the peasants will be protected. On the other hand, peasants may be able to play off one agency against the

other creating further land-tenure insecurity, especially as the rural population increases on choice lands that already are developed.

Difficulty in coping with bureaucratic dilemmas has not only hampered land reform but also has brought about demands for "reform of the land reform." Calls have been made for a reorganization so that land may be worked collectively, cooperatively, or individually (under expanded titling rights). These calls to undo the "old land reform" cause a new dilemma: Should the state take away from the peasants *minifundia* which was granted in all good faith, land for which the peasants waited years and over which they generally fought long legal and bureaucratic battles to

TABLE 47

†FAO Index of Per Capita Agricultural Production in
Bolivia, Venezuela, and Latin America, 1952-1971
(1963 = 100)

Year	Index of Per Capita Agricultural Production		
	Bolivia	Venezuela	Latin America
1952	69	86	97
1953	67	89	95
1954	66	88	97
1955	66	91	97
1956	83	88	99
1957	85	90	99
1958	91	88	102
1959	90	91	99
1960	93	97	98
1961	97	97	102
1962	94	99	100
1963	100	100	100
1964	104	104	98
1965	99	108	102
1966	98	108	97
1967	101	113	99
1968	99	114	97
1969	101	117	98
1970	101	120	98
1971	99(P)	119(P)	94(P)

†Based upon different population estimates than given in Appendices K and DD. The FAO population estimate for 1969 was 901 000 higher than used in this study and the Venezuelan was 590 000 higher; see pages 16-17 in United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization, *Food Production Yearbook* (1970).

Source: *SNP* — X:1. Cf. Table 17 and 35 above.

finally achieve either provisional and/or definitive rights? Would not an attempt to consolidate *minifundia* open the door to a general assault on all land rights? (This may be answered affirmatively especially because the size and definition of *minifundia* varies by and within regions.) Could productivity scales be developed for simple implementation to determine what holdings are "too small"? Or would a new bureaucracy trap peasants in so much paperwork and so many trips to the capital for appeal of lower echelon rulings that productivity would be under-

mined? It has been cogently suggested by Ronald J. Clark²⁰² and Joseph R. Thome²⁰³ that a lack of definitive title may have made many holdings only appear to be unproductive because land reform recipients are reluctant to invest the money and energy necessary for success without some guarantee that they are not wasting their resources. According to Thome, many Bolivian peasants, waiting for the government to legalize their seizures of land

have grown weary of waiting, and have purchased "titles" from their former landowners, who unscrupulously exploit their ignorance. These "titles" have no legal validity whatsoever, and only serve to further complicate an already indefinite title situation, particularly as these transactions may result in the abandonment of their agrarian reform cases by the campesinos, who no longer feel the need for proceeding through the Agrarian Reform Agency.

Moreover, many changes take place during the nine or ten years that the proceedings last. Campesinos with rights over the land die, or abandon their holdings, and others without any legal rights take their place. As the families increase, the holdings are subdivided, or lands which legally pertain to the former landowner are occupied or invaded. And when the final legal

TABLE 48

Bolivian Agricultural Credit for Peasants by State,
1965-1969
(In Per Cent)

State	Agricultural Credit
Total	^a 100.0
Beni	37.7
Cuquisaca	6.7
Cochabamba	10.9
La Paz	7.3
Oruro	1.7
Pando	#
Potosí	3.3
Santa Cruz	25.9
Tarija	6.5

^a108.7 million pesos, nondeflated.

Source: See Table 42.

²⁰²Ronald J. Clark, "Problems and Conflicts Over Land Ownership in Bolivia," *Inter-American Economic Affairs* 22:4 (1969), pp. 3-18.

²⁰³Joseph R. Thome, "Improving Land Tenure Security," in Peter Dorner (ed.), *Land Reform in Latin America; Issues and Cases* (Madison: Land Economics Monographs, 1971), pp. 229-240.

TABLE 49
Venezuelan Agricultural Credit for Peasants
By State, 1959-1969
(In Per Cent)

State	Betancourt 1959-1963	Leoni 1964-1968	Caldera 1969
Total	^a 100.0	^b 100.0	^c 100.0
Amazonas	.1	#	#
Anzoátegui	6.3	4.2	3.5
Apure	2.6	2.2	2.1
Aragua	4.1	3.2	2.8
Barinas	4.1	6.3	7.8
Bolívar	4.6	2.6	1.7
Carabobo	5.2	6.0	5.0
Cojedes	2.8	3.0	6.1
Delta Amacuro	.3	.6	1.8
Distrito Federal	1.5	.6	.1
Falcón	4.7	2.4	1.5
Guárico	9.1	12.4	14.0
Lara	3.3	3.8	4.0
Mérida	2.8	3.8	2.7
Miranda	2.2	1.3	.4
Monagas	8.4	4.4	3.9
Nueva Esparta	.1	.5	.4
Portuguesa	12.6	18.6	20.0
Sucre	5.5	2.5	2.3
Táchira	4.5	5.0	4.1
Trujillo	3.3	3.5	2.9
Yaracuy	3.7	5.6	7.9
Zulia	8.2	7.5	5.0

^a366.6 million bolívares, nondeflated.

^b600.9 million bolívares, nondeflated.

^c123.3 million bolívares, nondeflated.

Sources: Publications by Venezuela's BAP: *Síntesis . . . 1959-1963*; and *Informe Anual* (yearly). Sources include USAID Supervised Agricultural Credit.

determination is finally reached, it may have absolutely no relevance to the conditions now existing in the property, and more often than not, it will be impossible to enforce.²⁰⁴

Calls for reform of the land reform have been somewhat muted in Venezuela, in contrast with Bolivia where a projected new land reform has been debated. In Venezuela the Federación Campesina has retained sufficient organizational strength to be able to effectively argue that the definition of "revolutionariness" now depends on award of definitive title. Ironically, it would be easier to change this definition and reform the land reform in Venezuela for the very reason that titles there are still basically insecure in contrast with Bolivia where land reform has involved distribution of definitive rather than provisional titles.

Under the proposed Bolivian reform, lands would be "reconcentrated" into holdings of economically rational size through a rational process. By interpreting "correctly" decree-law 7260 of August 2, 1965, the "complementary land reform law" proposed in 1970 would give peasants the right to sell lands granted to them, the new interpretation being that they hold definitive title which gives them absolute property rights. The Council's legal position would be clarified in order to give it final jurisdiction over land, thus ending the present situation in which advisors to the cabinet ministers involved (agriculture and peasant affairs) as well as advisors to the President of Bolivia have modified the Council land grants. Under the proposed law, the president would merely sign the Council's decrees without modification; and the Council would become a judicial agency instead of existing in an administrative limbo as neither a centralized nor a decentralized agency. As a juridical body, final action by the Council would also eliminate lengthy appeals to the ministries and to the presidency. The proposed law would not only encourage the development of large-scale commercial holdings but also establish collective and cooperative agricultural enterprises if the peasants vote freely and democratically to give up their individual rights.²⁰⁵

If in Venezuela discussion of legal reform of the land reform process has not prospered because legislators do not want to become trapped in attempting to resolve an explosive issue, in Bolivia the executive decree-law proposed in 1970 has not been implemented because it is identified as a capitalistic plan having been proposed by foreigners. Although in agreement with the rationale for the projected law that the growth of *minifundia* has impeded the mechanization of production and slowed diffusion of the wage system, Teófilo Andía C. led criticism against implementation of the law by claiming that sale of lands "always signifies displacement of the economically weak by the economically strong." Moreover, according to Andía:

²⁰⁴*Ibid.*, p. 231.

²⁰⁵For the proposed law, with exposition of rationale, see *Revista de Derecho y Ciencia Política* (Universidad Mayor de San Andrés, La Paz) 55-56 (April-December, 1970), pp. 145-165.

TABLE 50
 Illiteracy in Bolivia (1950) and Venezuela (1961)
 (Age 5 and over)

Bolivia		Venezuela	
Department	Per Cent Illiterate	State	Per Cent Illiterate
†Total	68.9	@Total	47.1
Beni	49.3	Amazonas	60.0
Chuquisaca	81.2	Anzoátegui	50.1
Cochabamba	69.9	Apure	63.1
La Paz	67.3	Aragua	41.9
Oruro	60.2	Barinas	63.5
Pando	62.6	Bolívar	44.4
Potosí	78.8	Carabobo	42.9
Santa Cruz	52.0	Cojedes	65.8
Tarija	67.3	Delta Amacuro	53.0
		Distrito Federal	25.3
		Falcón	59.6
		Guárico	58.9
		Lara	56.3
		Mérida	61.4
		Miranda	39.0
		Monagas	54.2
		Nueva Esparta	50.0
		Portuguesa	65.8
		Sucre	57.7
		Táchira	52.0
		Trujillo	62.7
		Yaracuy	60.8
		Zulia	43.7

†Total censused population = 2 278 502; excludes unknown ages.

Source: Bolivia, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos, *Censo Demográfico, 1950*, 114; and UCLA *Statistical Abstract of Latin America* (1975), pp. 6-7. See also Appendix ZZ.

@Absolute national total = 2 898 111; adjusted to include ages 5-9, all assumed to be illiterate.

Source: Venezuela, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos Nacionales, *Censo de Población, 1961*, A, pp. 20-21, 89. See also Appendix ZZ.

[Bolivians must refuse "American Aid" when the University of] Wisconsin, USAID, and others openly engage in neocolonialism and use a discretionary loan to the Bolivian government to manage the supervisory level of the Council [Their purpose is to] waste that loan in exaggerated salaries of toadies, to finance ridiculous Mobile Brigades in the execution of amorphous

and unusual land reform without the existence of any express law . . . and to create espionage and information units such as the IBM computer center of the Council . . . in order to justify capriciously ever increasing American loans that will make Bolivia indebted to and dependent upon American domination for several generations to come.²⁰⁶

²⁰⁶Teófilo Andía C., "Análisis y Crítica del Proyecto del Consejo de Reforma Agraria," in *ibid.*, pp. 167-182; quote is from p. 169. Andía calls for cooperatives created voluntarily (p. 168) but notes (p. 171) that "the expropriation of *minifundia* for reconcentration of lands goes against the basic peasant psychology which is introspective and distrustful; therefore the peasant is anchored to his land no matter how small a plot." According to Andía, only a long-range educational process could change this firmly rooted conservative mentality.

In spite of the preposterous nature of the charge, or perhaps because of it, one can appreciate the importance of the bureaucracy as an employer in such countries as Bolivia—many persons were extremely jealous of the special training afforded select Bolivians who qualified for high salaries in order to speed up land reform. Ironically, the projected land reform was drafted apparently by the Torres government, the government that was certainly no friend of the United States and which had nationalized U.S. Gulf Oil properties. Given this last factor, the reader can begin to appreciate the dilemma facing those who would make land reform. Once certain aspects do not prove feasible in operation, it may not be possible to enact new legislation because (as in Venezuela) nobody wants to open the whole land reform issue to potential legislative revisions that might go beyond narrow goals or because (as in Bolivia) political factions have very different views of how to cope with acknowledged problems. In the fervor of revolution it is not possible to spend much time writing legislation that will work out in practice; and, once the fervor is gone, the impetus for new laws may be most difficult to recapture. Thus it proves hard to learn from experience.

If policymakers have not been able to resolve the dilemma posed by the need to give land to many (resulting in *minifundia*) versus the need to create larger holdings (resulting in commercial farming), we may ask if discussion here has not implicitly confused matters by referring (as in Table 14) to the balance between hectares and population, a ratio of 1.0 meaning that the percentage distribution of land is equal to percentage of population in a given political entity. Actually, my analysis utilizing ratios has not been to show that landholding is equal or unequal per se but to show the impact of land reform activity in terms of governmental propaganda. (As we have seen,

however, the favorable impact of propaganda in yesterday's terms may have an unfavorable impact tomorrow as more people move from the country to the city.) To reiterate, my use of ratios is not related to any implicit theoretical statement that landholdings must be equally owned, let alone equal in size.²⁰⁷ Such a statement can be of value mainly to those who wish to manipulate data for "ideal" ends; and we have seen here not only how questionable are the data on land reform but also how alternative views of the data may lead to different conclusions.

The study of problematic data here reveals the extent of the difficulties which policymakers face: Given the range of data as well as the regional differences within each country, what kind of general policy can be made which takes variation into account? And how can makers of policy grasp the meaning of their activity so that they can explain it to the public as well as understand it themselves? Since results of policy and attitudes of the populace vary from locale to locale, one can also understand why it is difficult to take sample censuses without first determining the present as well as historical conditions that would influence the sample. Given the variety of circumstance (amount of agricultural credit, rate of illiteracy, and so on) as well as the amount of land distributed, the choice of representative locales with which to develop a valid sample census is itself a problem. Policymakers, then, find it increasingly difficult to understand the political implications of their policy results.²⁰⁸ Nevertheless, the CENDES sample census of IAN beneficiaries in Venezuela (whatever its shortcomings) sets a valuable precedent in attempting to find out what the peasants think, in addition to discovering their objective living conditions. Such a census with both aspects is required if government officials are to develop policy that will be accepted rather than foisted on the electorate.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁷For such an implicit theoretical statement, see Peter H. Smith, "History," in Robert S. Byars and Joseph L. Love (eds.), *Quantitative Social Research on Latin America* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973), p. 27, who notes in regard to Mexico that the land concentration Gini indices converted to percentages (and presented in a Lorenz Curve) show that states in the central valley "tend to have relatively equal land distribution while states in the Gulf and South Pacific tend to cluster above the median." Smith attributes this pattern to (a) crops involving different economics of scale and (b) a political factor in which land-owning groups have been able to resist the central government. The naïve use of data here is striking: the first reason is acceptable as far as it goes; but the second reason reveals a great lack of knowledge about rural Mexico. In losing his interpretation in his methodology, Smith does not consider size of holdings necessary for pastures and crops according to geography or kind of land; and he does not discuss in the type of presentation he has chosen the vital factor of population: total population, rural population, population economically employed, adult males employed in agriculture, and so on. In any case Smith is apparently unaware of the historical patterns of Mexican land tenure which have seen heavy population pressures and small land holdings in the central farming portion of the country, and sparse population and large land holdings in the commercial farming and grazing areas of the north and south.

See also my Table 14, as well as note 196, above.

²⁰⁸For the number of government agencies involved in the now complex rural scene, see Venezuela, Ministerio de Agricultura y Cría, *Organización y Administración del sector Agropecuario de Venezuela* (Caracas: Instituto Interamericano de Ciencias Agrícolas de la O.E.A., 1969).

²⁰⁹For a survey of leaders of the Federación Campesina in 1966, see Powell, *Political Mobilization of the Venezuelan Peasant*, pp. 120, 247.

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Government leaders have taken many views of the impact of land title distribution on national politics. President Betancourt summed up the official view before he left office when he told peasants in the state of Monagas: "All of you voted December 1, [1963], for the candidate of your choice. And you all know that when you were given credit, when you were given a plot of land, and when you were given a housing loan, no obligation was imposed to vote for any specific candidate. You voted for whom you wished."²¹⁰

That the politics of land reform has not been as simple as the official view would lead to believe, however, was admitted by Betancourt's Minister of Agriculture, Víctor Giménez Landínez, defending the land reform program before hostile members of the national Congress in December, 1961, when he noted:

Land reform is very difficult within the political climate of the country, especially if we recall that it is subject to the fire created by political interests. I have been a politician all my life and I belong to a political party, but I am obliged to say that . . . land reform will go wrong if political parties do not make an effort to overcome avarice and self-interest At times it seems that political parties have viewed land reform as a succulent electoral banquet to which they have to arrive on time in order that each would get the choicest morsels. I do not regret that statement, even though it includes the party to which I have dedicated my life.²¹¹

As discussed above,²¹² Venezuelan land reform policy has been dependent upon cooperation between AD and COPEI. Thus *copeyano*, Víctor Giménez Landínez had important power when he served as Minister of Agriculture during Betancourt's AD presidency. As Director of the IAN under Caldera (serving as executive agent of the IAN board of directors), he was to some extent responsible for the reversal of Caldera's announced policy. Apparently in the confusion of reorganizing IAN personnel during the shift from AD to COPEI presidencies, distribution of private lands was carried out by the IAN director as a matter of personal policy.

In Bolivia, land reform also has continued under presidents of different political persuasion. Apparently, however, for a time General Ovando was not convinced that land reform was necessary because while acting

president during 1966 he allowed great numbers of resolutions to accumulate without his signature. While he might have left the resolutions for signature by a duly elected president, it is more likely that he was simply not interested in land reform. Certainly his action slowed down the program immeasurably; all the unsigned resolutions had to be returned to the Ministry of Peasant Affairs since resolutions must be signed by the president and his minister while both are in office. According to Thome,²¹³ four thousand cases had accumulated for Barrientos's signature when he took office on August 6, 1966. If Ovando were actively seeking to seize the presidency at the first opportunity, he obviously missed an excellent opportunity to make himself popular with the peasants, unless he felt that his control of the army would be adequate for determining his political future or he believed that emphasis on land reform was not necessary.

Since land reform is intimately related to politics and to politicians, an important question is the following: When do politicians *learn* of the need for land reform? And how does this influence their consequent policy decisions? In Venezuela, AD and Betancourt were committed to land reform at an early stage of party development. Once the promise was made, Betancourt found himself and his party locked (albeit willingly) into fulfilling past promises. One major problem of Latin American politics which is related to the above dilemmas is that much of the populace tends to judge the politician on the basis of how consistently he behaves. Even if AD were to learn from mistakes and problems in the land reform process, then, change would not be possible in the eyes of those voters who value "sticking to principles," especially in new times. And as we have seen, since land reform has not stopped the process of urbanization, AD has found itself in the predicament of seeing its identification with land reform change its propaganda image.

It is ironic that because democratic or popular politicians such as Betancourt need years to build the base of support, which can help them gain effective power, the promises that they made in their early days may not correspond to national needs by the time they win the presidency; yet the fulfillment of those promises is necessary to show the consistency that is equated with honesty. Even as Betancourt was gaining power, the population census of 1961 was to show that the percentage of Venezuela's rural population was half that of the late 1930s and early 1940s when the AD

²¹⁰Betancourt, "La Reforma Agraria en el Estado Monagas," speech of January 29, 1964, in his *La Revolución Democrata en Venezuela; Documentos de Gobierno* (Caracas: Imprenta Nacional, 1968), IV, p. 266.

²¹¹Víctor Giménez Landínez, *La Reforma Agraria Integral* (2 vols.; Caracas: Ministerio de Agricultura y Cría, 1963-1964), II, p. 138.

²¹²See note 144 above.

²¹³Thome, "Problems Which Obstruct the Process of Title Distribution," p. 43.

had emerged as a political party.²¹⁴ By 1961 only one-third of the country's population lived in communities of less than 1 000 persons; and, as land reform became a reality, that share fell to less than one-quarter. Not only did AD appear to be out of step with the times, but the population that would appreciate its consistency in land reform had declined drastically. COPEI's victory over AD no doubt was dulled by the policies of the IAN under Giménez Landínez, who made the IAN board of directors work to keep up with his personal policy instead of vice versa. It is noteworthy that AD's return to power in the 1973 presidential election no doubt was helped by IAN's policy of self-criticism, criticism that came to be identified with "failure" of the "old" land reform and need for new agricultural reform. That the IAN had attempted to be open about inherited problems and that AD as well as COPEI had not been able to marshal the necessary funds for agricultural reform were ignored by the populace; and AD's call for agricultural reform (utilizing funds from increased oil prices to "sow the petroleum") was part of an effective campaign to regain power.

The urbanization trend has not been as strong in Bolivia, yet much the same situation prevails in that the same sequence has prevailed: The MNR and its primary leader Paz Estenssoro stood for change in the rural sector since approximately the same period as AD. When Paz finally came to power, however, he did not have to concern himself so much with land reform itself as with legislation to legally recognize the de facto situation that occurred simultaneously with his seizure of power in 1952. Not until 1960 did Paz speed up this process, but this came at the very time he needed to reassure investors that the "revolution" had stabilized. And even though an extremist such as Torres has questioned the future of land reform, the reform of land reform is still pending. As Andia has noted:

In effect, over the course of time and under the influence of successive governments, the great social conquest of the Land Reform has lost its essential dynamism. Reduced as it is to the simple distribution of land and delivery of yellowed titles, it is failure on the march. Although many Council employees talk with great emphasis about integral land reform, nevertheless, they plan unilateral and defective solutions. The great majority of the peasants continue to cultivate their lands with the most primitive agricultural equipment. Nothing has been done to mechanize production on a

national scale, agricultural extension has not been developed according to regional needs, no real credit policy exists, . . . yet meanwhile the increasing urban and rural population has a greater demand for agricultural products due to our stage of incipient industrialization, but no method to satisfy this need.²¹⁵

Times have indeed changed: Whereas critics once called for land reform, today's critics call for agricultural reform to complete the process of agrarian reform. The problem is that agricultural reform is much more costly than land redistribution.

In self-defense, governments tend to place emphasis on education as a long-term method of bringing about change in the countryside, a change necessary if agricultural credit and extension is to be used effectively. Education, in the meantime, is seen as the means of encouraging peasants not to migrate to the cities. Whereas land reform was once assigned the task of making rural areas more desirable, education, particularly agricultural education, is now seen as *the* necessary ingredient. We are left, then, with another simple answer to a complex problem, a simple answer necessitated by a shortage of funds, the same funds used to import foreign agricultural products. In this difficult situation, Bolivian "realists" call for understanding of the limited options open to the government; "idealists" demand all or nothing. In Venezuela politicians of all hues continue to "talk" about "sowing petroleum" profits in rural areas in order to provide a new basis for national development when oil reserves are depleted toward the end of this century, but they may well find that it is difficult to channel money to the rural sector. Competing demands of urban groups include new industrial projects to relieve unemployment problems, construction of subways and highways to relieve modern congestion, and urban housing to relieve slum problems created by the rush to the cities. When forced to choose, politicians who wish to stay in power may well opt for meeting urban demands—long-range needs being sacrificed for immediate votes, as usual.

Bolivian and Venezuelan politicians admittedly may well look to other revolutionary models in Chile, Peru, and Cuba, thus abandoning land reform in favor of land revolution. But here, also, the scene is not encouraging. The crisis in food production caused in Chile by the Allende government's tacit encouragement of land seizures not only vitiated the land reform program which would have created "semi-independent cooperatives,"²¹⁶ but also created a climate of fear among small producers who feared loss of property

²¹⁴On rural population, see note 182 above.

²¹⁵Andia, "Análisis y Crítica del Proyecto del Consejo de Reforma Agraria," pp. 167–168.

²¹⁶In Marxian terminology, "cooperativism" is used for "collectivism," the distinction deriving from the strategy of collectivizing without the force used in the Soviet experience; see Warriner, *Land Reform in Principle and Practice*, p. 65.

through invasions of land that should not have been subject to redistribution because of size. Food shortages in the cities, compounded by the loss of foreign exchange necessary to import foods as working-class purchasing power rose precipitously under the "popular revolution" (1970–1973), helped in no small measure to create the confusion in which Allende's regime collapsed.²¹⁷

Peru's model also appears to offer little in the way of success, especially given criticism of a system in which "workers now have the privilege of being exploited by workers' cooperatives rather than by individual *hacendados*." Actually this statement by itself is misleading because the large-scale collectives created and turned over to the workers by the state are seen by many to be relatively successful worker-managed operations. The Peruvian military government, however, is concerned that the cooperative system may not be working out as expected because it has created a new privileged class of permanent cooperative workers who exploit temporary laborers from nearby areas.²¹⁸

Cuba's model is no longer generally seen to offer a viable alternative, particularly because Cuban state farms have not resolved the country's acute food shortages. As one authoritative observer has shown, a decade after revolution, food consumption per capita had declined an average of 24 per cent for ten major items (including rice, meat, grains, fats, eggs, milk, fish, chicken, coffee, and beans). Only one item was more in abundance (milk, up 80 per cent); and the main item of production was rationed (sugar, since 1969). Caloric consumption was down about the same amount, 23 per cent. "It must be concluded that underconsumption still exists in Cuba, despite the betterment of some rural areas. Also a dangerous trend has developed since 1961 in which Cubans are eating less as the years pass by."²¹⁹

Cuban and Peruvian creation of state farms and collective agricultural units is intended to combine change in the system of land tenure with shift to large-scale agriculture, thus short-circuiting problems of land redistribution as generally developed in twentieth-century Latin America. Such programs may resolve for Cuba and Peru some of the long-range needs for large landholdings, but given periodic drives to reconstitute private landholdings,²²⁰ this solution may yield only cyclical results, unless educational programs to create the "new man" finally are successful. In any

case, as mechanization takes over lands that previously were worked by hand, and as urban migration continues, pressure to give every peasant a share of land may decrease. Moreover, we can be sure that an analysis of data for Cuban and Peruvian land programs would lead to a series of dilemmas that are of the same magnitude, if different specifically, as those developed here for Bolivia and Venezuela. In my view, if we have learned anything here, it is that no single answer—such as shifting from individual to collective production—will resolve complex problems.

Because no country with similar Latin American problems seems to offer a way out of its own agrarian problems, and because of recently granted individual land rights, perhaps it is clear that both Bolivia and Venezuela must live within the land tenure systems born during their own revolutions, with adjustments limited to tinkering with administrative aspects of land reform instead of making sweeping legislative changes. Even in Bolivia, the reform of the land reform law was termed "complementary legislation" in order not to alienate the peasantry.

Does this analysis leave Bolivian and Venezuelan land reform in a hopeless limbo? Or can we be more optimistic? The answer may be in the affirmative to the latter question only if the entire educational process about land reform and the possibilities of government action is revamped. First, while it is true that peasants need education, perhaps they need a different or more sophisticated kind than is generally planned for them. And not only peasants but also the entire populace need to become aware of the fact that there are no single answers or simple solutions to alternative realities in the land reform process. Second, those who develop land reform need to become involved in the learning process even more than peasants. Politicians need to understand how they can become locked into programs that no longer may correspond to changing needs; and *técnicos* in the land reform agency need to spend as much time thinking about problems and discontinuities in the administration of reform as they do in administering it. (All too often presidents believe that by bringing the heads of agencies together problems in coordination can be resolved, but if the head of an agency such as the land reform institute does not himself understand clearly what his agency is doing, not only is interagency coordination impossible but also is intra-agency planning confused.) Lest it sound like there is no dilemma

²¹⁷See Richard E. Fineberg, *The Triumph of Allende: Chile's Legal Revolution* (New York: Mentor, 1972), pp. 180–184; and Solomon Barraclough, "Agrarian Reform in Chile," in Dale L. Johnson (ed.), *The Chilean Road to Socialism* (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1973), Chapter 26.

²¹⁸*Latin America* (London), April 27, 1973.

²¹⁹Ricardo Leyva, "Health and Revolution in Cuba," in Roland E. Bonachea and Nelson P. Valdés (eds.), *Cuba in Revolution* (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1972), pp. 462–464. Cf. *Latin America*, May 19, 1972, which notes that butter and rum were again available in Cuba; and that, for the first time in four years, fish, fruit, and vegetables were easily obtainable.

²²⁰For a general discussion of ownership rights, see Warriner, *Land Reform in Principle and Practice*, pp. 59–73; and Elias H. Tuma, *Twenty-Six Centuries of Agrarian Reform: A Comparative Approach* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965).

in this “educational solution” take note that voters would have to be much more tolerant than they are of the land reform agency’s self-criticism. And this itself would require a lengthy educational process that would test voter patience. In the meantime let us hope that,

through the analysis of data, voters, politicians, and land reform *técnicos* can begin to understand the complexity of problems that face them. The first lesson to be learned is that complex problems cannot be resolved with simple solutions.

5: CONCLUSION

Applied historical statistics offer a useful method of analysis to test policy as well as to test data generated by policy. Development of time-series data is not aimed at reducing problems to so-called "manageable proportions," but at showing in a systematic way the wealth of detail that helps us to see alternative realities in complex situations, alternatives that must be understood if experience is to be of use in resolving dilemmas inherent in all policy. This is not to say that applied historical statistics offer a "solution" for analysts inside (or outside) governments. Rather, applied historical statistics are important for defining patterns and dimensions in problems: Problems cannot be resolved (whether by reform or by revolution) without first being recognized and defined.

Given the dilemmas and political problems analyzed in the present case study, we may tentatively set forth the following generalized scenario of land reform in Bolivia and Venezuela. This scenario involves ten hypotheses:

1. Because of the complexity of the land reform process, land reform agencies may not know what they are actually accomplishing.
2. Governments that espouse land reform may inflate land reform figures (willfully or by accident) in order to justify expenditure on the rural sector.
3. In the competition for scarce national financial resources, governments find it difficult to invest the necessary funds in education, agricultural credit, and rural technology that would make land reform effective.
4. Even if adequate funds for hypothesis 3 were available, government hopes that land reform will stem the tide of rural to urban migration may be unrealistic, mainly because the quality of rural life is relatively poor in that it lacks opportunities for pluralistic self-development through work, education, health services, and entertainment.
5. If a modernizing society demands high-level manpower employment in the industrial, commercial, and service sectors (wherein lie the opportunities for self-advancement of the citizenry), on-the-job education not only becomes a key alternative to formal education for the masses, but effective state planning is dependent upon ability of *técnicos* to learn the extent and role of their ongoing policies as they affect rural and urban development.
6. One tool for examining the ability of the bureaucracy to meet the conceptual stress placed upon it by land reform involves analyzing data on distribution of land to determine if the agency's stated principles are in accord with practices.
7. Politicians who advocate land reform may need decades to build the electoral and/or societal consensus that will enable them to gain power to effectively carry out their promises; however, by the time they gain power, times may have changed so that they find themselves locked into an outdated program in relation to the needs of modernization of the economy.
8. The vicious circle suggested in hypothesis 7 may be closed as the "revolutionariness" of politicians (measured often by urban intellectuals who have a faith that life for the common man must be better in the countryside than in urban slums) forces governmental policy into the encouragement of subsistence agriculture, thus hampering commercial farming which meets the needs of internal consumption as well as eliminates the need for imports of foodstuffs.
9. In the above problems, the land reform agency is so caught up in the day-to-day operation of land title distribution that it may find it inconvenient to be aware that it is being used as a political tool, especially as the growth of bureaucracy comes to be an end in itself. In this sense, the less the agency knows about its programs the better. Instead of blaming problems on the failure of the bureaucracy to understand conceptually what it is doing, *técnicos* often claim that all would have worked well if the bureaucracy were larger; thus, administrative errors are compounded by an even larger unthinking bureaucracy.
10. In spite of the above problems, land reform may be a relatively inexpensive way (compensation for expropriated lands being irrelevant) to buy off the restless rural sector until, with passing time, rural-to-urban migration leaves the rural sector so depopulated that by the year 2000 we may look back on the era of the 1950s and 1960s as decades of anachronistic policy. With most of the population living in cities and with the need to feed a vastly expanded population pool, land reform agencies will not only have "discovered" that small-scale agriculture is not feasible, but that land reform will have to enter into a new phase as it attempts to bring into usage lands that have been distributed and then abandoned.

Periodic Bolivian and Venezuelan pronouncements that land reform is "about to be completed" ostensibly demonstrate a political capitulation to the increasingly important urban sector where scarce funds are desperately needed. Nevertheless, land reform agencies may actually believe those naïve statements because of conceptual failures to understand the complexities of their programs.

Although the Bolivian and Venezuelan governments feel land redistribution to be desirable, a comparative investigation of programs in the two countries shows very different results than have been planned. Not only has Bolivia accomplished more reform with much less money than has Venezuela (where the land reform agency operates with affluence—relative to Bolivia—that is almost beyond belief), but the Bolivians have gathered data on the type of land distributed, a notable shortcoming in the Venezuelan land reform program.

If in the statistics of both countries the amount of land distributed appears to be relatively accurate, the number of beneficiaries has been inflated. The latter problem may have been unintentional in Bolivia owing to (a) counting activity by the Mobile Brigades as well as by (b) counting amplification or adjustment of original titling actions as a separate action instead of as part of the same action. In one evaluation, Bolivian beneficiaries by 1967 were about 82 per cent of the official figures. In Venezuela, the inflation appears to be politically motivated and the total of actual beneficiaries by 1967 was only 66 per cent of the official figures.

Whereas Bolivia began to improve its reporting in the mid-1960s, not until 1969 under the Caldera government did Venezuela attempt to take a more realistic view in its publications; and a census of beneficiaries in 1969 attempted to test the AD propaganda figures. Although Bolivia has attempted to computerize its statistics, political instability and a shortage of funds has hampered the government's attempt to reorganize its data. Furthermore, since Bolivia has not taken either a population or an agricultural census since 1950, Venezuelan data in these areas are much more advanced, with data for 1961 soon to be complemented by figures to be published for 1971.

With regard to political mobilization for support, Betancourt's programs in Venezuela date from the 1930s, which accounts for much of AD's political problems by the end of the 1960s as the balance of population had shifted from one of rural to urban nature. In Bolivia, although Paz Estenssoro spoke of land reform before the Bolivian Revolution of 1952, which was accompanied by de facto land reform, his first concern was with the mining problem and it was not until eight years later that Paz sought to speed up legal distribution of title, especially as a political

counterpoise to the army and militant miners who threatened his authority.

Because of land reform agency problems in self-understanding or of self-defining of role in both countries—and because each agency did not take time to conceptualize what it would measure—the problems of state planning have been compounded tremendously. By comparing data on what governments thought was happening with what actually happened, my independent investigation here of the many realities of land reform confirm the view that what politicians think is happening is as important as what is actually happening.²²¹ By comparing original and revised figures, we may suggest how planning failed. It is important to note that because many sincere land reform *técnicos* did not know how their agency was inflating figures on the number of beneficiaries, let alone that such inflation was taking place, an analysis of the original data is important to understand the information with which policy decisions necessarily have been made.

In suggesting that there is a good deal of truth in all of the above ten hypotheses, two ironies bear examination. First, the inflation of the number of beneficiaries has been counterproductive politically in several ways. Not only may those who have not received land feel left out of an "inflated" land reform process, but, by breaking down the amount of agricultural credit available per beneficiary of land reform, governments gain a negative political image because less funds appear to be available per beneficiary than has really been the case when we take into account the revised number of land recipients. Data per beneficiary on agricultural production and on size of holdings also may be understated by an inflated number of land reform recipients. Second, the population that appears to be most in need of education would appear to be not only the peasant (as writers would have us believe) but also the administrators of land reform programs and politicians who by their lack of sophistication make state planning all but impossible for the rural sector.

Whereas peasants may have been content with owning subsistence-level plots until past mid-twentieth-century, growing communication systems and resultant internal migration mean that the land reform issue will take on new tones during the next three decades. By the year 2000 (if not before) peasants may not be permitted to own their own small holdings. In the future, then, Bolivian and Venezuelan land reforms may well be in tune with Mexico's land reform of the Díaz regime (1876–1910) in which "constructive rural changes" were seen to be based upon large-scale landholdings. Thus, we may say that land reform will never be finished because policy tends (like a pendulum) to swing between the extremes: large holdings, to small holdings, to large land holdings.

²²¹See also, James W. Wilkie, *Elitelore* (Los Angeles: Latin American Center, University of California, 1973).

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

YEARLY ORIGINAL BOLIVIAN LAND REFORM DATA, 1955-1969

Part I

Year	Number of Cases	Titles			Heads of Family	Hectares Affected		
		Total	Individual	Collective		Total	Reversion to State	^a Distributed
1955	32	3 400	2 715	685	2 809	51 811	#	51 811
1956	75	4 463	3 431	1 032	3 863	47 184	580	46 604
1957	281	11 400	7 048	4 352	8 028	276 396	103	276 293
1958	216	9 193	4 874	4 319	5 709	201 998	367	201 631
1959	313	18 380	11 125	7 255	12 097	320 502	4 040	316 462
1960	904	38 897	20 400	18 497	22 410	852 771	26 899	825 872
1961	1 186	45 511	23 191	22 320	28 210	1 167 821	38 379	1 129 441
1962	1 880	50 227	24 412	25 815	28 843	1 280 742	24 950	1 255 791
1963	1 185	47 461	23 951	23 510	40 641	1 363 591	91 905	1 271 686
1964	626	18 317	9 678	8 639	11 295	565 443	33 497	531 946
1965	202	15 600	8 279	7 321	9 652	388 283	23 241	365 042
1966	800	16 892	9 623	7 269	10 498	928 757	31 806	896 951
1967	835	16 497	8 911	7 586	10 028	639 285	32 726	606 559
1968	554	8 933	4 981	3 952	5 477	1 029 627	16 036	1 013 590
^b 1969	777	12 616	8 220	4 396	8 621	992 322	41 320	951 002

^aBreakdown is given in part II of this Appendix.

^bNine months.

Methods and sources: See notes and source for Table 8. Excludes data in Appendix U. Data here may differ from figures in Table 8 which are not presented on a calendar year basis; for accumulated totals on heads of family, see Table 40.

(APPENDIX A CONTINUED)

Part II
^aHectares Distributed

Year	Individual Culti- vable	Collective			Schools	Sports	Coopera- tives	Coloni- zation	Urban Zones
		Culti- vable	Pasture	Unculti- vable					
1955	15 701	23 883	12 227	#	#	#	#	#	
1956	28 980	2 125	14 925	556	17	2	#	#	
1957	151 447	22 358	100 832	1 433	30	2	158	#	
1958	97 596	42 072	60 572	1 213	22	#	145	#	
1959	127 552	112 387	67 613	6 806	199	7	1 526	#	
1960	347 348	186 910	261 173	23 582	911	49	4 328	#	
1961	507 109	173 879	339 836	76 132	1 184	99	27 746	2 841	
1962	527 764	194 285	370 558	138 107	1 235	93	9 142	13 131	
1963	369 100	213 202	480 661	201 733	1 046	71	4 574	581	
1964	294 749	93 889	90 337	38 489	430	15	950	11 921	
1965	122 614	28 126	158 672	50 311	329	53	3 541	#	
1966	157 742	55 880	655 442	26 037	545	58	705	67	
1967	97 801	11 107	448 950	46 191	275	57	1 311	589	
1968	83 738	10 905	881 012	35 541	235	28	1 332	#	
^b 1969	110 670	9 338	776 307	53 087	264	78	324	#	

^aTotal is given in Part I of this Appendix.

^bNine months.

Methods and sources: See notes and source for Table 8.

APPENDIX B

CUMULATIVE BOLIVIAN LAND REFORM DATA: DEPARTMENT OF BENI

Original Data	1956	1960	1964	1966	1969
Titles (total)	1	180	631	723	1 170
Individual	1	99	491	583	923
Collective	#	81	140	140	247
Heads of Family	1	100	531	623	1 061
Hectares Affected (total)	3	64 629	542 266	699 151	1 687 916
Reversion to State (subtotal)	#	#	2 049	2 049	3 240
Distributed (subtotal)	3	64 629	540 217	697 102	1 684 675
Individual					
Cultivable	3	64 629	535 408	538 205	575 167
Collective					
Cultivable	#	#	1 181	1 181	6 755
Pasture	#	#	763	154 850	1 098 106
Uncultivable	#	#	75	75	1 857
Schools	#	#	19	19	19
Sports	#	#	#	#	#
Cooperatives	#	#	#	#	#
Colonization	#	#	2 769	2 769	2 769
Urban Zones	#	#	2	2	2

Methods and sources: See notes and source for Table 8.

APPENDIX C

CUMULATIVE BOLIVIAN LAND REFORM DATA: DEPARTMENT OF CHUQUISACA

Original Data	1956	1960	1964	1966	1969
Titles (total)	954	8 990	30 419	34 684	44 388
Individual	843	6 324	19 413	21 992	28 177
Collective	111	2 666	11 006	12 692	16 211
Heads of Family	851	6 288	22 635	25 230	31 455
Hectares Affected (total)	7 053	132 841	800 769	928 841	1 277 569
Reversion to State (subtotal)	#	#	3 637	9 124	56 127
Distributed (subtotal)	7 053	132 841	797 132	919 717	1 221 442
Individual Cultivable	5 584	75 670	355 918	384 734	454 366
Collective Cultivable	1 469	15 678	68 325	68 899	72 941
Pasture	#	38 073	315 391	403 569	579 906
Uncultivable	#	3 268	54 541	59 504	110 114
Schools	#	28	480	504	607
Sports	#	3	18	18	61
Cooperatives	#	79	2 290	2 313	3 067
Colonization	#	#	#	#	#
Urban Zones	#	42	169	178	380

Methods and Sources: See notes and source for Table 8.

APPENDIX D

CUMULATIVE BOLIVIAN LAND REFORM DATA: DEPARTMENT OF COCHABAMBA

Original Data	1956	1960	1964	1966	1969
Titles (total)	1 494	13 359	54 854	65 246	75 560
Individual	1 276	7 865	28 670	34 123	39 929
Collective	218	5 494	26 184	31 123	35 631
Heads of Family	1 368	8 868	41 294	46 885	52 962
Hectares Affected (total)	13 294	152 540	964 908	1 120 027	1 300 780
Reversion to State (subtotal)	#	#	43 070	55 120	73 881
Distributed (subtotal)	13 294	152 540	921 838	1 064 907	1 226 899
Individual Cultivable	3 946	45 515	303 286	338 462	383 353
Collective Cultivable	9 312	61 388	181 636	191 233	200 561
Pasture	36	42 737	309 101	375 350	445 094
Uncultivable	#	2 463	119 061	148 765	186 289
Schools	#	86	996	1 282	1 506
Sports	#	15	74	97	121
Cooperatives	#	135	7 199	9 157	9 362
Colonization	#	#	#	#	#
Urban Zones	#	201	484	561	611

Methods and Sources: See notes and source for Table 8.

APPENDIX E

CUMULATIVE BOLIVIAN LAND REFORM DATA: DEPARTMENT OF LA PAZ

Original Data	1956	1960	1964	1966	1969
Titles (total)	3 313	29 961	91 658	101 042	117 488
Individual	2 331	16 859	46 835	51 757	60 549
Collective	982	13 102	44 823	49 285	56 939
Heads of Family	2 558	18 455	54 409	60 584	70 652
Hectares Affected (total)	54 013	346 434	1 301 308	1 473 533	1 765 229
Reversion to State (subtotal)	#	3 722	74 572	83 995	101 382
Distributed (subtotal)	54 013	342 712	1 226 736	1 389 538	1 663 848
Individual Cultivable	18 229	138 898	347 679	389 347	461 606
Collective Cultivable	14 954	99 508	299 035	329 190	352 595
Pasture	20 785	88 554	343 282	411 230	549 786
Uncultivable	32	12 266	209 528	231 032	268 101
Schools	13	585	2 272	2 528	2 981
Sports	#	24	146	186	241
Cooperatives	#	2 278	10 056	10 924	12 259
Colonization	#	#	12 772	12 839	13 428
Urban Zones	#	599	1 965	2 262	2 851

Methods and Sources: See notes and source for Table 8.

APPENDIX F

CUMULATIVE BOLIVIAN LAND REFORM DATA: DEPARTMENT OF ORURO

Original Data	1956	1960	1964	1966	1969
Titles (total)	182	2 597	6 421	6 606	7 057
Individual	91	579	1 720	1 740	1 785
Collective	91	2 018	4 701	4 866	5 272
Heads of Family	92	1 980	6 073	6 250	6 685
Hectares Affected (total)	5 910	204 395	442 057	452 970	477 338
Reversion to State (subtotal)	#	14 464	28 221	28 512	38 491
Distributed (subtotal)	5 910	189 931	413 837	424 457	438 848
Individual Cultivable	1 495	53 226	89 106	90 136	95 421
Collective Cultivable	#	62 272	168 602	169 739	170 811
Pasture	4 415	70 517	100 678	102 619	110 237
Uncultivable	#	3 354	51 313	57 801	58 009
Schools	#	84	456	468	503
Sports	#	#	16	16	16
Cooperatives	#	384	2 993	2 993	3 048
Colonization	#	#	#	#	#
Urban Zones	#	94	673	685	802

Methods and Sources: See notes and source for Table 8.

APPENDIX G

CUMULATIVE BOLIVIAN LAND REFORM DATA: DEPARTMENT OF PANDO

Original Data	1956	1960	1964	1966	1969
Titles (total)	#	29	55	55	78
Individual	#	29	55	55	78
Collective	#	#	#	#	#
Heads of Family	#	29	55	55	78
Hectares Affected (total)	#	2 391	3 565	3 565	8 759
Reversion to State (subtotal)	#	#	#	#	#
Distributed (subtotal)	#	2 391	3 565	3 565	8 759
Individual Cultivable	#	2 391	3 565	3 565	4 630
Collective Cultivable	#	#	#	#	#
Pasture	#	#	#	#	4 129
Uncultivable	#	#	#	#	#
Schools	#	#	#	#	#
Sports	#	#	#	#	#
Cooperatives	#	#	#	#	#
Colonization	#	#	#	#	#
Urban Zones	#	#	#	#	#

Methods and Sources: See notes and source for Table 8.

APPENDIX H
CUMULATIVE BOLIVIAN LAND REFORM DATA: DEPARTMENT OF POTOSI

Original Data	1956	1960	1964	1966	1969
Titles (total)	53	7 934	38 270	38 583	42 994
Individual	53	3 318	18 719	18 914	21 278
Collective	#	4 616	19 551	19 669	21 716
Heads of Family	53	4 589	22 308	22 503	25 050
Hectares Affected (total)	474	298 824	1 098 057	1 109 029	1 186 069
Reversion to State (subtotal)	#	1 580	46 770	48 770	55 706
Distributed (subtotal)	474	297 244	1 051 287	1 060 259	1 130 363
Individual Cultivable	474	70 492	182 557	185 556	200 203
Collective Cultivable	#	93 112	250 559	250 672	252 405
Pasture	#	123 674	571 734	576 384	622 240
Uncultivable	#	9 361	38 869	40 058	47 810
Schools	#	124	437	448	482
Sports	#	4	48	49	53
Cooperatives	#	477	7 055	7 068	7 104
Colonization	#	#	#	#	#
Urban Zones	#	#	28	28	65

Methods and Sources: See notes and source for Table 8.

APPENDIX I
CUMULATIVE BOLIVIAN LAND REFORM DATA: DEPARTMENT OF SANTA CRUZ

Original Data	1956	1960	1964	1966	1969
Titles (total)	17	2 611	14 957	15 799	18 900
Individual	17	2 395	9 106	9 720	12 122
Collective	#	216	5 851	6 079	6 778
Heads of Family	17	2 574	10 530	11 234	13 955
Hectares Affected (total)	1 015	135 675	639 480	986 070	2 025 218
Reversion to State (subtotal)	#	1 103	12 093	13 092	24 113
Distributed (subtotal)	1 015	134 572	627 386	972 978	2 001 105
Individual Cultivable	1 015	130 724	522 470	609 742	733 708
Collective Cultivable	#	3 344	46 503	59 076	75 761
Pasture	#	128	12 878	254 023	1 129 523
Uncultivable	#	#	11 335	13 449	23 075
Schools	#	18	296	314	515
Sports	#	#	20	20	104
Cooperatives	#	#	18 484	19 726	20 522
Colonization	#	#	12 933	12 933	12 933
Urban Zones	#	358	2 468	3 696	4 965

Methods and Sources: See notes and source for Table 8.

APPENDIX J

CUMULATIVE BOLIVIAN LAND REFORM DATA: DEPARTMENT OF TARIJA

Original Data	1956	1960	1964	1966	1969
Titles (total)	659	3 565	9 426	9 487	10 152
Individual	659	2 724	5 489	5 525	5 998
Collective	#	841	3 937	3 962	4 154
Heads of Family	660	2 772	5 743	5 794	6 283
Hectares Affected (total)	3 780	109 056	329 305	330 622	377 650
Reversion to State (subtotal)	#	#	9 408	9 408	12 908
Distributed (subtotal)	3 780	109 056	319 897	321 214	364 742
Individual Cultivable	3 780	56 149	125 819	126 201	131 456
Collective Cultivable	#	11 761	48 336	48 370	48 516
Pasture	#	41 132	143 481	144 353	180 093
Uncultivable	#	#	1 553	1 582	3 961
Schools	#	13	100	101	107
Sports	#	1	16	16	16
Cooperatives	#	#	420	420	420
Colonization	#	#	#	#	#
Urban Zones	#	#	173	173	173

Methods and Sources: See notes and source for Table 8.

APPENDIX K
POPULATION OF BOLIVIA IN SELECTED YEARS

Year	Part I	Part II		
	^a Estimates	Thousands	Category	Census Data
			1950	1963
1952		3 104	Total	^a 2 704 165 3 088 000
1956		3 279	Rural	1 757 509 2 402 500
1960		3 462	Urban	^b 946 656 ^c 686 100
1964		3 653	Economically	
1966		3 751	Active	1 350 782 1 296 500
1969		3 903	Employed in	
			Agriculture	973 959 896 350
			Males Employed	
			in Agriculture	533 593 585 150

^aExcludes 314 866 calculation for omissions and estimate of jungle population. Cf Appendix S.

^bDepartmental capitals.

^cCenters with 2 000 or more persons; Cf Table 15 in the Afterword.

^aBased upon census of 1950, including estimated jungle population and omissions of 314 866.

Source: Bolivia, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos, *Proyección de la Población, 1950-1962 [Hasta 1980]* (La Paz, 1962), p. 8. See Appendix S below.

Sources: Bolivia, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos, *Censo Demográfico, 1950*, pp. 11, 124, 158-172; and *idem* "Sample Population Census of Bolivia, 1963," unpublished. See also Table 44.

APPENDIX L
LAND USE IN BOLIVIA ACCORDING TO AGRICULTURAL AND RANCHING CENSUS OF 1950

Department	Informants	^a Hectares					
		Area Censused	Cultivable	Pasture and Meadow	Forest	^b Fallow	Other
Total	86 377	32 749 850	654 258	11 322 525	10 972 647	2 437 166	7 363 254
Beni	2 686	4 112 747	10 559	2 722 187	1 206 213	52 594	121 195
Chuquisaca	7 634	5 292 748	82 439	2 383 210	1 924 503	185 618	716 979
Cochabamba	31 996	3 590 370	125 703	776 011	1 478 507	167 424	1 042 725
La Paz	7 352	7 421 329	188 127	1 790 996	1 374 563	1 301 731	2 765 908
Oruro	1 239	3 250 217	22 826	1 512 498	102 444	379 812	1 232 638
Pando	438	1 317 112	2 812	30 039	1 223 034	17 783	43 444
Potosí	5 683	2 223 403	137 683	681 859	37 593	207 309	1 158 959
Santa Cruz	9 485	3 778 053	58 242	976 348	2 507 550	108 057	127 856
Tarija	9 864	1 763 871	25 867	449 376	1 118 238	16 839	153 551

^aDetail may not add to total due to rounding.

^bIncludes productive but unused lands.

Source: Bolivia, Dirección Nacional de Estadística y Censos, *Censo Agropecuario, 1950* (La Paz: Ministerio de Hacienda, 1956), p. 68.

APPENDIX M
MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM EXTENSIONS OF AGRARIAN
PROPERTIES ALLOWABLE UNDER BOLIVIAN LAND REFORM

Zone	Hectares			
	Small Property	Medium Property	Agricultural Enterprise	Ranching Enterprise
Altiplano y Puna	10-35	80-350	400-800	^a up to 1 050
Valley	3-20	24-200	230-500	^a up to 600
Subtropical	10-80	150-600	up to 2 000	^b up to 50 000
Tropical	**	up to 500	up to 2 000	^b up to 50 000

^aExtension based upon necessary pasture for livestock involved.

^bMaximum extension requires 10 000 head of large livestock.

Source: Land Reform Law Articles 15, 16, 17, 21, and 26 given in Buenaventura Villarroel and Guillermo Barrios Avila, *Legislación Agraria y Jurisprudencia* (La Paz: n.p., 1969), pp. 13-16.

APPENDIX N
CUMULATIVE HEADS OF FAMILY BENEFITTED BY BOLIVIAN LAND REFORM
AS A PERCENTAGE OF AGRICULTURALLY EMPLOYED POPULATION IN 1950

Department	Population Employed in ^a Agriculture in 1950	^b Cumulative Percentage Benefitted				
		1956	1960	1964	1966	1969
Total	973 959	.6	4.8	16.8	18.4	21.4
Beni	16 994	#	.6	3.1	3.7	6.3
Chuquisaca	114 417	.7	5.5	19.8	22.1	27.5
Cochabamba	170 780	.8	5.2	24.2	27.5	31.0
La Paz	291 874	.9	6.3	18.6	20.8	24.2
Oruro	55 747	.2	3.6	10.9	11.2	12.0
Pando	6 787	#	.4	.8	.8	1.1
Potosí	221 647	#	2.1	10.1	10.2	11.3
Santa Cruz	62 845	#	4.1	16.8	17.9	22.2
Tarija	32 865	2.0	8.4	17.5	17.6	19.1

^aIncludes ranching, silviculture, hunting, and fishing.

^bOriginal data.

Source: See Table 16.

APPENDIX O
 PERCENTAGE SHARES BY DEPARTMENT OF
 BOLIVIA'S CUMULATIVE LAND SURFACE
 DISTRIBUTED IN LAND REFORM

Department	Per Cent of Land Distributed				
	1956	1960	1964	1966	1969
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Beni	#	4.5	9.2	10.2	17.3
Chuquisaca	8.3	9.3	13.5	13.4	12.5
Cochabamba	15.5	10.7	15.6	15.5	12.6
La Paz	63.1	24.0	20.8	20.3	17.1
Oruro	6.9	13.3	7.0	6.2	4.5
Pando	#	.2	.1	#	.1
Potosí	.6	20.9	17.8	15.5	11.6
Santa Cruz	1.2	9.4	10.6	14.2	20.6
Tarija	4.4	7.7	5.4	4.7	3.7

Source: Calculated from Table 8 and Appendices B—J. Original data.

APPENDIX P
 RATIO BY DEPARTMENT OF (A) PER CENT OF BOLIVIAN CUMULATIVE
 HECTARES DISTRIBUTED TO (B) PER CENT OF MALES
 EMPLOYED IN AGRICULTURE IN 1950

(Hectares as a rounded percentage of males agriculturally employed)

Department	1956			1960			1964			1966			1969		
	Hec- tares	Males	Ratio	Hec- tares	Males	Ratio	Hec- tares	Males	Ratio	Hec- tares	Males	Ratio	Hec- tares	Males	Ratio
Total	100.0	100.0	**	100.0	100.0	**	100.0	100.0	**	100.0	100.0	**	100.0	100.0	**
Beni	#	2.4	**	4.5	2.4	1.9	9.2	2.4	3.8	10.2	2.4	4.3	17.3	2.4	7.2
Chuquisaca	8.3	12.0	.7	9.3	12.0	.8	13.5	12.0	1.1	13.4	12.0	1.1	12.5	12.0	1.0
Cochabamba	15.5	17.7	.9	10.7	17.7	.6	15.6	17.7	.9	15.5	17.7	.9	12.6	17.7	.7
La Paz	63.1	28.2	2.2	24.0	28.2	.9	20.8	28.2	.7	20.3	28.2	.7	17.1	28.2	.6
Oruro	6.9	5.4	1.3	13.3	5.4	2.5	7.0	5.4	1.3	6.2	5.4	1.1	4.5	5.4	1.0
Pando	#	.8	**	.2	.8	.3	.1	.8	.1	#	.8	**	.1	.8	.1
Potosí	.6	21.6	#	20.9	21.6	1.0	17.8	21.6	.8	15.5	21.6	.7	11.6	21.6	.5
Santa Cruz	1.2	8.3	.1	9.4	8.3	1.1	10.6	8.3	1.3	14.2	8.3	1.7	20.6	8.3	2.5
Tarija	4.4	3.6	1.2	7.7	3.6	2.1	5.4	3.6	1.5	4.7	3.6	1.3	3.7	3.6	1.0

Sources: See Table 16. For explanation of ratios, see Table 14. Hectares are original data.

APPENDIX Q
ESTIMATED HEAD OF LIVESTOCK EXISTING
IN BOLIVIA
SELECTED YEARS, 1950-1963

(In Thousands)

Type	1950	1958	1963
Cattle	2 227	2 455	2 662
Sheep	7 224	5 549	6 097
Pigs	509	596	654
Goats	1 229	1 528	1 250
Llama/Alpaca	1 179	1 033	1 082

Sources: Data for 1950 are from Bolivia, Dirección Nacional de Estadística y Censos, *Censo Agropecuario, 1950* (La Paz: Ministerio de Hacienda, 1956), pp. 93-97; data for 1958 and 1963 are estimated by Bolivia, Ministerio de Agricultura, División de Estudios Económicos y Estadística.

APPENDIX R
FURTHER ESTIMATES OF SELECTED BOLIVIAN
CROP PRODUCTION
(In Thousands of Metric Tons)

Part I: 1957-1965

Year	Wheat	Potatoes	Rice
1957	45.0	450.0	19.3
1958	62.3	562.0	23.0
1959	62.3	600.0	23.0
1960	40.0	500.0	23.3
1961	40.0	620.0	24.0
1962	50.0	620.0	24.0
1963	55.0	630.0	34.0
1964	58.0	621.5	27.1
1965	58.0	630.0	28.1

Part II: 1962-1968

Year	Wheat	Potatoes	Rice	Corn	Barley	Sugar Cane
1962	61	616	41	234	60	525
1963	55	622	25	260	62	815
1964	58	622	31	261	62	1 085
1965	42	650	33	239	65	889
1966	41	670	34	249	62	845
1967	27	635	34	224	56	993
^a 1968	45	^b 610	45	218	58	—

^aPreliminary.

^bPotato census.

Source: Wade G. Dewey, Devere R. McAllister, and B. Delworth Gardner, *Análisis del Problema del Trigo y Harina en Bolivia* (La Paz: Utah State University and USAID/Bolivia, 1966), Appendix 1.

Source: Alliance for Progress, Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress (CIAP), *Domestic Efforts and the Needs for External Financing for the Development of Bolivia* (Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union, 1970), p. 25.

APPENDIX S

POPULATION OF BOLIVIA BY DEPARTMENT, 1950

Department	Census	†Estimate
Total	2 704 165	3 019 031
Beni	71 636	119 770
Chuquisaca	260 479	282 980
Cochabamba	452 145	490 475
La Paz	854 079	948 446
Oruro	192 356	210 260
Pando	16 284	19 804
Potosí	509 087	534 399
Santa Cruz	244 658	286 145
Tarija	103 441	126 752

†Includes estimated jungle population and omissions.

Source: Bolivia, Dirección Nacional de Estadística y Censos, *Censo Demográfico, 1950* pp. 3-6. See Appendix K above.

APPENDIX T

PERCENTAGE SHARES BY DEPARTMENT OF CUMULATIVE HEADS OF FAMILY BENEFITTED BY LAND REFORM IN BOLIVIA

Department	Per Cent of Families Benefitted				
	1956	1960	1964	1966	1969
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Beni	#	.2	.3	.3	.5
Chuquisaca	15.2	13.8	13.9	14.1	15.1
Cochabamba	24.4	19.4	25.3	26.2	25.5
La Paz	45.7	40.4	33.3	33.8	34.0
Oruro	1.6	4.3	3.7	3.5	3.2
Pando	#	.1	#	#	#
Potosí	1.0	10.1	13.6	12.6	12.0
Santa Cruz	.3	5.6	6.4	6.3	6.7
Tarija	11.8	6.1	3.5	3.2	3.0

Source: Calculated from Table 8 and Appendices B–J. Original data.

APPENDIX U

ACTIVITY OF BOLIVIA'S MOBILE LAND DISTRIBUTION BRIGADES, 1968-1970

^a(Data Generated by the Special Titling Procedure as Differentiated from the Original Titling Method)

Category	1968	1969	^b 1970
Number of Cases	332	1 773	574
^c Total Titles	60 727	56 379	24 810
Heads of Family Benefitted	30 750	27 135	11 657
^d Hectares Affected	326 540	1 604 653	716 584

^aExclusive from original data given in Tables 1, 8 and Appendix A.

^bPreliminary data through September 30, 1970.

^cIncludes individual and collective titles.

^dIncludes hectares reverting to the government.

Source: "El Avance de la Reforma Agraria de Mayo de 1955 al 30 de Septiembre de 1970," typescript prepared by the SNRA's Mobile Brigade Advisory Office; and interview with Guillermo Barrios Avila, La Paz, Bolivia, October 26, 1970. For the 1966 Ministerial Resolution establishing the Mobile Brigades, see Buenaventura Villarroel and Guillermo Barrios Avila, *Legislación Agraria y Jurisprudencia* (La Paz: n.p., 1969), pp. 128-148.

APPENDIX V

CLASSIFICATION OF BOLIVIAN CUMULATIVE ORIGINAL AND SNRA
REVISED DATA ON LAND DISTRIBUTION BY 1967

Department	^a Total Hectares		Percent							
	Original	Revised	Cultivable		Pasture		Uncultivable		Other	
			Original	Revised	Original	Revised	Original	Revised	Original	Revised
Total	^b 7 617	^c 7 242	^b 52.3	^c 25.0	^b 38.5	^c 56.4	^b 7.9	^c 16.7	^b 1.3	^c 1.9
Beni	907	949	60.2	10.4	39.5	89.0	#	.1	.3	.5
Chuquisaca	1 048	984	48.0	17.7	44.5	53.2	7.1	28.7	.4	.4
Cochabamba	1 144	1 109	49.3	23.9	35.5	36.4	14.2	38.0	1.0	1.7
La Paz	1 476	1 205	50.9	41.0	30.4	32.5	16.6	21.4	2.1	5.1
Oruro	426	476	61.3	32.1	24.2	46.3	13.6	21.4	.9	.2
Pando	5	5	100.0	89.0	#	6.5	#	4.5	#	#
Potosí	1 098	1 126	40.6	17.4	54.8	70.9	4.0	10.3	.6	1.4
Santa Cruz	1 172	1 030	62.4	35.0	33.2	61.0	1.3	1.5	3.1	2.5
Tarija	341	358	52.2	19.3	47.2	75.7	.6	3.7	#	1.3

^a Excludes land reverting to government.

^b Original hectares in thousands = 100 per cent.

^c Revised hectares in thousands = 100.0 per cent.

Source: See Appendix W, except SNRA data is from Anexos IV-5 and IV-8 in the Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria source.

APPENDIX W
COMPARISON OF ORIGINAL AND SNRA-REVISED CUMULATIVE
BOLIVIAN LAND REFORM DATA BY 1967

Department	Hectares (In Thousands)								
	Heads of Family Benefitted			Affected			Distributed		
	Original	^a Revised	^b Percent	Original	Revised	^b Percent	Original	Revised	^b Percent
Total	191 459	156 113	82	7 906	7 694	97	7 617	7 242	95
Beni	783	684	87	909	1 005	111	907	949	105
Chuquisaca	27 687	20 549	74	1 064	1 005	94	1 048	984	94
Cochabamba	50 032	39 347	79	1 209	1 181	98	1 144	1 109	97
La Paz	64 422	53 640	83	1 564	1 313	84	1 476	1 205	82
Oruro	6 314	5 340	85	455	508	112	426	475	112
Pando	74	78	105	5	6	120	5	5	100
Potosí	23 775	22 811	96	1 154	1 229	106	1 098	1 126	103
Santa Cruz	12 401	9 387	76	1 194	1 075	90	1 172	1 031	88
Tarija	5 971	4 267	71	352	372	106	341	358	105

^aThis revised data is not used by one of those who developed it; see Table 40.

^bRevised data as a percentage of original data. For detail of original data, see Appendix Z.

Source: Original data are from Bolivia, Consejo Nacional de Reforma Agraria, Departamento de Estadística, "Número de Títulos Ejecutoriales y Superficies Entregados a Partir de Mayo de 1955 al 31 de Agosto de 1967." Revised data are from Bolivia, Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria, *Reforma Agraria en Bolivia* (2 vols.; La Paz, 1970-), II, Anexos IV-2 and IV-7.

APPENDIX X

^aCUMULATIVE SNRA DATA ON HECTARES AFFECTED IN BOLIVIA
BY TYPE OF PROPERTY, 1967
(In Thousands)

Department	^b Type of Property				
	^c Small Properties	^d Medium Properties	^e Agricultural Enterprise	^f Latifundia	^g Other
Total	417	2 772	2 139	2 210	153
Beni	93	221	682	4	5
Chuquisaca	33	501	117	353	#
Cochabamba	10	399	212	528	32
La Paz	58	490	124	592	49
Oruro	3	146	147	166	47
Pando	1	1	#	4	#
Potosí	7	555	316	348	2
Santa Cruz	178	333	476	69	18
Tarija	34	127	65	146	#

^a For totals by department, see Appendix W; detail may not add to totals because of rounding.

^b Definitions which follow are from the Land Reform Law, Articles 7-12; see source for Appendix M.

^c Primarily worked by peasant and his family to satisfy their own needs.

^d Exploitation for market by salaried labor or technical and mechanical methods.

^e Characterized by investment of large-scale capital, salaried labor, and modern technological methods.

^f Large properties unexploited, inefficiently exploited by traditional methods, or exploited through concessions to peasants with surplus value recurring to the latifundist.

^g Including cooperatives.

Source: Bolivia, Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria, *Reforma Agraria en Bolivia*, II, Anexo IV-18.

APPENDIX Y
 CUMULATIVE SNRA DATA ON HECTARES DISTRIBUTED TO (A) TOTAL HEADS
 OF FAMILY (INCLUDING FORMER LANDOWNERS)
 AND (B) PEASANTS, 1967

(In Thousands)

Department	Cultivable Land			^a Pasture Land		
	^b Total	Peasants	^c Percent	^b Total	Peasants	^c Percent
Total	1 814	1 429	78.8	4 081	1 737	42.6
Beni	98	76	77.6	844	268	31.8
Chuquisaca	175	144	82.3	524	250	47.7
Cochabamba	265	227	85.7	404	118	29.2
La Paz	494	398	80.6	392	232	59.2
Oruro	152	131	86.2	217	168	77.4
Pando	5	4	80.0	#	#	#
Potosí	196	176	89.8	799	312	39.0
Santa Cruz	360	227	63.1	629	224	35.6
Tarija	69	56	81.2	272	165	60.7

^a Excludes collective pasture grants to peasants and former owners who jointly use the same lands.

^b Includes lands remaining in the hands of former landowners.

^c Land distributed to peasants as a percentage of total land distributed.

Source: Bolivia, Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria, *Reforma Agraria en Bolivia*, II, Anexos IV-15 and IV-16.

APPENDIX Z

^aORIGINAL CUMULATIVE LAND REFORM DATA BY DEPARTMENT, 1967

Category	Total	Beni	Chuqui- saca	Cocha- bamba	La Paz	Oruro	Pando	Potosí	Santa Cruz	Tarija
Titles										
Individual	155 638	676	24 452	37 038	55 273	1 751	74	20 010	10 678	5 686
Collective	136 185	216	14 352	33 524	51 977	4 919	#	20 738	6 454	4 005
^b Hectares (In Thousands)										
Reversion to State	289	2	16	65	88	29	#	56	22	11
Distributed										
Individual Cultivable	2 827	540	430	364	414	91	5	194	660	129
Collective Cultivable	1 157	6	73	200	337	170	#	252	71	49
Pasture	2 935	358	467	406	449	103	#	601	389	161
Uncultivable	601	#	74	163	245	58	#	44	15	2
Schools	6	#	1	1	3	#	#	#	#	#
Sports	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
Cooperatives	53	#	3	9	11	3	#	7	20	#
Colonization	29	3	#	#	13	#	#	#	13	#
Urban Zones	8	#	#	1	2	1	#	#	4	#

^aFor Heads of Family, Hectares Affected and Hectares Distributed, see Appendix W. For methods and sources, see Table 8. Excludes data given in Appendix U.

^bDetail may not add to totals in Appendix W because of rounding.

Source: Bolivia, Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria, Departamento de Estadística, "Número de Títulos Ejecutoriales y Superficies Entregados a Partir de Mayo de 1955 al 31 de Agosto de 1967."

APPENDIX AA

CUMULATIVE HEADS OF FAMILY BENEFITTED BY LAND
REFORM IN VENEZUELA, 1963 AND 1968

State	1963		1968	
	Official	Revised	Official	†Revised
Total	66 428	46 204	162 141	113 064
Amazonas	#	#	#	#
Anzoátegui	2 512	1 345	7 479	4 539
Apure	973	1 004	2 656	2 553
Aragua	2 040	1 768	4 810	4 159
Barinas	2 065	1 191	9 473	5 474
Bolívar	1 795	1 432	4 547	3 740
Carabobo	5 131	3 890	9 533	6 446
Cojedes	1 330	906	6 578	3 999
Delta Amacuro	1 830	1 090	2 552	1 660
Distrito Federal	364	321	1 108	897
Falcón	2 678	1 520	6 834	4 496
Guárico	3 248	1 464	10 109	4 771
Lara	2 775	2 358	7 550	5 843
Mérida	2 776	1 686	5 703	4 045
Miranda	3 104	3 015	6 137	5 081
Monagas	5 327	3 375	10 808	7 328
Nueva Esparta	39	42	69	83
Portuguesa	7 388	4 321	14 934	8 781
Sucre	1 994	1 593	7 040	5 194
Táchira	1 545	762	2 597	1 574
Trujillo	3 277	2 473	6 267	4 665
Yaracuy	7 377	5 768	11 481	9 140
Zulia	6 860	4 880	23 876	18 566

†Includes official data for 1968.

Source: Appendices BB and CC.

APPENDIX BB

^aYEARLY OFFICIAL DATA ON VENEZUELAN PROVISIONAL TITLE DISTRIBUTION
TO HEADS OF FAMILY BY STATE, 1959-1968

State	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
Total	5 874	25 221	11 074	14 603	9 656	11 527	36 443	16 852	14 100	16 791
^b Amazonas	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
Anzoátegui	240	991	250	1 011	20	85	2 741	391	766	984
Apure	282	691	#	#	#	#	185	423	310	765
Aragua	283	916	698	138	5	375	972	413	980	30
Barinas	102	642	#	1 321	#	78	2 813	2 013	1 587	917
Bolívar	#	871	924	#	#	794	125	445	1 086	302
Carabobo	1 491	1 704	1 404	512	20	1 820	1 175	589	413	405
Cojedes	235	979	#	116	#	208	2 341	622	1 813	264
^b Delta Amacuro	#	525	34	#	1 271	#	474	#	248	#
Distrito Federal	#	364	#	#	#	#	744	#	#	#
Falcón	50	1 536	101	624	367	655	653	818	1 070	960
Guárico	219	1 597	167	879	386	1 020	3 496	1 874	280	191
Lara	154	1 286	303	957	75	534	2 029	495	500	1 217
Mérida	#	1 192	246	105	1 233	301	1 003	584	86	953
Miranda	#	1 068	1 126	781	129	480	2 085	118	230	120
Monagas	239	926	528	1 330	2 304	676	2 048	1 779	848	130
Nueva Esparta	#	39	#	#	#	30	#	#	#	#
Portuguesa	878	2 648	664	2 741	457	604	4 575	2 137	30	200
Sucre	396	1 294	247	#	57	103	2 313	327	1 596	707
Táchira	288	876	40	161	180	#	352	320	350	30
Trujillo	134	1 620	719	674	130	163	1 639	817	371	#
Yaracuy	566	2 288	1 954	997	1 572	708	1 794	929	242	431
Zulia	317	1 168	1 669	2 256	1 450	2 893	2 886	1 758	1 294	8 185

^aFor 1969 see Table 22; for 1970 see Appendix RR.

^bFederal Territory.

Source: Venezuela, IAN, *Reforma Agraria en las Entidades Federales, 1959-1967*; *idem*, *Memoria y Cuenta* (1968), and *idem*, *Entrega de Títulos, 1969*.

APPENDIX CC

YEARLY REVISED ESTIMATE OF VENEZUELAN PROVISIONAL TITLE DISTRIBUTION
TO HEADS OF FAMILY BY STATE, 1959-1967

State	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	Total
Total	4 423	17 594	9 263	8 702	6 222	6 130	19 255	13 341	11 343	96 273
† Amazonas	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
Anzoátegui	173	551	115	466	40	60	1 281	294	575	3 555
Apure	336	668	#	#	#	#	138	373	273	1 788
Aragua	206	711	636	151	64	308	771	380	902	4 129
Barinas	102	267	#	822	#	78	754	1 417	1 117	4 557
Bolívar	#	687	745	#	#	563	89	394	960	3 438
Carabobo	1 171	1 049	1 262	408	#	597	696	504	354	6 041
Cojedes	160	635	#	111	#	174	836	464	1 355	3 735
† Delta Amacuro	#	247	#	#	843	#	367	#	203	1 660
Distrito Federal	#	321	#	#	#	#	576	#	#	897
Falcón	20	808	78	394	220	88	487	624	817	3 536
Guárico	137	741	110	257	219	342	1 270	1 308	196	4 580
Lara	154	1 032	460	657	55	488	940	418	422	4 626
Mérida	#	1 002	190	103	391	14	813	505	74	3 092
Miranda	#	1 210	1 095	640	70	290	1 341	107	208	4 961
Monagas	212	728	582	348	1 505	106	1 604	1 451	692	7 228
Nueva Esparta	#	42	#	#	#	41	#	#	#	83
Portuguesa	467	2 050	541	1 192	71	352	2 230	1 655	23	8 581
Sucre	282	1 004	254	#	53	103	1 198	271	1 322	4 487
Táchira	209	305	40	100	108	#	232	263	287	1 544
Trujillo	134	1 091	600	446	202	112	1 059	702	319	4 665
Yaracuy	350	1 531	1 515	789	1 583	1 095	831	805	210	8 709
Zulia	310	914	1 040	1 818	798	1 319	1 742	1 406	1 034	10 381

†Federal Territory; corrects error in source titling for Delta Amacuro

Source: CENDES, *La Reforma Agraria en Venezuela*, II, p. a/36.

APPENDIX DD
VENEZUELAN POPULATION, SELECTED YEARS,
1948-1971

Part I				Part II		
Estimates 1948-1969				Census by State		
Year	Total	Year	Total	Department	1961	1971
1948	4 869 947	1963	8 143 138	Total	7 523 138	10 721 522
^a 1950	5 034 059	1964	8 426 799	† Amazonas	11 757	21 696
1958	6 878 738	1968	9 686 486	Anzoátegui	382 002	506 297
^a 1961	7 523 138	1969	10 035 435	Apure	117 577	164 705
				Aragua	313 274	543 170
				Barinas	139 271	231 046
				Bolívar	213 543	391 665
				Carabobo	381 636	659 339
				Cojedes	72 652	94 351
				† Delta Amacuro	33 979	48 139
				Distrito Federal	1 257 515	1 860 637
				Falcón	340 450	407 957
				Guárico	244 966	318 905
				Lara	489 140	671 410
				Mérida	270 668	347 095
				Miranda	492 349	856 272
				Monagas	246 217	298 239
				Nueva Esparta	89 492	118 830
				Portuguesa	203 707	297 047
				Sucre	401 992	469 004
				Táchira	399 163	511 346
				Trujillo	326 634	381 334
				Yaracuy	175 291	223 545
				Zulia	919 863	1 299 030

†Federal Territory.

Source: Venezuela, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos Nacionales, *Censo de Población, 1961*, B and C, p. 283; and for 1971 OAS, Instituto Interamericano de Estadística, *Boletín Estadístico* 87 (1972), p. 23. Excludes estimates of Indian jungle population (31 500) and population of island dependencies (861).

^aCensus, see Part II below for source.

Source: Venezuela, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos Nacionales, *Anuario Estadístico* (1957-1963), I, pp. 117, 134, 137, 152.

APPENDIX EE

HECTARES DISTRIBUTED IN VENEZUELA WITH PROVISIONAL TITLE
BY STATE IN PRESIDENTIAL PERIODS

State	^a 1959-1963	1964-1968	Accumulated	1969	Accumulated
^b Total	1 974 979	2 520 776	4 495 755	109 838	4 605 594
Amazonas	#	#	#	#	#
Anzoategui	38 503	78 022	116 525	2 145	118 670
Apure	291 167	70 377	361 544	16 818	378 362
Aragua	38 459	48 241	86 700	4 300	91 000
Barinas	287 985	213 708	501 693	7 500	509 193
Bolívar	54 161	64 858	119 019	4 107	123 126
Carabobo	104 289	104 427	208 716	2 500	211 216
Cojedes	43 883	137 519	181 402	7 241	188 643
Delta Amacuro	37 229	114 538	151 767	#	151 767
Distrito Federal	11 450	10 597	22 047	293	22 340
Falcón	41 102	122 534	163 634	1 400	165 034
Guárico	153 760	147 574	301 334	8 481	309 815
Lara	64 226	74 717	138 943	12 791	151 734
Mérida	54 310	34 334	88 644	350	88 994
Miranda	54 849	39 913	94 762	4 020	98 782
Monagas	113 353	187 892	301 245	4 603	305 848
Nueva Esparta	617	322	939	#	939
Portuguesa	132 819	130 135	262 958	3 084	266 042
Sucre	57 091	70 379	127 470	960	128 430
Táchira	57 980	22 120	80 100	11 430	91 530
Trujillo	55 075	87 253	142 328	7 318	149 646
Yaracuy	117 145	55 493	172 638	1 788	174 426
Zulia	165 551	705 824	871 375	8 708	880 083

^aCf. unrevised official total in Venezuela, IAN, *La Reforma Agraria en las Entidades Federales, 1959-1963*.

^bDetail may not add to total because of rounding. *Official data*.

Source: Appendix FF and GG. See also Appendices RR and VV. Cf. Appendix PP.

APPENDIX FF

YEARLY PROVISIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF VENEZUELA'S PUBLIC HECTARES BY STATE, 1959-1969

State	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
†Total	275 460	440 789	65 865	47 178	141 628	96 210	400 541	310 459	277 105	640 536	17 162
Amazonas	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
Anzoátegui	4 500	16 770	#	1 706	#	#	20 609	6 915	6 000	8 914	#
Apure	120 000	67 167	#	#	#	#	#	5 200	12 400	35 961	#
Aragua	702	9 249	1 052	#	#	#	#	800	8 246	#	#
Barinas	5 450	76 800	#	#	#	#	#	58 800	38 249	20 000	6 000
Bolívar	#	29 700	20 720	#	#	9 032	3 007	12 560	31 000	3 890	4 107
Carabobo	6 380	1 868	9 635	698	#	7 585	#	#	#	#	#
Cojedes	7 800	24 300	#	2 583	#	2 500	69 460	13 861	16 700	3 749	#
Delta Amacuro	#	22 113	544	#	14 572	#	31 000	#	83 538	#	#
Distrito Federal	#	2 750	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
Falcón	500	5 170	#	2 000	3 434	10 820	45 583	11 500	25 367	8 000	1 000
Guárico	934	51 170	2 000	7 850	10 304	9 050	44 528	18 166	3 800	#	#
Lara	10 000	15 565	#	160	#	#	6 512	#	#	#	#
Mérida	#	16 246	4 167	260	30 904	3 762	9 300	#	#	10 050	350
Miranda	#	900	#	#	#	#	5 980	#	#	#	#
Monagas	25 000	13 140	3 660	17 348	29 487	10 519	41 438	103 272	14 200	#	820
Nueva Esparta	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
Portuguesa	30 608	17 805	597	5 381	#	6 585	49 230	19 200	#	#	#
Sucre	23 000	20 000	1 017	#	#	#	27 517	800	20 330	5 636	#
Táchira	17 250	9 622	#	3 661	#	#	12 005	#	#	#	2 625
Trujillo	230	9 820	3 934	432	#	#	7 522	45 595	#	#	#
Yaracuy	21 106	10 985	419	#	25 533	6 912	#	150	#	#	#
Zulia	2 000	19 649	18 120	5 100	27 395	29 444	26 850	13 640	17 275	544 336	2 260

†Detail may not add to totals because of rounding. *Official data.*

Source: See Table 18; for data on 1970, see Appendix RR.

APPENDIX GG

YEARLY PROVISIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF VENEZUELA'S PRIVATE HECTARES BY STATE, 1959-1969

State	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
†Total	185 309	460 034	115 027	214 313	29 375	106 653	383 709	134 998	102 895	67 669	92 676
Amazonas	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
Anzoátegui	#	6 223	2 611	6 613	80	6 156	14 744	1 459	7 921	5 300	2 145
Apure	10 000	94 000	#	#	#	#	6 816	10 000	#	#	16 818
Aragua	2 664	11 619	6 899	6 250	23	5 922	12 660	2 317	17 696	600	4 300
Barinas	80 000	112 000	#	13 734	#	782	82 226	2 781	2 500	8 370	1 500
Bolívar	#	600	3 140	#	#	80	#	#	4 450	840	#
Carabobo	2 312	50 750	14 432	18 133	80	61 220	15 513	4 245	7 966	7 898	2 500
Cojedes	#	9 200	#	#	#	650	4 559	795	25 245	#	7 241
Delta Amacuro	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
Distrito Federal	#	8 700	#	#	#	#	10 597	#	#	#	294
Falcón	#	15 964	336	13 573	125	160	5 468	2 816	4 970	7 850	400
Guárico	70 000	4 455	513	6 534	#	5 093	39 035	24 239	1 900	1 763	8 481
Lara	1 200	15 777	3 248	16 778	1 500	6 067	25 599	7 939	4 985	23 613	12 791
Mérida	#	1 398	#	1 050	285	72	3 881	4 994	650	1 625	#
Miranda	#	19 584	19 071	10 454	4 841	7 113	23 392	941	1 811	676	4 020
Monagas	1 118	9 972	3 193	3 367	7 068	249	13 534	1 418	2 002	1 260	3 783
Nueva Esparta	#	617	#	#	#	322	#	#	#	#	#
Portuguesa	#	33 043	15 349	25 444	4 592	1 764	28 769	22 062	250	2 275	3 084
Sucre	#	9 400	3 334	#	340	1 448	3 802	2 034	7 381	1 431	960
Táchira	1 515	17 644	800	256	7 232	#	2 400	4 000	3 334	381	8 805
Trujillo	10 000	13 480	6 370	8 840	1 949	1 534	21 336	8 142	3 124	#	7 318
Yaracuy	5 100	10 721	29 253	13 168	860	1 804	25 571	15 771	1 773	3 512	1 788
Zulia	1 400	14 888	6 477	70 121	400	6 215	43 807	19 045	4 937	275	6 448

†Detail may not add to total because of rounding. *Official data.*

Source: See Table 18.

APPENDIX HH
LAND USE IN VENEZUELA ACCORDING TO AGRICULTURAL
AND RANCHING CENSUS OF 1961

State	Informants	^a Area Censused	Public	^b Private
^c Total	^d 315 287	26 002 228	^e 2 662 679	23 292 998
Amazonas	400	20 316	18 873	1 444
Anzoátegui	15 888	1 640 796	81 139	1 559 658
Apure	6 462	4 423 770	490 672	3 933 098
Aragua	8 296	569 651	15 430	554 220
Barinas	12 702	2 027 913	187 571	1 840 342
Bolívar	8 131	2 772 965	214 428	2 558 537
Carabobo	12 663	416 739	37 569	379 170
Cojedes	6 079	1 368 343	29 982	1 338 361
Delta Amacuro	2 886	64 415	32 011	32 404
Distrito Federal	2 583	60 645	2 124	58 521
Falcón	16 039	850 452	17 855	832 597
Guárico	15 292	4 124 923	233 686	3 891 237
Lara	19 140	1 032 309	53 675	978 634
Mérida	26 928	665 766	83 924	531 842
Miranda	17 970	592 600	50 120	542 481
Monagas	14 845	847 128	119 113	727 996
Nueva Esparta	2 172	21 897	304	21 593
Portuguesa	16 956	681 861	113 245	572 064
Sucre	27 915	331 066	114 415	216 650
Táchira	26 006	784 230	115 803	628 427
Trujillo	26 012	462 095	45 302	416 793
Yaracuy	14 919	363 182	71 495	291 686
Zulia	15 003	1 879 167	493 923	1 385 244

^aHectares may not add to total because of rounding.

^bCorrects some errors in source, but there may still be an error of about .2 per cent.

^cExcludes island dependencies.

^dEach informant may own more than one plot.

^eIncludes lands administered by the IAN.

Source: Venezuela, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos Nacionales, *Censo Agropecuario, 1961*, A, pp. 2-8.

APPENDIX II
VENEZUELAN CLASSIFICATION OF LAND SUBJECT
TO EXPROPRIATION UNDER THE LAND REFORM
REGULATORY LAW

A. Land Classification

Categories	Points	^{a,b} Minimum Social- Function Hectares
First	90-100	- 150
Second	80-89	151- 200
Third	70-79	201- 300
Fourth	60-69	301- 500
Fifth	50-59	501-1,000
Sixth	40-49	1,001-1,750
Seventh	Less than 40	1,751-5,000

B. Factors (with weights totaling 1.00)

Soil Conditions (0-100 points each component):

.04 weighted factors = .40

- | | |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. Type | 6. Texture |
| 2. Thickness | 7. Organic content |
| 3. p.H. | 8. Nitrogen content |
| 4. Salinity | 9. Phosphorus content |
| 5. Capacity for
base interchange | 10. Potassium content |

Topographic Conditions (0-100 points each component):

.10 weighted factors = .30

- | | |
|------------------|------------------|
| 1. Average level | 3. Discontinuity |
| 2. Drainage | |

Climate and Water (0-100 points each component):

.10 weighted factors = .20

- | | |
|-------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1. Climatic index | 2. Surface irrigation
water |
|-------------------|--------------------------------|

Market Accessibility (0-100 points each component)

.05 weighted factors = .10

- | | |
|-------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1. Transport time | 2. Quality of
communication |
|-------------------|--------------------------------|

^aNot subject to expropriation, even when a larger estate that fulfills a social function is divided because of special demographic pressures (Article 27 of the Land Reform Law).

^bExcept, however, that in dry or flood zones the IAN may fix the minimum higher if necessary; and in high-density population zones or areas of special hydraulic resources the IAN may reduce the minimum by 33 or 50 per cent (Articles 29 and 30 of the Land Reform Law).

Source: Articles 238-248 of the Regulatory Law which is printed, with the Land Reform Law, in Miguel Angel Hernández O., *Legislación Agraria Venezolana* (Caracas: Instituto Nacional Agrario, 1969).

APPENDIX JJ

RATIO BY STATE OF (A) PER CENT OF CUMULATIVE HECTARES PROVISIONALLY
DISTRIBUTED TO (B) PER CENT OF MALES EMPLOYED IN
VENEZUELAN AGRICULTURE IN 1961

(Hectares as a rounded percentage of males agriculturally employed)

State	1963			1968		
	Hectares	Males	Ratio	Hectares	Males	Ratio
Total	100.0	100.0	**	100.0	100.0	**
Amazonas	#	.2	**	#	.2	**
Anzoátegui	1.9	4.7	.4	2.6	4.7	.6
Apure	14.7	2.8	5.3	8.1	2.8	2.9
Aragua	1.9	3.2	.6	1.9	3.2	.6
Barinas	14.6	3.6	4.1	11.2	3.6	3.1
Bolívar	2.7	2.6	1.0	2.7	2.6	1.0
Carabobo	5.3	3.5	1.5	4.6	3.5	1.3
Cojedes	2.2	1.8	1.2	4.0	1.8	2.2
Delta Amacuro	1.9	.9	2.1	3.4	.9	3.8
Distrito Federal	.6	1.3	.5	.5	1.3	.4
Falcón	2.1	4.7	.4	3.6	4.7	.8
Guárico	7.8	5.2	1.5	6.7	5.2	1.3
Lara	3.3	7.4	.4	3.1	7.4	.4
Mérida	2.8	6.6	.4	2.0	6.6	.3
Miranda	2.8	4.8	.6	2.1	4.8	.4
Monagas	5.7	4.7	1.2	6.7	4.7	1.4
Nueva Esparta	#	.8	**	#	.8	**
Portuguesa	6.8	5.6	1.2	5.8	5.6	1.0
Sucre	2.9	8.0	.4	2.8	8.0	.4
Táchira	2.9	7.8	.4	1.8	7.8	.2
Trujillo	2.8	7.4	.4	3.2	7.4	.4
Yaracuy	5.9	4.0	1.5	3.8	4.0	1.0
Zulia	8.4	8.4	1.0	19.4	8.4	2.3

Source: Calculated from Appendix EE; percentage of males employed in agricultures is calculated from Table 30. For explanation of ratio, see Table 14. Hectares are *official* data.

APPENDIX KK

CUMULATIVE HEADS OF FAMILY PROVISIONALLY BENEFITTED BY LAND REFORM
AS A PERCENTAGE OF AGRICULTURALLY EMPLOYED
VENEZUELAN POPULATION IN 1961

State	†Agriculturally Employed Population 1961	Cumulative Percentage			
		1963		1968	
		Official	Revised	Official	Revised
Total	759 322	8.7	6.1	21.4	14.9
Amazonas	1 465	#	#	#	#
Anzoátegui	35 540	7.1	3.8	21.0	12.8
Apure	21 497	4.5	4.7	12.4	11.9
Aragua	24 121	8.5	7.3	19.9	17.2
Barinas	27 381	7.5	4.3	34.6	20.0
Bolívar	19 897	9.0	7.2	22.9	18.8
Carabobo	26 729	19.2	14.6	35.7	24.1
Cojedes	13 605	9.8	6.7	48.3	29.4
Delta Amacuro	6 452	28.4	16.9	39.6	25.7
Distrito Federal	9 843	3.7	3.3	11.3	9.1
Falcón	37 287	7.2	4.1	18.3	12.1
Guárico	39 878	8.1	3.7	25.3	12.0
Lara	56 099	4.9	4.2	13.5	10.4
Mérida	50 040	5.5	3.4	11.4	8.1
Miranda	38 218	8.1	7.9	16.1	13.3
Monagas	35 468	15.0	9.5	30.5	20.7
Nueva Esparta	6 342	.6	.7	1.1	1.3
Portuguesa	42 327	17.5	10.2	35.3	20.7
Sucre	59 895	3.3	2.7	11.8	8.7
Táchira	58 876	2.6	1.3	4.4	2.7
Trujillo	55 433	5.9	4.5	11.3	8.4
Yaracuy	30 580	24.1	18.9	37.5	29.9
Zulia	62 349	11.0	7.8	38.3	29.8

†Includes silviculture, hunting, ranching, and fishing; data are for employed and unemployed persons.

Source: Appendix AA; data on agriculturally employed population are from Venezuela, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos Nacionales, *Censo de Población, 1961*, A, pp 198-199.

APPENDIX LL
YEARLY DEFINITIVE DISTRIBUTION OF INDIVIDUAL TITLES
TO HEADS OF FAMILY BY VENEZUELAN STATE

State	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
^a Total	2 306	3 534	3 589	3 732	1 478	7 638	^b 8 910	3 722
Amazonas	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
Anzoátegui	#	299	55	80	240	344	499	59
Apure	#	#	#	#	#	60	88	#
Aragua	503	36	#	#	118	453	330	197
Barinas	#	#	#	110	141	182	629	146
Bolívar	292	#	334	#	76	#	269	307
Carabobo	#	633	#	#	#	430	751	256
Cojedes	#	#	#	422	#	286	305	219
Delta Amacuro	#	#	334	239	#	#	#	#
Distrito Federal	#	#	#	#	#	#	129	470
Falcón	#	121	#	221	#	159	152	133
Guárico	180	185	157	404	#	111	337	103
Lara	#	139	519	#	129	534	441	226
Mérida	#	#	#	451	#	252	292	141
Miranda	#	#	644	167	105	55	811	304
Monagas	#	504	703	503	87	1 414	500	437
Nueva Esparta	#	44	#	21	#	#	#	#
Portuguesa	946	199	#	148	204	846	1 066	245
Sucre	#	#	#	93	#	650	974	243
Táchira	#	#	#	33	#	#	212	36
Trujillo	#	#	#	#	48	407	560	#
Yaracuy	#	1 374	806	200	247	1 009	361	#
Zulia	385	#	37	640	83	446	572	250

^aFor 1970 see Appendix TT.

^bUnrevised detail add to 9 278.

Source: See Table 33. CENDES (1962-1967) and official (1968-1969) data.

APPENDIX MM

YEARLY DEFINITIVE DISTRIBUTION OF COLLECTIVE
TITLES TO HEADS OF FAMILY BY
VENEZUELAN STATE

State	^a 1967	1968	1969
^b Total	412	132	603
Amazonas	#	#	#
Anzoátegui	#	#	#
Apure	#	#	#
Aragua	20	36	22
Barinas	#	#	#
Bolívar	#	#	#
Carabobo	117	31	241
Cojedes	#	#	#
Delta Amacuro	#	#	#
Distrito Federal	#	#	#
Falcón	#	#	69
Guárico	#	#	#
Lara	110	#	20
Mérida	23	#	54
Miranda	#	#	#
Monagas	81	45	112
Nueva Esparta	#	#	#
Portuguesa	#	#	#
Sucre	46	20	85
Táchira	#	#	#
Trujillo	15	#	#
Yaracuy	#	#	#
Zulia	#	#	#

^aNone prior to 1967.

^bFor 1970 see Appendix TT.

Source: Table 33. CENDES (1967) and official (1968-1969) data.

APPENDIX NN

VENEZUELA'S IAN CENSUS OF PEASANTS
WORKING ITS LANDS IN 1969

Number of Schedules Processed	^a 121 845
Number of Plots Censused	108 444
Total Heads of Family Actually	
Occupying Land	95 320
Peasants Working Individual	
Titled Plots	^b 23 107
Peasants Working Collectively	
Titled Lands	^c 2 184
Peasants Working Lands Held	
Provisionally or without Title	
(<i>en precario</i>)	70 029

^aTable I-1 in source below.

^bIncluding 6 096 *ocupantes en precario* working titled land that has been abandoned, ceded, or vacated by death of original beneficiary.

^cIncluding 379 *ocupantes en precario* (see note b, above).

Source: Venezuela, IAN, *Resultados del Programa de Investigación de la Tenencia* (3 vols.; Caracas, 1970), I, Table I-2, except for note a, above.

APPENDIX OO

^aESTIMATE OF TOTAL IAN BENEFICIARIES
BY 1969, BASED UPON VENEZUELA'S
IAN CENSUS

Number of Schedules Processed	^b 121 845
Less Peasants Working More than One Plot	^c 10 256
Less Duplicate Schedules for Titled Lands Occupied Provisionally Following Abandonment, Cession, or Death of Original Beneficiary	^d 7 302
Estimate of Total Beneficiaries	104 287

^aDoes not take into account abandonment of land by any beneficiaries.

^bFrom Appendix NN.

^cFrom Tables II-6, II-7, and IV-1 in source below.

^dCalculated as the difference between (i) distribution of total individual definitive titles and (ii) peasants actually working such lands in 1969. Calculation is based on Tables II-3 and II-2, respectively, in source below.

Source: Calculations based upon Venezuela, IAN, *Resultados del Programa de Investigación de la Tenencia*, I.

APPENDIX PP

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF VENEZUELA'S HECTARES
EFFECTIVELY OCCUPIED BY IAN
RECIPIENTS, 1969

^a Total	1 254 027
Hectares Worked by Heads of Family with Individual Titles	^b 260 513
Hectares Worked by Heads of Family with Collective Title	^c 31 814
Hectares Worked by Heads of Family with Provisional Title	961 700

^aIAN calculations based upon multiplication of number of recipients times their average occupancy of hectares.

^bIncludes 71 153 hectares held by *ocupantes en precario*.

^cIncludes 830 hectares held by *ocupantes en precario*.

Source: For IAN definitions and source, see Appendix NN above; and Venezuela, IAN, *Resultados del Programa de Investigación de la Tenencia*, pp. 1, 6 (in chapter on "Análisis de los Resultados del Programa de Investigación de la Tenencia"), and Table 1-3, Cf. Appendix EE.

APPENDIX QQ

COMPARISON OF CENDES AND IAN DATA ON DEFINITIVE TITLE
GRANTED TO HEADS OF FAMILY IN VENEZUELA

Year	Total		Individual		Collective	
	CENDES	^a IAN	CENDES	IAN	CENDES	IAN
1959	**	**	**	**	**	**
1960	**	**	**	**	**	**
1961	**	**	**	**	**	**
1962	2 306	2 913	2 306	2 913	#	#
1963	3 534	3 236	3 534	3 236	#	#
1964	3 589	2 863	3 589	2 863	#	#
1965	3 732	2 658	3 732	2 658	#	#
1966	1 478	1 580	1 478	1 580	#	#
1967	8 050	7 571	7 638	7 432	412	139
1968	^b 9 042	8 696	8 910	8 584	132	112
1969	^b 4 325	3 120	3 722	1 085	603	2 035

^aExcludes 87 recipients for which there is no information by year, 58 individual. For 1970 see Appendix TT.

^bOfficial data (in contrast with CENDES data).

Source: Table 33 above; and Venezuela, IAN, *Resultados del Programa de Investigación de la Tenencia*, I, Tables II-3 and III-6.

APPENDIX RR

VENEZUELAN OFFICIAL DATA ON HEADS OF FAMILY
BENEFITTED AND HECTARES PROVISIONALLY
DISTRIBUTED BY STATE, 1970

State	Families	Hectares
Total	12 204	408 604
Amazonas	#	#
Anzoátegui	630	10 562
Apure	342	19 650
Aragua	380	20 147
Barinas	750	48 948
Bolívar	546	39 415
Carabobo	33	450
Cojedes	63	3 670
Delta Amacuro	761	15 172
Distrito Federal	#	#
Falcón	#	#
Guárico	1 706	124 375
Lara	541	9 900
Mérida	737	9 785
Miranda	418	6 000
Monagas	397	6 842
Nueva Esparta	#	#
Portuguesa	2 280	43 209
Sucre	171	2 602
Táchira	259	9 040
Trujillo	182	1 089
Yaracuy	913	15 610
Zulia	1 095	22 137

Source: Venezuela, IAN, *Memoria y Cuenta*, (1970), p. 114; for earlier data see Table 22 and Appendices BB and FF.

APPENDIX SS

OFFICIAL DATA BY STATE ON PROVISIONAL
DISTRIBUTION OF VENEZUELAN PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE LANDS, 1970

State	†Hectares	
	Public	Private
Total	288 631	119 973
Amazonas	#	#
Anzoátegui	7 508	3 054
Apure	15 900	3 750
Aragua	#	20 147
Barinas	37 601	11 347
Bolívar	35 762	3 653
Carabobo	#	450
Cojedes	#	3 670
Delta Amacuro	15 172	#
Distrito Federal	#	#
Falcón	#	#
Guárico	103 944	20 431
Lara	#	9 900
Mérida	9 785	#
Miranda	#	6 000
Monagas	#	6 842
Nueva Esparta	#	#
Portuguesa	40 000	3 209
Sucre	#	2 602
Táchira	#	9 040
Trujillo	#	1 089
Yaracuy	10 035	5 575
Zulia	12 924	9 213

†For earlier figures, see Table 26.

Source: See Appendix RR.

APPENDIX TT
DEFINITIVE TITLES AND HECTARES GRANTED TO HEADS OF FAMILY
INDIVIDUALLY AND COLLECTIVELY IN VENEZUELA BY
STATE, 1969-1970

(Official Figures)

State	1969				1970			
	Individual		Collective		Individual		Collective	
	^a Families	^b Hectares	^a Families	^b Hectares	^a Families	^b Hectares	^a Families	^b Hectares
Total	3 772	36 512	603	14 483	5 921	72 513	1 114	39 400
Amazonas	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
Anzoátegui	59	736	#	#	795	10 442	99	2 970
Apure	#	#	#	#	19	375	86	4 118
Aragua	197	1 004	22	180	246	2 571	51	2 420
Barinas	146	1 830	#	#	159	4 486	#	#
Bolívar	307	4 807	#	#	148	2 804	#	#
Carabobo	256	1 556	241	11 391	427	2 721	313	6 541
Cojedes	219	3 085	#	#	236	2 967	#	#
Delta Amacuro	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
Distrito Federal	470	2 576	#	#	#	#	#	#
Falcón	133	1 017	69	1 447	152	1 695	39	1 560
Guárico	103	1 926	#	#	392	7 538	#	#
Lara	226	1 646	20	115	384	3 746	#	#
Mérida	141	1 095	54	467	339	2 437	#	#
Miranda	304	3 824	#	#	187	2 470	#	#
Monagas	437	4 489	112	363	507	6 916	#	#
Nueva Esparta	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
Portuguesa	245	3 461	#	#	438	5 262	#	#
Sucre	243	1 325	85	521	127	850	22	800
Táchira	36	590	#	#	42	662	392	19 818
Trujillo	#	#	#	#	396	4 132	#	#
Yaracuy	#	#	#	#	631	6 716	112	1 173
Zulia	250	1 546	#	#	296	3 722	#	#

^aFor earlier data, see Appendices LL and MM.

^bData on hectares available beginning only in 1969.

Source: Venezuela, IAN, *Entrega de Títulos, 1969*, p. 1; and *idem*, *Memoria y Cuenta (1970)*, p. 118.

APPENDIX UU

TOTAL VENEZUELAN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LANDS
DEFINITELY DISTRIBUTED TO
HEADS OF FAMILY, 1970

†(Official Data)

Origin of Land	Heads of Family	Hectares
Total	7 035	111 912
Public	2 488	37 092
Private	4 547	74 820

†Data in source not broken down by state; no data available for earlier years.

Source: Venezuela, IAN, *Memoria y Cuenta* (1970), p. 119.

APPENDIX VV

YEARLY TOTALS OF VENEZUELA'S PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE LAND PROVISIONALLY DISTRIBUTED,
1959-1970

†(Official data in Hectares)

Year	Public	Private
1959	275 460	185 309
1960	440 789	460 034
1961	65 865	115 027
1962	47 178	214 314
1963	141 628	29 375
1964	96 210	106 653
1965	400 541	383 709
1966	310 459	134 998
1967	277 105	102 895
1968	640 536	67 669
1969	17 162	92 676
1970	288 631	119 973

†For AD totals by presidential period, see Table 26 and Appendix EE.

Source: Venezuela, IAN, *Reforma Agraria en Venezuela, 1964*, p. 122; *idem, Reforma Agraria en las Entidades Federales, 1959-1967*, p. 2; *idem, Memoria y Cuenta* (yearly, 1964-1968, 1970); and *idem, Entrega de Títulos, 1969*. Breakdown for 1969 prepared for me by IAN's División de Tenencia, Oficina de Dotaciones Campesinas.

APPENDIX WW

†YEARLY VENEZUELAN OFFICIAL DATA ON
DISTRIBUTION OF PROVISIONAL TITLE
TO HEADS OF FAMILY ON PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE LANDS,
1963-1970

Year	Public	Private
1963	33 820	32 608
1964	5 491	6 036
1965	17 495	18 948
1966	8 213	8 639
1967	6 486	7 614
1968	12 460	4 331
1969	423	3 799
1970	8 114	4 060

†For AD totals by presidential period, see Table 19. No data available for 1959-1962.

Source: Appendix VV.

APPENDIX XX

CHARACTERISTICS OF PEASANTS ACTUALLY WORKING IAN LANDS IN VENEZUELA, 1969

Category	Total	Titled Lands		Provisionally or Illegally Held Land
		Individual	Collective	
Heads of Family:				
Working Without IAN Authorization (Per Cent)	80.3	6.4	.4	73.5
Having Received Credit from the Agricultural Bank (Per Cent)	20.6	34.0	#	16.0
Average Age (Rounded)	43	45	43	43
Average Size of Plot (Rounded Hectares)	13	11	11	15

Source: Venezuela, IAN, *Resultados del Programa de Investigacion de la Tenencia*, I, Tables I-2, I-4.

APPENDIX YY

IAN CENSUS RESULTS OF PEASANTS WORKING
ON IAN LANDS BY VENEZUELAN STATE,
1969

(In Per Cent)

State	Heads of Family in 1969	†Schedules Processed	
		Total by 1969	For 1968
Total	^a 100.0	^b 100.0	^c 100.0
Amazonas	.2	.2	.1
Anzoátegui	5.0	5.2	6.3
Apure	2.2	1.9	1.8
Aragua	3.5	3.2	3.5
Barinas	4.0	3.8	6.5
Bolívar	4.2	4.0	4.7
Carabobo	8.2	8.5	5.4
Cojedes	1.5	1.5	2.4
Delta Amacuro	2.9	2.7	2.2
Distrito Federal	1.1	1.0	1.2
Falcón	2.9	2.8	1.6
Guárico	3.3	3.3	3.7
Lara	4.4	4.4	2.8
Mérida	4.0	3.6	4.8
Miranda	7.2	7.5	7.4
Monagas	4.7	5.6	5.1
Nueva Esparta	.1	.1	#
^d Portuguesa	9.1	8.9	8.8
Sucre	4.0	4.1	7.1
Táchira	2.4	2.0	2.0
Trujillo	5.2	4.7	6.0
Yaracuy	8.0	8.9	5.9
Zulia	11.9	12.1	10.6

†Includes peasants working more than one plot; duplicate schedules for titled lands occupied provisionally following abandonment, cession, or death of original beneficiary; and schedules for abandoned lands. See also Appendices NN and OO.

^aFor absolute total (95 320) see Appendix NN.

^bFor absolute total (121 845) see Appendix NN.

^cAbsolute total is 17 865.

^dSee also Table II-5 in source, below.

Source: Venezuela, IAN, *Resultados del Programa de Investigación de la Tenencia*, Vols. II and III, by state: Tables I-1, I-2, II-3, II-10, III-6, and IV-4.

APPENDIX ZZ

RATIO BY POLITICAL DIVISION OF (A) HECTARES DISTRIBUTED IN
RELATION TO (B) PER CENT OF ILLITERATE POPULATION
AGE 5 AND OVER IN BOLIVIA AND VENEZUELA

†(Hectares as a rounded percentage of illiteracy)

Bolivia				Venezuela			
Department	Hectares 1964	Illiterate 1950	Ratio	States	Hectares 1968	Illiterate 1961	Ratio
Total	100.0	100.0	**	Total	100.0	100.0	**
Beni	9.2	1.8	5.1	Amazonas	#	.2	**
Chuquisaca	13.5	11.4	1.2	Anzoátegui	2.6	5.3	.5
Cochabamba	15.6	17.0	.9	Apure	8.1	2.0	4.1
La Paz	20.8	31.0	.7	Aragua	1.9	3.7	.5
Oruro	7.0	6.2	1.1	Barinas	11.2	2.4	4.7
Pando	.1	.5	.2	Bolívar	2.7	2.6	1.0
Potosí	17.8	21.6	.8	Carabobo	4.6	4.7	1.0
Santa Cruz	10.6	6.8	1.6	Cojedes	4.0	1.3	3.1
Tarija	5.4	3.7	1.5	Delta Amacuro	3.4	.5	6.8
				Distrito Federal	.5	9.3	.1
				Falcón	3.6	5.1	.7
				Guárico	6.7	4.0	1.7
				Lara	3.1	7.7	.4
				Mérida	2.0	4.7	.4
				Miranda	2.1	5.5	.4
				Monagas	6.7	3.7	1.8
				Nueva Esparta	#	1.3	**
				Portuguesa	5.8	3.7	1.6
				Sucre	2.8	6.4	.4
				Táchira	1.8	5.8	.3
				Trujillo	3.2	5.8	.6
				Yaracuy	3.8	3.0	1.3
				Zulia	19.4	11.3	1.7

†For explanation of ratios, see Table 14.

Source:

- (A) Table 14; original data.
- (B) Bolivia, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos, *Censo Demográfico, 1950*, p. 115. Absolute total = 1 569 989 or 68.9 per cent of the population age 5 and over. See Table 50.

†For explanation of ratios, see Table 14.

Source:

- (A) Table 28; official, provisional data.
- (B) Venezuela, Dirección General de Estadística y Censos Nacionales, *Censo de Población, 1961*, pp. 20-21, 89. Absolute total = 2 898 111 or 47.1 per cent of the population age 5 and over. See Table 50.

